Quantcast
Channel: POLITICAL & CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW BLOG
Viewing all 486 articles
Browse latest View live

case digest

$
0
0


G.R. No. 130191                  April 27, 1998
Rodrigo R. Duterte and Benjamin C. De Guzman, petitioners, 
vs.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan, respondent.


Facts
            In 1990, the the Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the City government of Davao. The Computerization Program Committee recommended the acquisition of Goldstar computers manufactured by Goldstar Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea and exclusively distributed in the Philippines by Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI). After obtaining prior clearance from COA Auditor Kintanar, the Committee proceeded to negotiate with SPI.
            Sometime in February 1991, a complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, by Dean Pilar Braga, Hospicio Conanan, Jr., and Korsung Dabaw Foundation, Inc. against the petitioners, the City Council, various City Officials and SPI for the judicial declaration of nullity of the aforestated resolutions and ordinances and the computer contract executed pursuant thereto. On February 22, 1991, Goldstar, through its agent, Mr. S.Y. Lee sent a proposal to petitioner Duterte for the cancellation of the computerization contract. On May 6, 1991, petitioner Duterte, in behalf of Davao City, and SPI mutually rescinded the contract and the downpayment was duly refunded.
            On August 1, 1991, the Anti-Graft League - Davao City, through one Miguel C. Enriquez, filed an unverified complaint with the Ombudsman – Mindanao against petitioners, the City Treasurer, City Auditor, the whole city government of Davao and SPI. The League alleged that the respondents, in entering into the computerization contract, violated R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), P.D. No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines), COA circulars and regulations, the Revised Penal Code and other pertinent laws.
            Petitioners allege that the Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration considering that petitioners were effectively deprived of their Right to a Preliminary Investigation pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule II of Administrative Order NO. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman); and assuming that a Preliminary Investigation was properly conducted, there was an inordinate delay in terminating the same thereby depriving them of their Right to Due Provess and Speedy Disposition of the case.


Issues
1.         Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their right to due process.
2.         Whether or not Mayor Duterte violated the R.A. No. 3019.

Ruling
1.         Yes.
.           The right to a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused of such right would be to deprive him of due process.
            Preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07. In November 12, 1991 Order of Graft Investigator Manriquez, petitioners were merely directed to submit a point-by-point comment under oath on the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 and on SAR No. 91-05. The said order was not accompanied by a single affidavit of any person charging petitioners of any offense as required by law. They were just required to comment upon the allegations in Civil Case No. 20,550-91 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City which had earlier been dismissed and on the COA Special Audit Report. Petitioners had no inkling that they were being subjected to a preliminary investigation as in fact there was no indication in the order that a preliminary investigation was being conducted. If Graft Investigator Manriquez had intended merely to adopt the allegations of the plaintiffs in the civil case or the Special Audit Report (whose recommendation for the cancellation of the contract in question had been complied with) as his bases for criminal prosecution, then the procedure was plainly anomalous and highly irregular. As a consequence, petitioners' constitutional right to due process was violated.
            Apparently, in the case at bar, the investigating officer considered the filing of petitioner's comment as a substantial compliance with the requirements of a preliminary investigation. Initially, Graft Investigator Manriquez directed the members of the Special Audit Team on 9 October 1991 to submit their affidavits relative to SAR No. 91-05. However, on 12 November 1991, before the affidavits were submitted, Manriquez required petitioners to submit their respective comments on the complaint in the civil case and on Special Audit Report (SAR) 91-05. Even when the required affidavits were filed by the audit team on 4 December 1991, petitioners were still not furnished copies thereof. The Ombudsman contends that failure to provide petitioners the complaint-affidavits is immaterial since petitioners were well aware of the existence of the civil complaint and SAR No. 91-05. We find the Ombudsman's reasoning flawed. The civil complaint and the COA Special Audit Report are not equivalent to the complaint-affidavits required by the rules. Moreover, long before petitioners were directed to file their comments, the civil complaint (Civil Case No. 20,550-91) was rendered moot and academic and, accordingly, dismissed following the mutual cancellation of the computerization contract. In SAR No. 91-05, on the other hand, petitioners were merely advised to rescind the subject contract — which was accomplished even before the audit report came out. In light of these circumstances, the Court cannot blame petitioners for being unaware of the proceedings conducted against them.
2.         There is no basis in law or in fact to charge petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; and (3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The second element of the crime — that the accused public officers entered into a contract in behalf of the government — is absent. The computerization contract was rescinded on May 6, 1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on May 31, 1991 and before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on  August 1, 1991. Hence, at that time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its Order on November 12, 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The contract, after May 6, 1991 became in contemplation of law, non-existent, as if no contract was ever executed.













G.R. No. 94284                    April 8, 1991
Ricardo C. Silverio, petitioner
vs.
The Court of Appeals, Hon. Benigno G. Gaviola, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and People of the Philippines, respondents

Facts
            On October 14, 1985, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On January 26, 1988, respondent People of the Philippines filed an urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. On April 4, 1988, the Regional Trial Court issued and order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel petititoner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent petitioner from leaving the country.

Issues
            Whether or not the cancellation of the petitioner’s passport violated his constitutional right to travel.

Ruling
            Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of “national security, public safety, or public health.”
            Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.
            Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

















 G.R. No. 193023                  June 22, 2011
National Power Corporation, petitioner
vs.
Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon and Maria Teresa Tuazon, respondents 



Facts

 

The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land in Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax purposes in the name of the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, the late Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power TL Project.  In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed. Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-of-way agreement with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and 21/100 PESOS (P26,978.21). The amount represents payments for “damaged improvements” (P23,970.00), “easement and tower occupancy fees” (P1,808.21), and “additional damaged improvements” (P1,200.00).

In 2002, the respondents filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar projects, were paid just compensation in sums ranging from P2,000.00 to P2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to the determination made by different branches of the RTC in Samar.

The herein petitioner filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellee’s Brief,NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of “just compensation” equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines.


Issue
            Whether or not the right-of-way easement instead of just compensation on the private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is valid.



Ruling

NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents herein just compensation and not only easement fee.

            Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
            Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.”




 






                       



G.R. No. L-15474                 August 31, 1960
Alfredo B. Saulo, petitioner
vs.
Brig. General Pelagio Cruz, ETC., respondent


Facts
After successfully evading arrest since September, 1950, in connection with three criminal cases (Nos. 13681, 19166 and 39253, CFI, Manila) one for inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, Alfredo B. Saulo, in whose behalf the present petition for a writ of habeas corpushas been presented, finally showed up at the Indonesian Embassy, Manila, on November 12, 1958, to seek refuge therein. As a result of negotiations had, the Indonesian Embassy surrendered him to the Philippine Government on November 18, 1958, since which date he has remained in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. One of the two criminal cases for rebellion having been dismissed with respect to him on motion of the prosecution, Saulo put up bail in the two remaining cases (Nos. 13681 and 39253). When the corresponding order for his temporary release was served, the herein respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary commanded one of his subordinates to with hold the release of Saulo on account of Criminal Case No. 46410 the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said criminal case is a complaint against Saulo, filed on November 19, 1958, by the Fiscal of Manila, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, punishable byprision mayorto death, so that the said Court of First Instance might conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation, as provided in the Act. While said preliminary investigation was still going on, that is, on December 23, 1958, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpuswith the Supreme Court, as already stated, on the ground that his detention, without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 46410, is illegal and void. Said court gave due course to the application and directed the respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file answer, returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Respondent filed answer, as directed, admitting practically all the facts above related and alleged in the application, with the plea that "the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410 for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila is sufficient reason for continuing the detention of the petitioner, in the absence of an order of the Court for his discharge under the case aforesaid."


Issues

            Whether or not denial of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is illegal and void.


Ruling

            Petitioner’s appeal has been filed out of time. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower court’s decision, denying the petition, was served upon petitioner’s counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriff's return). As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of judgment: Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas corpuscase shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals from the judgment rendered.
            The appeal is hereby dismissed.






















G.R. No. 191411                  July 15, 2013
Rafael L. Coscolluela,petitioner,
vs.
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines,respondents


Facts

Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for three (3) full terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.
           On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint dated November 7, 2001 from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
           Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits.
          On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares prepared a Resolution, finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the Information was prepared and signed by Cañares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro, came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
          Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.
          On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.
          In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 7, 2009, explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim.

                                                                                                          

Issues

            Whether or not the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of the petitioner was violated.



Ruling

The petitions are meritorious.
             First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely remains unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies”.   
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.























case digest

$
0
0


G.R. No. 83988  September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,

vs.

GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Issue:
                Whether or not the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures?
Ruling:
                The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.



















G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner,

vs.

 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.

Facts:

On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired “Prosti-tuition,” an episode of the television (TV) program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda.  It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.  In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed.  The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode.

                The showing of “The Inside Story” caused uproar in the PWU community.  Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints with petitioner MTRCB.  Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.

Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents  did not submit “The Inside Story” to petitioner for its review and  exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating Section 7 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986  and Section 3, Chapter III and Section 7, Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.

On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, the MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to pay the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of the program, subject of this case for review and approval of the MTRCB.

Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the ‘The Inside Story’ and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing; otherwise the Board will act accordingly.”

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City.  It seeks to:  declare as unconstitutional Sections 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4, 7, and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7, and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations;  (in the alternative) exclude the “The Inside Story” from the coverage of the above cited provisions; and  annul and set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April 14, 1993.  Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions constitute “prior restraint” on respondents’ exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the “The Inside Story” because it falls under the category of “public affairs program, news documentary, or socio-political editorials” governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers. The RTC rendered a decision in favour of the respondent.

Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including “public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials,” are subject to petitioner’s power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals; second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to “prior restraint;” and fourth, Section 3(b) of  P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents’ constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

Issue:

                Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “The Inside Story” prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television?

Ruling:

                Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos.  Thus, when the law says “all television programs,” the word “all” covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression.

                It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to review “The Inside Story.”  Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the press.  Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program.  Neither did it cancel respondents’ permit.  Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner “The Inside Story” for its review and approval.  Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.

Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTC’s ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional.  It is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.  The assailed RTC Decision dated November 18, 1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED.  The Decision dated March 12, 1993 of petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED.  Costs against respondents.



























G.R. No. 96131  September 6, 1991

CORAZON C. GONZAGA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCA PETITION CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner alleges in her present petition  that a complaint for malversation of public funds was filed against her, in her capacity as School Principal of the Malabon Municipal High School, Malabon, Metro Manila. The complaint was filed before the Ombudsman by the Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of Malabon, based on the audit report of the Commission on Audit, wherein petitioner as an accountable officer is alleged to have incurred a shortage of P15,188.37; that an information  dated 2 March 1990 was thereafter filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for the crime of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code;  that before she could be arraigned, accused-petitioner filed with respondent court a motion for re- investigation, which motion was denied by said court in its resolution dated 2 July 1990;  that on 17 August 1990, accused-petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged; and that on the same date, the prosecution filed a motion seeking to suspend, pendente lite, the accused as school principal of the above-named school,  on the basis of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 ("Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"), as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195.

The resolution dated 10 September 1990 granted the prosecutions motion to suspend the accused.

Issue:

                Whether or not the suspension of the petitioner under Section 13, Republic Act 3019 ("Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"), as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 valid?

Ruling:

                To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:

1.            Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.

2.            Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of Id Pres. Decree 807; 22 and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, 23 the continuance of his suspension shag be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan, dated 10 September 1990 and 30 October 1990, are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner may re-assume the position of school principal of the Malabon Municipal High School, Malabon Metro Manila without prejudice to the continuation of trial on the merits of the pending case against her in the Sandiganbayan, unless there are other supervening legal grounds which would prevent such re-assumption of office.






















[G.R. No. 93219. August 30, 1990.]
MARCELINO G. RIVERA, JR., Petitioner,
v.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. MARCELINO F. BAUTISTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio City, Respondents.
Facts:
On December 16, 1988, petitioner Marcelino G. Rivera, Jr. was arrested and detained for he allegedly was about to transport marijuana to Manila. Consequently, on December 20, 1988 a case for violation of Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425 was filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III presided over by respondent Judge Marcelino F. Bautista. Petitioner was arraigned on February 20, 1989. He pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On April 5, 1989, the first witness for the prosecution Cpl. Victorio Afalla partially testified on direct examination and reserved the right to identify the marijuana specimen allegedly confiscated from the petitioner. The hearing was thus re-set to May 3, 1989 and June 6, 1989. But due to the absence of any prosecution witness despite notice and the non-availability of the allegedly confiscated marijuana specimen, the hearings set for May 3, 1989 and June 6, 1989 were postponed to June 8, 1989.
On June 8, 1989, for the same reasons, the hearing was re-set to February 27, 1990.
On March 28, 1990, when the case was called at about 8:30 a.m. Capt. Lina Sarmiento despite notice, was not around thereby necessitating a second call. When the case was called for the second time at around 9:00 a.m. Capt. Sarmiento was still not around. Hence, Atty. Tomas Gorospe, in behalf of petitioner orally moved for the dismissal of the case invoking the right to speedy trial as the petitioner stands confined and that the Government failed to prosecute or adduce evidence due to the non-appearance of a vital prosecution witness. The respondent Judge verbally granted the motion and ordered the immediate release of the accused.
While the subsequent calendared cases set for that day was in progress, and in less than an hour after pronouncement of the verbal order of dismissal, Capt. Lina Sarmiento arrived direct from Quezon City. Alleging that the verbal order of dismissal made in open court amounted to the acquittal of petitioner and which order is immediately final and executory, the respondent Judge could no longer set it aside without violating petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Issue:
                Whether or not the verbal order of dismissal is final and executor?
Ruling:
                The petition should be denied. The earlier verbal order of dismissal was not final, in fact, was ineffective, because it left something to be done in line with the decision of this Court in Cabarroguis v. San Diego, L-19517, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 866. This Court in said case ruled:
                "Petitioner’s pretense is untenable. The verbal order of dismissal of said case was withdrawn or set aside, as soon as it was dictated by respondent and before it could be reduced to writing and signed by her. As a matter of fact, it was never put in writing. Much less was it ever signed by Respondent. For this reason, respondent contended that said order of dismissal was incomplete and did not have the effect of acquitting the accused before it was withdrawn. Indeed, pursuant to section 2 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, `the judgment’ — and the order of dismissal in question had, if completed, such effect — ‘must be written . . . personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him . . . .’ The cases cited by herein petitioner involved written orders of dismissal, which were signed by the corresponding judges. Hence, said cases are not controlling in the one at bar."
                ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The case is remanded to the court of origin for farther proceedings.
















G.R. No. L-49677               May 4, 1989
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents.
Facts:
                On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation.  The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations  where, acting thereon in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election.  This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
Issue:
                Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form union?
Ruling:
                With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.





               




case digest

$
0
0


Police Power(Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances)

Bel-Air Association vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)
BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION V. IAC (1989)

Facts:
Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air Village) executed a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets to Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA). Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor of Makati, studies were made by the on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to traffic several village streets including Jupiter and Orbit streets.                                                            Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets and that the opening was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of police power. Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. By virtue of its ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived without due process of law and without just compensation.
Issues:
1.     Whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit streets? If yes, what is the nature of the state power being invoked by the Mayor?
Ruling:
BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of Makati, in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets, had acted arbitrarily. Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. Being considered as merely a boundary – and hence not part of Ayala’s real estate development projects – it cannot be said to have been for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air Village residents. The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corporation covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst others, effectively required both passageways open to the general public.As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience.                                                                                                                                               The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept of police power. The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation – there is no taking of property involved. Police power as the, state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power. The exercise of police power, however, may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party. In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets was unjustified or that the Mayor acted unreasonably.The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against the Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. The duty of local executive is to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the minority.
Dispositive: Motion for reconsideration by Bel-Air Village Association is DENIED with FINALITY. The petition in G.R. 60727 is GRANTED.






Eminent Domain

G.R. No. 107916     February 20, 1997
PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners,
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents
Facts:
Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan Del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.
Issue:
Whether or not a Municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Ruling:
Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.  It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.










Rights of the Accused

G.R. No. 85215
July 7, 1989
People vs. Judge Ayson
175 SCRA 216

Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76, 000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondentJudge iscorrect in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused.
Ruling:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).      
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in Miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1)      He shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2)      Nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3)      Any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.



Right to Information

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association
vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employeesfrom staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike they are prohibited from doing so.











Right against Self-incrimination

MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents
G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962
Facts:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.                                                                                                                                                 The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Ruling:
Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemptions of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.            No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.                                                                                                                                        The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

case digest

$
0
0


BILL OF RIGHTS: PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
G.R. NO. 171980
October 6, 2010

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Vs.
Olive Rubio Mamaril, Accused-appellant

FACTS:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis Gotidoc, along with the members of Intel Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), implemented Search Warrant No. 144C dated 18 March 2003 issued by Judge Alipio Yumul of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court, Capas, Tarlac against the appellant in her residence at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City, Province of Tarlac.
Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad Oscar Tabamo of Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search and seizure operation in the appellant’s house.  With Barangay Kagawad Tabamo, the police team presented the search warrant to appellant and informed her of the purpose of the search and her constitutional rights.
Afterwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the appellant’s house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo. During his search, he found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the appellant refused to sign.
The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination.  The examination conducted by Engr. Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white crystalline substance, yielded positive results for 0.055 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The factual version presented by the defense is:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’ clock in the evening the police officers arrived at appellant’s house and showed her a search warrant.  Thereafter, the policemen searched her house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan asked her where she was sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut, the police officers proceeded to and searched the place and found the plastic sachet containing the shabu.
Thereafter, she was brought to the sub-station at Maliwalo and was told, particularly by SPO4 Gotidoc and a certain Ma’am Dulay that in exchange of P20,000.00, no case would be filed against her.  When she told them that she did not have money, she was detained. However, on cross-examination, the appellant admitted that the alleged extortion of P20,000.00 was not reported to the higher ranking police officers.
Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and planted the shabu inside her house because of her refusal to give them money.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is innocent of violating Section 11, Article II, of RA 9165.

RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a regulated drug, namely, (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.
Centered on the conduct of the search of appellant’s house that yielded the prohibited substance, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the finding that “after a careful evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the prosecution and the defense, we hold that the search conducted by the INTEL Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in coordination with the PDEA, on the residence of the accused-appellant on 25 March 2003 at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” weighing 0.055 gram are legal.  As a consequence of the legal search, the said methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” seized on the occasion thereof, is admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.”
The accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office, goes further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant was not based on probable cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained through it may not be admitted to support the accused-appellant’s conviction and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
The original position of the accused which, in this petition, begins with the contention of non-compliance with all the requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.  We agree with the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was indeed full satisfaction of the requisites for the conviction of the accused.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not adequately defeated.  Re-stating that in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, there are only three (3) elements to secure conviction: (1) accused is in possession of the prohibited drugs; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) accused consciously and freely possessed the prohibited drugs, the trial court held that all these were established beyond doubt. It determined that appellant failed to proffer evidence enough to discredit the prosecution and render doubtful his guilt.
The argument is without merit.
In the case at hand, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the search warrant, was found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up.The defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive.  Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that “no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers’ alleged ill motive.”


















JUST COMPENSATION.
G.R. No. 164195,             
 April 5, 2011

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9 million for AFC’s land and P164.40 million for HPI’s land (total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited P26M into AFC’s account and P45M into HPI’s account as down payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996. Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARAB’s failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was just compensation.

FACTS:
No. AFC’s and HPI’s land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The RTC’s finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFC’s and HPI’s lands have been introduced and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stone’s throw from the residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location. Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest per annum plus attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the just compensation or P138 million.




















EMINENT DOMAIN
G.R. No. 185091,
 August 8, 2010

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner.
vs.
Primo Mendoza and Maria Lucero, respondents.

FACTS:
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education.  PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school.  But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
                On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows:
Lot 1 – 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga
Lot 2 – 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 – 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 – 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa.
                As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4.  Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.
                The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-declared.
          The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it.  They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time.   Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled.
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property.  When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republic’s immunity from suit. The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republic’s consent was not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it.
                In light of the RTC’s decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before it. The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners.  PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor. PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
                The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes.
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of the Mendozas’ registered title and the imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property.  The CA held that, this being the case, the Republic’s possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.
                The CA also rejected the Republic’s claim of ownership since it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government.  Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the government’s favor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas’ title.  The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.
                With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school.

RULING:
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice. Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. No one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas’ title over the property has not been disputed.   While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.
                That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas’ title.  This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership.
                The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years.  The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently.  In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes.  And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City Government of Lipa.  Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it.  Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas’ formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation.
                The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property.  Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession.  The Mendozas’ remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Court affirmed the RTC’s power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding.  It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages.  As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
                Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas’ right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.
                WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza’s action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa.














G.R. No. 170623,
July 7, 2010.

A. Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. represented by CARMEN Z. ARNAIZ, petitioner
vs
OFFICEOF THE PRESIDENT; DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; REGIONAL DIRECTOR,DAR REGION V, LEGASPI CITY; PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, DARPROVINCIAL OFFICE, MASBATE, MASBATE; MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER,DAR MUNICIPAL OFFICE, MASBATE, MASBATE, respondents

FACTS:
 A. Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc., filed a petition for exclusion from the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program (CARP) coverage dated April 25, 1994 before the Regional Director of  Agrarian Reform (DAR) a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Asid, Sinalugan, Masbate, Masbate since the land has been devoted to cattle-ranching purposes since time immemorial, not tenanted and has more than 18% slopes. However the petition was denied and ordered to be still in the coverage of the acquisition of the properties under the coverage of CARP. It was established that a portion of land was leased to Monterey Farm for 10 years. Petitioner sold its entire herd of cattle to Monterey Farms Corporation before the expiration of lease agreement. It was also established that said land is not owned by the petitioner but rather by Nuestra Senora del Carmen Marble, Inc with a new TCT number. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in December 8, 1995.Petitioner appealed again the Order to the Sec. of Agrarian Reform for two separate motions for ocular inspection. The Sec. of Agrarian Reform dismissed for lack of merit on Oct. 23, 1996.Ordering CARP to identify portions and areas not suited for agriculture and be excluded from the program and do the necessary notices. Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but was denied on February 13, 1998. Petitioner then sought recourse before the Office of the President (OP) on Sept. 19, 2001 but dismissed the appeal. Petitioner again filed for motion for reconsideration on the argument that OP seriously erred but CA rendered that petition for review is DENIED DUE COURSE and was DISMISSED on August 11, 2005. CA ratiocinated that DAR were supported that substantial evidence which the petitioner failed to established. On a petition for motion for reconsideration which was again denied on Nov. 24, 2005,Petitioner argued and insists that they were not given due process, and that subject lands are not suitable for agriculture if they contain slope more than 18%. Petitioner also added that DAR should allow for the ocular inspection to be conducted invoking the Luz Farms v Secretary of Department of Agri and Department of Agri v Sutton that the petitioner’s property should be excluded from the coverage of the CARP.


ISSUE:
 Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process.

HELD:
No, Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding.  Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
                Even if no formal hearing took place, it is not sufficient ground for petitioner to claim that due process was not afforded it.  In the present case, petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove and establish its claim that the subject properties were excluded from the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by submitting various pleadings and documentary evidence. In fact, petitioner filed motions for reconsideration in every unfavorable outcome of its actions in all tiers of the administrative and judicial process - from the Order of the DAR Regional Director up to the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
                The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. And any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.  Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. Undoubtedly, the requirement of the law was afforded to petitioner.
To be sure, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more so if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DAR, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction. The Courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies, because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which are ordinarily accorded great respect, is when they are not borne out by the records or are not based on substantial evidence. In the case at bar, no reason exists for us to disregard the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings being borne out by the record and supported by substantial evidence.



SEC. 19
G.R. No. 181560,
November 15, 2010

Vitarich Corporation
 vs.
Chona Locsin

FACTS:
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering services business named Glamours Chicken House, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City.  Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, had been her supplier of poultry meat.   In 1995, however, her account was transferred to the newly opened Vitarich branch in General Santos City.         
In the months of July to November 1996, Losin’s orders of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly amounted to P921,083.10.   During this said period, Losin’s poultry meat needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a supervisor of said corporation.  Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her account started to experience problems because of the fact that Directo delivered stocks to her even without prior booking which is the customary process of doing business with her.
On August 24, 1996, Directo’s services were terminated by Vitarich without Losin’s knowledge. He left without turning over some supporting invoices covering the orders of Losin.  Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand, resigned on November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1996, respectively.  Just like Directo, they did not also turn over pertinent invoices covering Losin’s account.
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged unpaid account amounting to P921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her records and discovered that she had an overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of P500,000.00.  She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed the latter that checks were issued and the same were collected by Directo.
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to P288,463.30 which were dishonored either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or Stop Payment.
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and Baybay before the RTC.
On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Vitarich rendered in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiff the following:
1.     P297,462.50 representing the three checks which had been stopped payment with interest at 12% per annum from the date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
2.     P101,450.20 representing the unpaid sales (Exhibits ‘L’ and ‘M’) with interest at 12% from date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
3.     P20,000.00 in concept of attorney’s fees; and
4.     The cost of suit.
As to the complaint against defendant Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay, the same is dismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo still remains and is hereby ordered archived until he could be served with summons.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was being violated her right by overpayment to the Vitarich?

RULING:
No. Records bear out that the Court already resolved to deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration of Losin challenging the Court's Decision dated November 15, 2010. The instant Urgent Manifestation with a Dire Request to Take a Very Close Look on the Fact That RCBC Check No. CX046324 Dated August 27, 1996 in the Amount of P93,888.80 Was Already Paid Way Back on August 29, 1996 appears to be a second motion for reconsideration although not denominated as such by Losin. Thus, it is essentially a prohibited pleading. It has been settled that only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. The Court finds no reason to depart from the general rule.
The Court already ruled that Losin was liable to pay petitioner Vitarich Corporation the amount of P93,888.80, as indicated in RCBC Check No. CX046324 dated August 27, 1996, as part of her total liability which had been stopped payment by Losin.
The attached bank statement marked as Exh. "BB" and referred to by Losin bearing the amount of P93,888.80 does not clearly prove payment of the said amount. In fact, the entry in the said bank statement with this amount has not been specifically sub-marked at all. If indeed the questioned amount was already paid by Losin, it could be threshed out in the court of origin in connection with the execution of the final judgment.

case digest

$
0
0


Freedom of Expression and Right to Privacy
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32066
August 6, 1979


FACTS:
            Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend. 
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.  
            On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner and private respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any of the acts herein authorized.
            After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different theaters all over the country.
            Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
            Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
            Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent.

ISSUES:

1.         Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
2.         Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:

1.         Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,” a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be.  In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 
2.         No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test."  The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." 
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.








































Writ of Habeas Corpus
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001

FACTS:
            Petitioners are husband and wife.  They have six children.  The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job.  Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned.  She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
On October 1993, Bienvenida allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez (who was the common-law husband of Angelita) was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpusis the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.

RULING:
     Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.  It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.  Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.






























Right against Self-incrimination
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.

G.R. No. 16444
September 8, 1920

FACTS:
            In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, EmeteriaVillaflor and FlorentinoSouingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant EmeteriaVillaflor, to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not compelling EmeteriaVillaflorto submit her body to the examination to determine if she is pregnant violates her constitutional right against self-incrimination.


RULING:

            No. The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided.
            It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.



Right to Information (Access to Public Records)
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, 
vs.
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO,
 respondent.

A.M. No. 1120-MJ
May 5, 1976

FACTS:
            In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.

            Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records but that the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private site or promote public scandal.

The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the motion was denied by the Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.

ISSUE:
            Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books infringe upon the right of individuals to information.

RULING:
            No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern.

            The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.”  However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order. 

Rights of the Accused (Presumption of Innocence)
G.R. No. L-21325 October 29, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA, MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERO SAVANDAL, defendants; PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN,
 defendants-appellant.

FACTS:
            In the morning of January 9, 1964,the two accused, now appellants, PableoDramayo and PaternoEcubin, in the company of the deceased EstelitoNogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigaodel Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-accused PrioloBillona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla,Crescencio and SeveroSavandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of killing EstelitoNogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby.
            Soon the Nogaliza was sighted,Dramayostopped him with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. Dramayo then warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened.
Early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the Estrelito’swidow Corazon that he had just seen the dead body of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof.
The lower court found PableoDramayo and PaternoEcubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder, qualified by thecircumstance of evident premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the saidaccused the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The other accused were not convicted as, two of them, CrescencioSavandal and SeveroSavandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three, PrioloBillona, FranciscoBillona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted. Dramayo and Ecubin appealed.

ISSUE:
            Whether Dramayo and Ecubin should be acquitted inasmuch as the other co-accused have beenacquitted due to reasonable doubt.

RULING:
            No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
            It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution.  That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt.
            The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. 
            The fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away with the principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case, circumstances weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.

case digest

$
0
0



Farhanna B. Mapandi23CALACDAY
VS
VIVO
33 SCRA 382 (1970)
FERNANDO, J.

Facts:

Martiniano P. Vivo : acting commissioner of Immigration-Petitioner Calacday’s citizenship is being questioned-Petitioner seeks to enjoin the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Vivo from taking them intocustody of conducting deportation proceedings against them or cancelling their identification certificateson the assumption that the previous decisions of the Board of Inquiry, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Commissioners declaring them Filipino citizens, had become final and conclusive-Based on this assumption, petitioner contends that respondent Vivo is devoid of any authority to takesteps to deport them under the appropriate provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, asamended.

Issue:

WON the warrants of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration (Vivo) for the purposes of investigation and before a final judgment of the deportation proceedings is issued, are valid.

Ruling:
No.

RD:
Art III, Sec 1 (3) states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, andthe persons or things to be seized.”
(the following is from Cruz, page 147)
Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities onlyfor the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an orderof contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. As held in Morano v. Vivo, “Theconstitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest…not as a measure indispensable to carry out avalid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commission of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.”




SWS
 vs
Comelec

Facts:
 

            Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Issue:

            Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

            No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. 
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”





US
 Vs
 DIAZ

FACTS:
Gabriel Diaz, by blows and kicks, inflicted bodily injuries to Cornelio Alcanzaren. For it, the latter was charged with assault and battery before the Justice of Peace of San Carlos where he was found guilty and was penalized accordingly.
Later, Alcanzaren died. Diaz was again charged before the same Justice of Peace with homicide on the argument that the death of Alcanzaren was due to physical assault made unto him by Diaz earlier, a matter which the Justice of Peace took as well founded. Accordingly, the Justice of Peace held that the accused to await the action of the court of first instance.
Diaz was charged in the Court of First Instance of Homicide, wherein, during arraignment he interposed a plea of former jeopardy which was overruled. After trial, he was found guilty and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment and other penalties.
Diaz appealed his case to the Supreme Court of the Philippines but the latter sustained his conviction. Hence, the case before the Supreme Court of the United States.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diaz is placed in a second jeopardy for being tried for a different offense arising from the same act considering that the latter offense could only be brought to court due to the resultant death of Alcanzaren.
RULING:
No. Diaz is not placed in a second jeopardy.




Villegas
 vs
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
Facts:
 The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
Issue: 
Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: 
The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]



Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.
A.M. RTJ-00-1522 January 20, 2000

Facts:

Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and incompetence in connection with granting bail to the accused in a criminal case for child abuse.
The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the holding of a preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information against the accused on the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation. Consequently, respondent Judge ordered that a preliminary investigation be had by the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he granted bail in favor of the defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to which the latter failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent of denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.
Issue:
            Whether or not there was an abuse of discretion resulting to denial of due process on the part of respondent?
Held:

NOT GUILTY. There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to hold hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the accused was strong since a preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court. At that point, bail was still a matter of right. Respondent judge, knowing that bail was indeed a matter of right at that stage, nevertheless set the hearing for the petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to appear and present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears that complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his duties. Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a matter of right. Thus, respondent judge’s decision granting bail to the accused was proper and in accordance with law and jurisprudence.


case dgest

$
0
0


JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts :                  On December 7, 1982 two search warrants were issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper which have been allegedly used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended, were seized.
The search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants.
The petitioner herein then assailed the validity of the search warrants contending that the abovementioned documents could have not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution .
Issue :  Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued upon probable cause.
Ruling :              We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda….
                The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. In view of the foregoing, the search warrants issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside.












RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO,petitioners,
vs. 
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC.  
June 29, 2001

Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letterrequesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of public concern be given more weight  than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Ruling :                The petition is denied.
                The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information.  It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.  
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.  A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.  In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.





















ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53487
May 25, 1981

Facts:   The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City has adopted four resolutions regarding theannual celebration annual of their patron saint San Vicente Ferrer. Resolution No. 5 ,set the feast day of the patron saint of Valencia and provided for the acquisition of San Vicente Ferrer and construction of a waiting shed. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified thatthe Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day.
                The waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image was acquired by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia.
The image was then temporarily placed in the Catholic Church so that devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. However, the petitioner Father Osmena  refused to return the image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. The respondent then enacted Resolutions No. 10 and 12 allowing the respondents to recover the image through a replevin case .
                In his answer to the complaint, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions on the grounds that the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to participate in its sessions and  that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provision of Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution.
Issue : Whether or not the questioned resolutions were constitutional.

Ruling :              That contention is glaringly devoid of merit.
 Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII  respectively provides; “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. Except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium”.The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
















PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14
 December 27, 1972
               
Facts:                   Two different cases was filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against respondents Feliciano Co and NiloTayag and other five others in violation of the Anti- Subversion Act which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization. The said respondents were said to be active members of the CCP. Both then moved to quash the informations against them on the ground that the Anti- Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed.

Issue :  Whether the Anti- Subversive Act is a bill of attainder.

Ruling :  The court upheldthe validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
                Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted."A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
 In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
If the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
The questioned resolution of September 15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.























THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLY OBSANIA, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-24447          
 June 29, 1968

Facts :                  On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, ErlindaDollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, CiriacoDollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery against the defendant Obsania. After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.  The appeal was then questioned by the defendant on the grounds of double jeopardy.
Issue :  Does the appeal of the Government violated the constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling :              The Court answered in the negative.
                                An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy.Correlatively, section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quowas a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his motion to dismiss.The controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under consideration did not terminate the action on the merits.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence.
The order appealed from is set aside.
                               




case digest

$
0
0


Bill of Rights:  Section 1 - No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
G.R. No. 185829. April 25, 2012.

Armando Ailing, Petitioner
vs.
Jose B. Feliciano, Manuel F. San Mateo III, et al., Respondents
FACTS:
Via  a letter dated June 2, 2004, respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to employ petitioner Armando Aliling (Aliling) as “Account Executive (Seafreight Sales),” with the following compensation package: a monthly salary of PhP 13,000, transportation allowance of PhP  3,000, clothing allowance of PhP 800, cost of living allowance of PhP 500, each payable on a per month basis and a 14th month pay depending on the profitability and availability of financial resources of the company. The offer came with a six (6)-month probation period condition with this express caveat: “Performance during probationary period shall be made as basis for confirmation to Regular or Permanent Status.”
            On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract under the following terms, among others:
·         Conversion to regular status shall be determined on the basis of work performance; and
·         Employment services may, at any time, be terminated for just cause or in accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement.
            Training then started. However, instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to handle Ground Express (GX), a new company product launched on June 18, 2004 involving domestic cargo forwarding service for Luzon. Marketing this product and finding daily contracts for it formed the core of Aliling’s new assignment.
            Barely a month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director, emailed Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the latter’s performance.
Thereafter, in a letter of September 25, 2004, Joseph R. Lariosa (Lariosa), Human Resources Manager of WWWEC, asked Aliling to report to the Human Resources Department to explain his absence taken without leave from September 20, 2004.
            Aliling responded two days later. He denied being absent on the days in question, attaching to his reply-letter a copy of his timesheet which showed that he worked from September 20 to 24, 2004. Aliling’s explanation came with a query regarding the withholding of his salary corresponding to September 11 to 25, 2004.
In a separate letter dated September 27, 2004, Aliling wrote San Mateo stating: “Pursuant to your instruction on September 20, 2004, I hereby tender my resignation effective October 15, 2004.” While WWWEC took no action on his tender, Aliling nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter dated October 1, 2004 to management that San Mateo had forced him to resign.
            Lariosa’s response-letter of October 1, 2004, informed Aliling that his case was still in the process of being evaluated. On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his services effective as of that date owing to his “non-satisfactory performance” during his probationary period. Records show that Aliling, for the period indicated, was paid his outstanding salary which consisted of:
PhP 4,988.18 (salary for the September 25, 2004 payroll)
Php 1,987.28 (salary for 4 days in October 2004)
PhP  6,975.46   Total
Earlier, however, or on October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation, nonpayment of salaries as well as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the complaint was Aliling’s Affidavit dated November 12, 2004, in which he stated: “5. At the time of my engagement, respondents did not make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a regular employee.”
             Refuting Aliling’s basic posture, WWWEC stated in its Position Paper dated November 22, 2004 that, in addition to the letter-offer and employment contract adverted to, WWWEC and Aliling have signed a letter of appointment on June 11, 2004 containing the following terms of engagement:
            Additionally, upon the effectivity of your probation, you and your immediate superior are required to jointly define your objectives compared with the job requirements of the position. Based on the pre-agreed objectives, your performance shall be reviewed on the 3rd month to assess your competence and work attitude. The 5th month Performance Appraisal shall be the basis in elevating or confirming your employment status from Probationary to Regular.
            Failure to meet the job requirements during the probation stage means that your services may be terminated without prior notice and without recourse to separation pay.
            WWWEC also attached to its Position Paper a memo dated September 20, 2004 in which San Mateo asked Aliling to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet the expected job performance, considering that the load factor for the GX Shuttles for the period July to September was only 0.18% as opposed to the allegedly agreed upon load of 80% targeted for August 5, 2004. According to WWWEC, Aliling, instead of explaining himself, simply submitted a resignation letter.
 In a Reply-Affidavit dated December 13, 2004, Aliling denied having received a copy of San Mateo’s September 20, 2004 letter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a due process.

RULING:
No. The petition is partly meritorious.
Petitioner is a regular employee.
            On a procedural matter, petitioner Aliling argues that WWWEC, not having appealed from the judgment of CA which declared Aliling as a regular employee from the time he signed the employment contract, is now precluded from questioning the appellate court’s determination as to the nature of his employment.
            Petitioner errs.  The Court has, when a case is on appeal, the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error if their consideration is necessary in reaching a just conclusion of the case.  We said as much in Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, SA v. Court of Appeals, “It is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.”
            The Labor Arbiter cryptically held in his decision dated April 25, 2006 that:
Be that as it may, there appears no showing that indeed the said September 20, 2004 Memorandum addressed to complainant was received by him. Moreover, complainant’s tasked where he was assigned was a new developed service. In this regard, it is noted:
            “Due process dictates that an employee be apprised beforehand of the conditions of his employment and of the terms of advancement therein. Precisely, implicit in Article 281 of the Labor Code is the requirement that reasonable standards be previously made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement (Ibid, citing Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 132564, October 20, 1999).
            From our review, it appears that the labor arbiter, and later the NLRC, considered Aliling a probationary employee despite finding that he was not informed of the reasonable standards by which his probationary employment was to be judged.
            The CA, on the other hand, citing Cielo v. National Labor Relations Commission, ruled that petitioner was a regular employee from the outset inasmuch as he was not informed of the standards by which his probationary employment would be measured.  The CA wrote:
            Petitioner was regularized from the time of the execution of the employment contract on June 11, 2004, although respondent company had arbitrarily shortened his tenure. As pointed out, respondent company did not make known the reasonable standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Hence, he was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee.
            WWWEC, however, excepts on the argument that it put Aliling on notice that he would be evaluated on the 3rd and 5th months of his probationary employment. To WWWEC, its efforts translate to sufficient compliance with the requirement that a probationary worker be apprised of the reasonable standards for his regularization. WWWEC invokes the ensuing holding in Alcira v. National Labor Relations Commission to support its case:
            Conversely, an employer is deemed to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after his hiring. We agree with the labor arbiter when he ruled that:
            In the instant case, petitioner cannot successfully say that he was never informed by private respondent of the standards that he must satisfy in order to be converted into regular status. This rans counter to the agreement between the parties that after five months of service the petitioner’s performance would be evaluated. It is only but natural that the evaluation should be made vis-à-vis the performance standards for the job. Private respondent Trifona Mamaradlo speaks of such standard in her affidavit referring to the fact that petitioner did not perform well in his assigned work and his attitude was below par compared to the company’s standard required of him.
           WWWEC’s contention is untenable.
            To note, the June 2, 2004 letter-offer itself states that the regularization standards or the performance norms to be used are still to be agreed upon by Aliling and his supervisor. WWWEC has failed to prove that an agreement as regards thereto has been reached. Clearly then, there were actually no performance standards to speak of. And lest it be overlooked, Aliling was assigned to GX trucking sales, an activity entirely different to the Seafreight Sales he was originally hired and trained for. Thus, at the time of his engagement, the standards relative to his assignment with GX sales could not have plausibly been communicated to him as he was under Seafreight Sales. Even for this reason alone, the conclusion reached in Alcira is of little relevant to the instant case.
            Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of 6% per annum from October 6, 2004 (date of termination) until fully paid.

















Bill of Rights: Section 12 (P. 1) - Rights of a Person under Custodial Investigation

G.R. No. 169431, April 3, 2007
People of the Philippines, Appellee
vs.
Jerry Rapeza y Francisco, Appellant

FACTS:

                Rapeza, the appellant, is a native of Samar, illiterate and was staying with Regino in Regino's house, 40 meters away from the victims' house. Several days after Rapeza's arrival, the killings took place.

                In  two separate information, Rapeza, together with Regino was charged with the murder of spouses Cesar Ganzon and Priscilla Libas.

                First information narrates that on October 21, 1995 around 4pm at Culion, Palawan, Rapeza together with Regino conspired, confederating together and mutually helped each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength and feloniously attacked and killed with bladed weapons the victims.

                Regino was at large, so Rapeza was the only one arraigned and pleaded notguilty.

                Prosecution: On October 21, 1995, unidentified woman went to Culion and reported a killing that took place in Sitio Cawa-Cawa, Culion. The officer in charge sent to the victims' house, the investigating team saw two blooded bodies, which was later identified as Libas and Ganzon. The autopsy reports show that the common cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to massive bleeding from multiple stab wounds and both bodies were in the early stage of decomposition. Upon information supplied, appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes. The appellant was found fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make confession in the presence of a lawyer. The appellant was brought to the police station and later brought to the house of the only available lawyer in the municipality- Atty. Reyes. Because Atty. Reyes is suffering from rheumatism and the typewriter in the police station was out of order, the custodial investigation took place at the house of atty. Reyes in the presence of VM Marasigan of CULION, 2 SB officials, interpreter and SPO2 Gapas (officer in charge).

                Rapeza narrated the crime and was signed and was notarized. Thereafter, acomplaint for multiple murder was filed against Regino who was likewisearrested. MTC of Culion conducted preliminary investigation. Finding probablecause only against Rapeza, Regino was ordered released. Provincial prosecutor however reversed the finding of the Trial Court by including Regino in the information, but then the latter had left Culion already.

                Defense: Rapeza testified that he did not know the victims and that he has nothing to do with their deaths. He did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. He was detained from 11 o’clock in the morning of Oct. 22, 1995 up to the morning of Oct. 23, 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly taken.  Regino too was arrested with him. While in detention, he told the police that it was Regino who did the killing but the police did not believe him. Rapeza was told to sign a document for his release but because he could not sign, the officer took his thumb, dipped it inink and marked it on the document. Rapeza denied going to the house of Atty. Reyes or meeting the alleged interpreter. When he was brought to the MTC, the counsel did not assist him, he was later brought to a hut in the mountainwhere he was told to go farther, which he refused for fear of being shot.

                 On the basis of appellant's extrajudicial confession, the RTC found him guilty. The RTC held that the accused is guilty with conspiracy. Case waselevated to the CA for review but RTC’s judgement was affirmed

                Therefore, this is an appeal from the decision of the court of appeals affirming theconsolidated judgment of the RTC of Palawan where Jerry Rapeza was foundguilty of two counts of murder sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, plus indemnity for the heirs of the two victims.

ISSUES:

1)               Whether his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
2)               Whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

               (1) Upon careful examination of the alleged confession and the testimony of the witnesses, the Court hold that the alleged confession is inadmissible and must perforce be discarded.

               Thus, the Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must conform to the following requisites: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant’s choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing. In this juncture, the appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house ofAtty. Reyes.

               In order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should likewise be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital thereof. Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation.

              In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. This fact should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood hisrights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the contents of his alleged confession.

              The extra-judicial confession was allegedly made in Tagalog when accused-appellant is admittedly not well versed in said language. Even if the confession was made in the presence of an interpreter, there is no showing that the rights of a person under investigation were effectively explained and/or interpreted to accused-appellant. The interpreter was not even presented in Court to prove that said rights were translated in a language understood by accused-appellant. 

              (2) The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writingand in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver.

                 Assuming that Atty. Reyes did assist appellant, still there would be gravedoubts as to his competence and independence as appellant’s counsel for purposes of the custodial investigation. 

               (3) It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. The trial court found that appellant’s bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility.

                First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves. Second, the prosecution failed to establish the actual date of the killings. The actual date of the commission of the crimes is material in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of the admissibility of the alleged confession.

                (4) Confession was not sufficiently corroborated.
                As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the time the confession was made or by any other evidence.The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellant’s statement could have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However, they were not presented in court.

                Consequently, the non-production of these material witnesses raises a doubt which must be resolved in favor of appellant and the confession should be disregarded as evidence. Verily, we are left with the unconvincing testimony of two police officers against whose abuse of authority the Constitution protects the appellant. As their respective testimonies are sated with inconsistencies and hearsay evidence, we find the same insufficient bases to hold appellant’s extrajudicial confession admissible against him.





















Bill of Rights: Section 4 - Freedom of Speech
G.R. No.  180291, July 27, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:
·         That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
·         That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
·         That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon.  On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.
            Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union president was there.  Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them.  For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing.  These letters were not under oath.
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005.  Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof. None was filed.
            On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
            On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand.  The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.  Instead,
            The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants’ (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.
            PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
            The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.  The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service.  Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished.  These employees, now respondents in this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS.  Hence, despite the belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS’  premises during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit.  Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molina’s case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government.  In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents “marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.”  Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.
ISSUE:
              WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
            Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents’ letters of explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager.  The respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
 SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.— Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.  Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
            According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
            SECTION 4.  In what cases not applicable. – These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
            The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners’ own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS’ Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
 If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
            A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver of “his right to file an answer.” There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted.  It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a “suppletory character.” Suppletory is defined as “supplying deficiencies.”It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.  There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer.  What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may “render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.”
            Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same.  Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners.  We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.




















Bill of Rights: Section 4 - Freedom of Expression
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, Petitioners, 
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.

FACTS:

              The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

               Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

             The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was
 in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. 

              The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with
 the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. 

               A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their
 Collective Bargaining Agreement. 

             The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were
 found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. 

 ISSUE:

             Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement?

RULING:

             No.

             While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.

             In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.













Bill of Rights: Section 6 - Liberty of Abode

G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., Petitioners
 vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., Respondents

FACTS:
              The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
              At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
             The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
             The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
             That when the petitioners filed for habeas corpus, the respondents moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

             The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

             For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

ISSUE:

            The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioners, with the prayer that the respondents produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

HELD:

            The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

             We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
              We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.















































case digest

$
0
0


SECTION 9 – RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION



MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA

G.R. No. L-59791
February 13, 1992




Facts:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.

The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence.


Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.


Ruling:

                Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation.

Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error.

Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30, 1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights, interests and easements over those parcels of land which are the subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No. 20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342-343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the former as party plaintiff.

All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the order dated February 9, 1982 issued by the respondent judge insofar as it finally determined the amount of just compensation is nullified. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the lower court for trial with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners. Further, the National Power Corporation is impleaded as party plaintiff therein.





















SECTION 5 – FREEDOM OF RELIGION


Iglesia Ni Cristo
Vs.
Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119673
July 26, 1996


Facts:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." 

On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them.It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128.
The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals however reversed it, hence this petition. 

Issues:

1.      Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression.

2.      Whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," 

Ruling:
           
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. 

The second issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986 particularly Section 3.The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . . exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime."
           
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner's TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside 









SECTION 7 – RIGHT TO INFORMATION


VALENTIN L. LEGASPI
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-72119
May 29, 1987



Facts:

The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.

The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

Issues:

a.      Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged to produce the information regarding the eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City?

b.      Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to information?

Ruling:

            a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

            b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.

The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.

SECTION 6 – LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL


Ferdinand E. Marcos
Versus
Hon. Raul Manglapus

G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989

Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency through the “People Power” revolution, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Eventually, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines


Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. 
SECTION 1 – RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS


Ray Peter O. Vivo
Versus
Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation (PAGCOR)

G.R. No. 187854
November 12, 2013

Facts:
The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) on September 9, 1986, and was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources Department, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension.

On February 26, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel, replying to Ela’s letter, assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension.On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002.At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date. His statement was taken in a question-and-answer format.  He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee. The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to address questions regarding his case.  His counsel moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. His counsel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of the request.

The petitioner received the letter dated May 15, 2002 from Ela informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being dismissed from the service.In its resolution dated April 11, 2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service.On February 27, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process.
Issues:

1.      The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s right for due process was not violated transgressed the fundamental rules in administrative due process.

2.       The Court of Appeals decision in setting aside CSC Resolutions Nos. 070732, dated 01 April 2007, and 071485, dated 01 August 2007, is contrary to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.

Ruling:

                The petition for review lacks merit.

The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR.  He received the letter from Ela apprising him of his being administratively charged for several offenses, and directing him to submit an explanation in writing.  He was later on properly summoned to appear before the CIU, which conducted its proceedings in his own residence upon his request. During the administrative inquiry, the CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of charges, which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. He was also given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions.  Lastly, he was informed through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from the service.
            In contrast, the petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by PAGCOR as set forth herein. He made no credible showing of the supposed violation of his right to due process.  He was heard through the written statement he submitted in response to the memorandum of the charges against him.  He actively participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own residence. He was afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings before the Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the adverse decision to dismiss him from the service to the CSC. There is also no question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice requirement prior to the termination of his employment, the first notice being made through Ela’s letter dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being administratively charged for the offenses mentioned, and the second being through the letter dated May 15, 2002 advising him that PAGCOR’s Board of Directors had resolved to dismiss him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.The right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.It is noteworthy, however, that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from the outset of the administrative case against him.

lazo report

$
0
0



FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141529.  June 6, 2001]

FACTS:
     The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, “in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.” He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.  The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17, 1999.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail.  He prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case.

ISSUE:   Whether or not the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?

RULING:
     No. Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal.  He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --- the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis.  Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. 
The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.



[G.R. No. 16480. December 11, 1920. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
 v.
AGAPITO BELTRAN and PEDRO DE LEON,Defendants. AGAPITO BELTRAN, Appellant.
Facts:
On May 10, 1919, Agapito Beltran borrowed from Facundo Ilaw, the owner of a chineleria, the sum of P74.50. At the same time, Beltran signed a receipt of the following tenor:
"I borrowed from Mr. Facundo Ilaw the sum of seventy-four pesos and fifty centavos (P74.50), by virtue of our agreement that I shall work while I have not paid, and that I shall pay every week by installment.”
Beltran worked continuously in Ilaw’s shop from March 17, 1919, until August 3p, 1919. During this period Beltran claims that he paid Ilaw P24 on account of his debt. Beltran left the employ of Ilaw because of a disagreement with the wife of his employer and because there was not enough work and material to keep him busy.
For failure to fulfill his agreement, Agapito Beltran was prosecuted, first in the municipal court of the city of Manila, and later, on appeal, in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, for a violation of section 1 of Act No. 2098, an Act relating to contracts of personal services and advances thereunder, and providing punishment for certain offenses connected therewith. He was found guilty and was sentenced by the latter court to two months’ imprisonment, to pay Facundo Ilaw the sum of P83.65, and to pay one-half of the costs.
Beltran appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
            Whether or not Beltran violated Act No. 2098, an Act relating to contracts of personal services and advances?
Ruling:
            No, there was no violation on the side of Beltran.
            "The ingredients of this statutory offense are: (1) A contract in writing by the accused for the performance of any act or service; (2) an intent of the part of the accused, when he entered into the contract, to injure or defraud his employer; (3) the obtaining by the accused of money or other personal property from such employer by means of such contract entered into with such intent; and (4) the refusal by the accused, with like intent, and without just cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property, to perform such act or service. This statute by no means provides that a person who has entered into a written contract for the performance of services, under which he has obtained money or other personal property, is punishable as if he had stolen such money or other personal property, upon his refusal to perform the contract, without refunding the money or paying for the property. A mere breach of a contract is not by the statute made a crime. The criminal feature of the transaction is wanting unless the accused entered into the contract with intent to injure or defraud his employer, and unless his refusal to perform was with like intent and without just cause. That there was an intent to injure or defraud the employer, both when the contract was entered into and when the accused refused performance, are facts which must be shown by the evidence. As the intent is the design, purpose, resolve, or determination in the mind of the accused, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence, but must be ascertained by means of inferences from the facts and circumstances developed by the proof. (Carlisle v. State, 76 Ala., 75; Mack v. State, 63 Ala., 138.) In the absence, however, of evidence from which such inferences may be drawn, the jury are not justified in indulging in mere unsupported conjectures, speculations, or suspicions as to intentions which were not disclosed by any visible or tangible act, expression, or circumstance. (Green v. State, 68 Ala., 539.)"
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts, we find nothing to show that when the defendant borrowed from the complainant the amount of money mentioned in the receipt, he had made up his mind not to pay his debt, or to injure his employer. If anything, the fact that the accused worked for the complainant continuously for three or four months after the debt was incurred, would indicate good faith on the part of the accused at the time the agreement was signed. In addition to this the testimony of the accused with regard to the reason which compelled him to seek work in another place, appears to be more convincing than that of the complainant on the same point.
Judgment is reversed, and the defendant is acquitted with all costs de officio. So ordered.


IDCPI (Islamic Da’wa Council)
vs.
 Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

Facts:
 The office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner, lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it, filed a complaint praying to nullify the EO 46 and further implementation of it. The complaint contends that the EO 46 violate the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State. The function of exclusive issuance of halal certificates is only for religious organization – a food becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer.

Issue:
 Whether or not EO 46 is unconstitutional thus, null and void.
Ruling:

Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations thus trangessing the preferred status of the freedom of religion. Interpretation of what food products are fit for Muslim consumption is vested exclusively on the conscience and belieft of one person whether muslim or non-muslim. The protection and promotion of the muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of muslims. Therefore the EO 46 is null and void.



G.R. No. L-63345     January 30, 1986
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.
Facts:
 Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s custody.
Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained person’s release with restrictions.

Ruling:
No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.








case digest

$
0
0


ART.3 SEC. 1.RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY

G.R. No. 162994

Duncan Association Of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A. Tecson, petitioner
vs.  Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent

September 19, 2005


FACTS:
            Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as a medical representative. He was assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Upon his employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed, among others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies; and if management  found that such relationship posed a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
     On September, 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm Astra Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The relationship, including the subsequent marriage, dismayed  Glaxo. On January 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his wife's possible resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they preferred to retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet no resolution came to pass. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to Glaxo's milk division, but his application was denied in view of Glaxo's "least-movement-possible" policy. Then in November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
             On Nov. 15, 2000, the Nat’l. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo’s policy was valid.Glaxo's policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals and the Court, but for nothing.


ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not Glaxo’s  policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
(2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.


                                                                                RULING:
                The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the policy imposed by  Glaxo company, upon signing the contract, he voluntarily set his hands to follow the said policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships w/ and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.  After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict . Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that his wife would be the one to resign instead.  Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra.  Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included.  In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family.  Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.




SEC. 4.FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY & TO PETITION THE GOVT.

G.R. Nos. 123562-65
LEONORA A. GESITE, FE LAMOSTE, ADELAIDA MACALINDOG, and GUIA C. AGATON, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 teachers in Metro Manila had a mass action, assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances and did not held classes. DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño, brushed aside their complaints, warning them they would lose their jobs for taking illegal mass actions.  He then ordered the teachers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours, otherwise they will be dismissed from the service, directed the DECS officials to initiate immediate administrative proceedings against those found disobedient.
Petitioners Gesite, Lamoste, Macalindog and Agaton were included  to those who did not report for work on September 19-21, 1990.  Hence, the DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints against them for defying his return-to-work order.  They were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law and Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without official leave.
Despite receipt of notice to file their answer within seventy-two (72) hours but not more than five (5) days, petitioners failed to do so.  Consequently, they were deemed to have waived their right to controvert the charges.  They were found guilty as charged and ordered dismissed from the service.  Subsequently, this penalty was reduced to nine (9) months suspension for petitioners Adelaida Macalindong and Guia Agaton and six (6) months suspension for petitioners Leonora Gesite and Fe Lamoste.
Petitioners  appealed to the Merit System Protection Board, but it was denied. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the same was also denied for lack of merit. They are found liable for “conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service” on the ground that they “acted without due regard to the adverse consequences of their action which necessarily resulted in the suspension and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice of the pupils/students to whom (they) were responsible.” The CSC imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Their respective motions for reconsideration were denied.


ISSUE:
                 Whether or Not the mass action launched by the Public school teachers from Sept. up to the first half of Oct. constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from performing the duty as teachers due to economic reasons is valid.

RULING:
            The issue in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of their students while the petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances, however they should have exercised such right in a lawful manner.It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners’ purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services.
Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the Constitution, employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formations of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. (Bangalisan vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.



   
  

SEC. 6.THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
A.M. No. P-11-2999
 SHEILA G. DEL ROSARIO, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, RTC, BRANCH 36, SANTIAGO CITY, ISABELA, complainant, vs. MARY ANNE C. PASCUA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, SAME COURT, respondent.
February 27, 2012
FACTS:
          Respondent Mary Anne Pascua traveled to Hong Kong on 1 to 6 June 2008 during her leave of absence without securing a travel authority from the Supreme Court and that she omitted to state her intended foreign travel in her leave application.  Complainant charged also respondent of dishonesty for misrepresenting her date of birth as 27 June 1974 in her official documents, when her registered date of birth in the National Statistics Office is 7 August 1974.
            Respondent maintained that she failed to secure a travel authority from the Supreme Court due to inefficiency. Respondent assumed that since she did not have custody of and is not accountable for government funds, then she is not required to secure a clearance from the Office of the Court Administrator before she can travel abroad. On the discrepancy in her date of birth, respondent claimed that she is in the process of correcting her Certificate of Live Birth to reflect her true date of birth which is 7 August 1974.
ISSUE:
            Whether or Not a government employee unauthorized foreign travel  during her l
leave of absence is unconstitutional.

RULING:
          Undeniably  that the use of leave of absence can be regulated without impairing the employees’ right to privacy and to travel. It can only be impaired upon lawful order of the court and the interest of national security, public safety, health is at stake and as maybe provided by law. In promulgation of the Civil Service Commission the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, of which Rule XVI is the Omnibus Rules on Leave. Such rules and regulations are adopted to balance the well-being and benefit of the government employees and the efficiency and productivity in the government service. Thus, the requirement of securing approval for any leave of absence is a reasonable and valid regulation to insure continuity of service in the government. However, once a leave of absence is approved, any restriction during the approved leave on the right to travel of the government employee violates his or her constitutional right to travel.
             The administrative complaint against Mary Anne C. Pascua is therefore DISMISSED.


sec.12.Rights of an accused under custodial investigation
G.R. No. 112262.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and WILFREDO TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellants
April 2, 1996

FACTS:
            On September 1, 1985 at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Nelson Sinoy and
Gonzalo Penalver, both members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati, Metro Manila, were walking along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila
Were followed by two men, one of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy,
kicked the latter. Armando Camat followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and
stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat who in turn stabbed the former,
hitting him at the right rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became outbalanced.
Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him (Penalver).
            Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid  
Of somebody who identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan
de Dios Hospital.
Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital.Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2, 1985. The patient was discharged from the hospital only on March 15, 1986.
In traversing the criminal charge, appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied any participation in the commission of the felony.
Patrolman Odeo Cariño, to whom the case was assigned for investigation on September 2, 1985, stated based on the testimony of the unidentified witness and since Camat fitted the description  of the murdere given. Prior to the incident, he was arrested by the police officers due to act of lasciviousness. Carino directly said that appellant Camat orally admitted to him his  participation in the killing of the soldier during interrogation at the police precinct. In addition, Camat also allegedly gave the names of Wilfredo del Rosario and one Roland as his co-conspirators in the crime charged, and alluded to appellant Del Rosario as the one who actually stabbed Sinoy.


ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not the the extrajudicial confession of accused violates his rights          under custodial investigation.
2) Is the testimony of a single witness is given much weight and sufficient                  enough to convict?

RULING:

In the absence of the appellants  duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of Rights, their confessions made before Patrolman Cariño are inadmissible against them and cannot be used in support of their conviction.
Trial courts should further keep in mind that even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
However, even disregarding the extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the judgment of conviction rendered by the lower court stands and can be sustained. Worthy of consideration It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing, sufficient and trustworthy by the trial court and the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable boubt.
 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that appellants are declared guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and the civil indemnity for the death of Nelson Sinoy is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with the present jurisprudential policy.



SEC.1. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
G.R. NO. 172538

ISABELO ESPERIDA, LORENZO HIPOLITO, and ROMEO DE BELEN, petitionersvs. FRANCO K. JURADO, respondent
April 25, 2012

FACTS:
 On February 5, 2001, petitioners Isabelo Esperida, Lorenzo Hipolito, and Romeo de Belen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Franco K. Jurado, Jr. before the Labor Arbiter. 
On March 14, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionin favor of petitioners, declaring that they have been illegally dismissed and awarding them their corresponding backwages and separation pay.  Respondent appealed the decision before the National Labor Relations Commission but the latter issued a resolutiondismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.
On December 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed Resolution of the NLRC. pespondent then filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was eventually denied in the Resolutionon September 27, 2005.
However, during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, or on July 21, 2005, respondent filed before the CA a Petition to declare petitioners in Contempt of Courtagainst the petitioners.  In the said petition, respondent sought to declare herein petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court on the basis of their alleged acts of dishonesty, fraud, and falsification of documents to mislead the CA to rule in their favor.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the CA issued a Resolution ordering herein petitioners to file their Answer within 15 days from notice, showing cause why they should not be adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of court.
On February 8, 2006, counsel for petitioners filed his entry of appearance, together with a motion for extension of time, seeking that petitioners be granted 15 days from February 3, 2006, or up to February 18, 2006, within which to submit their Answer to the petition.
On March 2, 2006, the CA issued one of the assailed resolutionsdenying the motion for extension due to the delay and contained no explanation upon failure of filing it personally.
Hence, the petitioners  motions for extentions due to the reasons of counsel’s workload and failed to give instructions to his liaison officer to mail the motion and the distance is impossible for personal service. Again, through the counsel, prayed the resolution be set aside.
On April 19, 2006, the CA issued the other assailed Resolution, denying both the Omnibus Motion and Second Motion for Extension for lack of merit.
In denying the motions, the CA ratiocinated that petitioners did not file their answer within the reglementary period and clearly disregarded the rules of procedure. petitioners’ plea for liberality is, therefore, undeserving of any sympathy.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the the Court of appeals erred in considering the case submitted for decision without giving petitioners their inherent and inalienable right to due process of law.
RULING:
 The Court of Appeals erred in considering the case deemed submitted for resolution without the answerof petitioners and without setting and conducting a hearing on a fixed date and time on which petitioners may personally, or through counsel, answer the charges against them.
The contempt case against petitioners is still in the early stage of the proceedings.  The proceedings have not reached that stage wherein the court below has set a hearing to provide petitioners with the opportunity to state their defenses.  Certainly, a hearing affords the contemner the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing will also allow the court a more thorough evaluation of the defense of the contemner, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or the court itself. In fine, the proper procedure must be observed and petitioners must be afforded full and real opportunity to be heard.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to admit petitioners’ Answer.
The case shall not be deemed submitted for resolution until a hearing is conducted in accordance with the Rules.  The Court of Appeals is directed to resume the proceedings below with dispatch.











2013 bar questions

$
0
0
INSTRUCTIONS
1. This Questionnaire contains FIFTEEN (15) pages including these Instructions pages. Check the number of pages and the page numbers at the upper right hand corner of each page of this Questionnaire and make sure it has the correct number of pages and their proper numbers.
There are TWELVE (12) Essay Questions numbered I to XII (with subquestions), and TWENTY (20) Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) numbered I to XX, to be answered within four (4) hours.
The essay portion contains questions that are worth 80% of the whole examination, while the MCQ portion contains questions worth20%.
2. Read each question very carefully and write your answers in your Bar Examination Notebook in the same order the questions are posed. Write your answers only at the front, not the back, page of every sheet in your Examination Notebook. Note well the allocated percentage points for each number, question, or sub-question. In your answers, use the numbering system in the questionnaire.
If the sheets provided in your Examination Notebook are not sufficient for your answers, use the back pages of every sheet of your Examination Notebook, starting at the back page of the first sheet and the back of the succeeding sheets thereafter.
3. Answer the Essay questions legibly, clearly, and concisely. Start each number on a separate page. An answer to a sub-question under the same number may be written continuously on the same page and the immediately succeeding pages until completed.
Your answer should demonstrate your ability to analyze the facts presented by the question, to select the material from the immaterial facts, and to discern the points upon which the question turns. It should show your knowledge and understanding of the pertinent principles and theories of law involved and their qualifications and limitations. It should demonstrate your ability to apply the law to the given facts, and to reason logically in a lawyer-like manner to a sound conclusion from the given premises.
A mere "Yes" or "No" answer without any corresponding explanation or discussion will not be given any credit. Thus, always briefly but fully explain your answers although the question does not expressly ask for an explanation. At the same time, remember that a complete explanation does not require that you volunteer information or discuss legal doctrines that are not necessary or pertinent to the solution to the problem. You do not need to re-write or repeat the question in your Examination Notebook.
4. MCQs are to be answered by writing in your Examination Notebook the capital letter (A, B, C, D, or E) corresponding to your chosen answer. The MCQ answers should begin in the page following the last page of your essay answers.
There is only one correct answer to every MCQ; choose the BEST answer from among the offered choices. Note that some MCQs may need careful analysis both of the questions and the choices offered.
5. Make sure you do not write your name or any extraneous note/s or distinctive marking/s on your Examination Notebook that can serve as an identifying mark/s (such as names that are not in the given questions, prayers, or private notes to the Examiner).
Writing, leaving or making any distinguishing or identifying mark in the Examination Notebook is considered cheating and can disqualify you for the Bar examinations.
You can use the questionnaire for notes you may wish/need to write during the examination.
HAND IN YOUR NOTEBOOK WITH THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
J. ARTURO D. BRION
Chairman
2013 Bar Examinations
ESSAY QUESTIONS
I.
In the last quarter of 2012, about 5,000 container vans of imported goods intended for the Christmas Season were seized by agents of the Bureau of Customs. The imported goods were released only on January 10,2013. A group of importers got together and filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs.
The Bureau of Customs raised the defense of immunity from suit and, alternatively, that liability should lie with XYZ Corp. which the Bureau had contracted for the lease of ten (10) high powered van cranes but delivered only five (5) of these cranes, thus causing the delay in its cargo-handling operations. It appears that the Bureau, despite demand, did not pay XYZ Corp. the Php 1.0 Million deposit and advance rental required under their contract.
(A) Will the action by the group of importers prosper? (5%)
(B) Can XYZ Corp. sue the Bureau of Customs to collect rentals for the delivered cranes? (5'%)
II.
While Congress was in session, the President appointed eight acting Secretaries. A group of Senators from the minority bloc questioned the validity of the appointments in a petition before the Supreme Court on the ground that while Congress is in session, no appointment that requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, can be made without the latter's consent, and that an undersecretary should instead be designated as Acting Secretary.
Should the petition be granted? (5%)
III.
A robbery with homicide had taken place and Lito, Badong and Rolliewere invited for questioning based on the information furnished by a neighbor that he saw them come out of the victim's house at about the time of the robbery/killing. The police confronted the three with this and other information they had gathered, and pointedly accused them of committing the crime.
Lito initially resisted, but eventually broke down and admitted his participation in the crime. Elated by this break and desirous of securing a written confession soonest, the police called City Attorney Juan Buan to serve as the trio's counsel and to advise them about their rights during the investigation.
Badong and Rollie, weakened in spirit by Lito's early admission, likewise admitted their participation. The trio thus signed a joint extra-judicial confession which served as the main evidence against them at their trial. They were convicted based on their confession.
Should the judgment of conviction be affirmed or reversed on appeal? (5%)
IV.
Congress enacted a law providing for trial by jury for those charged with crimes or offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The law provides for the qualifications of members of the jury, the guidelines for the bar and bench for their selection, the manner a trial by jury shall operate, and the procedures to be followed.
Is the law constitutional? (6%)
V.
As a leading member of the Lapiang Mandirigma in the House of Representatives, you were tasked by the party to initiate the moves to impeach the President because he entered into an executive agreement with the US Ambassador for the use of the former Subic Naval Base by the US Navy, for free, i.e., without need to pay rent nor any kind of fees as a show of goodwill to the U.S. because of the continuing harmonious RP-US relations.
Cite at least two (2) grounds for impeachment and explain why you chose them. (6%)
VI.
Congress passed Republic Act No. 7711 to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
In a petition filed with the Supreme Court, Anak Ti Ilocos, an association of Ilocano professionals, argued that Republic Act No. 7711discarded the definition of the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and in related treaties; excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic baselines; and converted internal waters into archipelagic waters.
Is the petition meritorious? (6%)
VII.
As he was entering a bar, Arnold -who was holding an unlit cigarette in his right hand -was handed a match box by someone standing near the doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the matchbox to light his cigarette and as he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard noticed. The guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its contents. After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he immediately arrested Arnold and called in the police.
At the police station, the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught Arnold in possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the guard's statement; he steadfastly remained silent and refused to give any written statement. Later in court, the guard testified and narrated the statements he gave the police over Arnold's counsel's objections. While Arnold presented his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension had been set-up, he himself did not testify.
The court convicted Arnold, relying largely on his admission of the charge by silence at the police investigation and during trial.
From the constitutional law perspective, was the court correct in its ruling? (6%)
VIII.
Bobby, an incoming third year college student, was denied admission by his university, a premiere educational institution in Manila, after he failed in three (3) major subjects in his sophomore year. The denial of admission was based on the university's rules and admission policies.
Unable to cope with the depression that his non-admission triggered, Bobby committed suicide. His family sued the school for damages, citing the school's grossly unreasonable rules that resulted in the denial of admission. They argued that these rules violated Bobby's human rights and the priority consideration that the Constitution gives to the education of the youth.
You are counsel for the university. Explain your arguments in support of the university's case. (6%)
IX.
Conrad is widely known in the neighborhood as a drug addict. He is also suspected of being a member of the notorious "Akyat-Condo Gang" that has previously broken into and looted condominium units in the area.
Retired Army Colonel Sangre – who is known as an anti-terrorism fighter who disdained human and constitutional rights and has been nicknamed "terror of Mindanao"–is now the Head of Security of Capricorn Land Corporation, the owner and developer of Sagittarius Estates where a series of robberies has recently taken place.
On March l, 2013, Conrad informed his mother, Vannie, that uniformed security guards had invited him for a talk in their office but he refused to come. Later that day, however, Conrad appeared to have relented; he was seen walking into the security office flanked by two security guards. Nobody saw him leave the office afterwards.
Conrad did not go home that night and was never seen again. The following week and after a week-long search, Vannie feared the worst because of Col. Sangre's reputation. She thus reported Conrad's disappearance to the police. When nothing concrete resulted from the police investigation, Vannie – at the advice of counsel - f1led a petition for a writ of amparo to compel Col. Sangre and the Sagittarius Security Office to produce Conrad and to hold them liable and responsible for Conrad's disappearance.
(A) Did Vannie's counsel give the correct legal advice? (6%)
(B) If the petition would prosper, can Col. Sangre be held liable and/or responsible for Conrad's disappearance? (6%)
X.
The Ambassador of the Republic of Kafiristan referred to you for handling, the case of the Embassy's Maintenance Agreement with CBM, a private domestic company engaged in maintenance work. The Agreement binds CBM, for a defined fee, to maintain the Embassy's elevators, air-conditioning units and electrical facilities. Section 10 of the Agreement provides that the Agreement shall be governed by Philippine laws and that any legal action shall be brought before the proper court of Makati. Kafiristan terminated the Agreement because CBM allegedly did not comply with their agreed maintenance standards.
CBM contested the tennination and filed a complaint againstKafiristan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Ambassador wants you to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity from suit and to oppose the position that under Section 10 of the Agreement, Kafiristan expressly waives its immunity from suit.
Under these facts, can the Embassy successfully invoke immunity from suit? (6%)
XI.
In her interview before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC),Commissioner Annie Amorsolo of the National Labor Relations Commission claims that she should be given credit for judicial service because as NLRC Commissioner, she has the rank of a Justice of the Court of Appeals; she adjudicates cases that are appealable to the Court of Appeals; she is assigned car plate No. 10; and she is, by law, entitled to the rank, benefits and privileges of a Court of Appeals Justice.
If you are a member of the JBC, would you give credit to this explanation? (6%)
XII.
In the May 2013 elections, the Allied Workers' Group of the Philippines (AWGP), representing land-based and sea-based workers in the Philippines and overseas, won in the party list congressional elections. Atty. Abling, a labor lawyer, is its nominee.
As part of the party's advocacy and services, Congressman Abling engages in labor counseling, particularly for local workers with claims against their employers and for those who need representation in collective bargaining negotiations with employers. When labor cases arise, AWGP enters its appearance in representation of the workers and the Congressman makes it a point to be there to accompany the workers, although a retained counsel also formally enters his appearance and is invariably there. Congressman Abling largely takes a passive role in the proceedings although he occasionally speaks to supplement the retained counsel's statements. It is otherwise in CBA negotiations where he actively participates.
Management lawyers, feeling that a congressman should not actively participate in cases before labor tribunals and before employers because of the influence a congressman can wield, filed a disbarment case against the Congressman before the Supreme Court for his violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for breach of trust, in relation particularly with the prohibitions on legislators under the Constitution.
Is the cited ground for disbarment meritorious? (6%)
MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
I. The equal protection clause is violated by __________. (1%)
(A) a law prohibiting motorcycles from plying on limited access highways.
(B) a law granting Value Added Tax exemption to electric cooperatives that sells electricity to the "homeless poor."
(C) a law providing that a policeman shall be preventively suspended until the termination of a criminal case against him.
(D) a law providing higher salaries to teachers in public schools who are "foreign hires."
(E) a law that grants rights to local Filipino workers but denies the same rights to overseas Filipino workers.
II. Offended by the President's remarks that the Bureau of Customs is a pit of misfits and the corrupt, the Bureau of Customs Employees Association composed of 3,000 workers seeks your legal advice on how best to protest what it views to be the President's baseless remarks.
A prudent legal advice is that __________. (1%)
(A) employees can go on mass leave of absence for one week
(B) employees can march and rally at Mendiola every Monday
(C) employees can barricade the gates of the Port of Manila at South Harbor and call for the resignation of the incumbent Commissioner of Customs
(D) employees can wear black arm bands and pins with the word "UNFAIR" inscribed
(E) None of the above can legally be done.
III. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1234 requiring all candidates for public offices to post an election bond equivalent to the one (1) year salary for the position for which they are candidates. The bond shall be forfeited if the candidates fail to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast.
Is Republic Act No. 1234 valid? (1%)
(A) It is valid as the bond is a means of ensuring fair, honest, peaceful and orderly elections.
(B) It is valid as the bond requirement ensures that only candidates with sufficient means and who cannot be corrupted, can runfor public office.
(C) It is invalid as the requirement effectively imposes a property qualification to run for public office.
(D) It is invalid as the amount of the surety bond is excessive and unconscionable.
(E) It is valid because it is a reasonable requirement; the Constitution itself expressly supports the accountability of public officers.
IV. What is the legal effect of decisions of the International Court of Justice in cases submitted to it for resolution? (1%)
(A) The decision is binding on other countries in similar situations.
(B) The decision is not binding on any country, even the countries that are parties to the case.
(C) The decision is binding only on the parties but only with respect to that particular case.
(D) The decision is not binding on the parties and is only advisory.
(E) The binding effect on the parties depends on their submission agreement.
V. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the exclusive economic zone refers to an area. (1%)
(A) that is at least 100 miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured
(B) that is at least 200 miles but not to exceed 300 miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured
(C) beyond and adjacent to a country's territorial sea which cannot go beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured
(D) that can go beyond 3 nautical miles but cannot extend 300 nautical miles from the baselines from which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured
(E) None of the above.
VI. A child born under either the 1973 or the 1987 Constitution, whose father or mother is a Filipino citizen at the time of his birth, is __________. (1%)
(A) not a Filipino citizen as his father and mother must both be Filipino citizens at the time of his birth
(B) not a Filipino citizen if his mother is a Filipino citizen but his father is not, at the time of his birth
(C) a Filipino citizen no matter where he or she may be born
(D) a Filipino citizen provided the child is born in the Philippines
(E) a Filipino citizen if he or she so elects upon reaching the age of 21
VII. Who has control of the expenditure of public funds? (1%)
(A) The Office of the President through the Department of Budget and Management.
(B) The House of Representatives from where all appropriation bills emanate.
(C) The Senate through its Committee on Finance.
(D) The Congress of the Republic of the Philippines.
(E) Both the members of Congress and the President acting jointly, if so provided by the General Appropriations Act.
VIII. May the power of cities to raise revenues be limited by an executive order of the President? (1%)
(A) Yes, because local government units are under the administrative control of the President through the Department of Interior and Local Government.
(B) No, because local government units now enjoy full local fiscal autonomy.
(C) No, because only limitations established by Congress can define and limit the powers of local governments.
(D) Yes, because the President has the power and authority to impose reasonable restrictions on the power of cities to raise revenues.
(E) Yes, if so provided in a city's charter.
IX. The provision under the Constitution -that any member who took no part, dissented, or inhibited from a decision or resolution must state the reason for his dissent or non-participation - applies __________. (1%)
(A) only to the Supreme Court
(B) to both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
(C) to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
(D) to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
(E) to all collegial judicial and quasi-judicial adjudicatory bodies
X. Choose the least accurate statement about the independence guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to the following constitutional bodies: (1%)
(A) The Constitution guarantees the COMELEC decisional and institutional independence similar to that granted to theJudiciary.
(B) All bodies labeled as "independent" by the Constitution enjoyfiscal autonomy as an attribute of their independence.
(C) Not all bodies labeled as "independent" by the Constitution were intended to be independent from the Executive branch of government.
(D) The Constitution guarantees various degrees of independence from the other branches of government when it labels bodies as "independent".
(E) The COMELEC, the COA, and the CSC enjoy the same degree of independence.
XI. At the Senate impeachment trial of Justice Pablo P. San Quintin, Hon. Emilio A. Tan, Congressman and Impeachment Panel Manager, wrote the Supreme Court requesting that the prosecutors be allowed to examine thecourt records of Stewards Association of the Philippines, Inc. (SAP!) v. Filipinas Air, et al., G.R. No. 987654, a case that is still pending. The High Court __________. (1%)
(A) may grant the request by reason of inter-departmental courtesy
(B) may grant the request as the records of the Filipinas Air case are public records
(C) should deny the request since records of cases that are pending for decision are privileged except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that are available to the public
(D) should deny the request because it violates the Court's independence and the doctrine of separation of powers
(E) should grant the request because of the sui generis nature of the power of impeachment, provided that the Bill of Rights is not violated
XII. Mr. Sinco sued the government for damages. After trial, the court ruled in his favor and awarded damages amounting to P50 million against the government. To satisfy the judgment against the government, which valid option is available to Mr. Sinco? ( 1%)
(A) Garnish the government funds deposited at the Land Bank.
(B) File a claim with the Commission on Audit (COA) pursuant to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by Presidential Decree1445.
(C) Make representations with the Congress to appropriate the amount to satisfy the judgment.
(D) File a petition for mandamus in court to compel Congress to appropriate P50 million to satisfy the judgment.
(E) Proceed to execute the judgment as provided by the Rules of Court because the State allowed itself to be sued.
XIII. Which of the following provisions of the Constitution does not confer rights that can be enforced in the courts but only provides guidelines for legislative or executive action? (l%)
(A) The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
(B) The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
(C) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
(D) The right of the people to information on matters. of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
(E) All the above only provide guidelines and are not self-executing.
XIV. The President entered into an executive agreement with Vietnam for the supply to the Philippines of animal feeds not to exceed 40,000 tons in any one year. The Association of Animal Feed Sellers of the Philippines questioned the executive agreement for being contrary to R.A. 462 which prohibits the importation of animal feeds from Asian countries. Is the challenge correct? (1%)
(A) Yes, the executive agreement is contrary to an existing domestic law.
(B) No, the President is solely in charge of foreign relations and all his actions in this role form part of the law of the land.
(C) No, international agreements are sui generis and stand independently of our domestic laws.
(D) Yes, the executive agreement is actually a treaty which does not take effect without ratification by the Senate.
(E) Yes, the challenge is correct because there is no law empowering the President to undertake the importation.
XV. The separation of Church and State is most clearly violated when __________. (1%)
(A) the State funds a road project whose effect is to make a church more accessible to its adherents
(B) the State declares the birthplace of a founder of a religious sect as a national historical site
(C) the State expropriates church property in order to construct an expressway that, among others, provides easy access to the Church's main cathedral
(D) the State gives vehicles to bishops to assist them in church-related charitable projects
(E) the State allows prayers in schools for minor children without securing the prior consent of their parents
XVI. Patricio was elected member of the House of Representative in the May 2010 Elections. His opponent Jose questioned Patricio's victory before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and later with the Supreme Court.
In a decision promulgated in November 2011, the Court ruled in Jose's favor; thus, Patricio was ousted from his seat in Congress. Within a year from that decision, the President can appoint Patricio __________. (1%)
(A) only as a member of the board of directors of any government owned and controlled corporation
(B) only as a deputy Ombudsman
(C) only as a Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission
(D) only as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(E) to any position as no prohibition applies to Patricio
XVII. Senator GSC proposed a bill increasing excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products. The generated incremental revenues shall be used for the universal health care program for all Filipinos and for tobacco farmers' livelihood. After the Senate passed the bill on third reading, it was transmitted to the House of Representatives which approved the bill in toto. The President eventually signed it into law. Atty. JFC filed a petition before the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
Is the law constitutional? (1%)
(A) The law is constitutional because it is for a public purpose and has duly satisfied the three-readings-on-separate-days rule in both Houses.
(B) The law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution; it is limited only to alcohol and liquor products.
(C) It is constitutional because of the Enrolled Bill Theory.
(D) It is constitutional because it is valid in form and substance and complied with the required lawmaking procedures.(E) None of the above is correct.
XVIII. Which of the following statements is correct? (1%)
(A) The President, with the concurrence of the Monetary Board, can guarantee a foreign loan on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
(B) Congress may, by law, provide limitations on the President's power to contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
(C) In order to be valid and effective, treaties and executive agreements must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(D) The President shall, at the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to Congress a complete report of the loans contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations.
(E) All the above choices are defective in some respects.
XIX. Candida has been administratively charged of immorality for openly living with Manuel, a married man. Candida argues that her conjugal arrangement with Manuel fully conforms with their religious beliefs and with the teachings of their church.
In resolving whether Candida should be administratively penalized, which is the best test to apply? (1%)
(A) Clear and Present Danger Test
(B) Compelling State Interest Test
(C) Balancing of interests Test
(D) Conscientious Objector Test
(E) Dangerous Tendency Test
XX. Rafael questioned the qualifications of Carlos as congressman of the Third District of Manila on the ground that Carlos is a citizen of the USA. The decision disqualifying Carlos for being a US citizen came only in March 2010, i.e., after the adjournment of the session of Congress on the 3'd year of the position's three-year term.
What was Carlos' status during his incumbency as congressman? (1%)
(A) He was a de jure officer, having been duly elected and proclaimed.
(B) He was not a public officer because he effectively was not entitled to be a congressman.
(C) He was a de jure officer since he completed the service of his term before he was disqualified.
(D) He was a de facto officer since he had served and was only disqualified later.
(E) He neither possesses de jure nor de facto status as such determination is p

2012 bar questions

$
0
0
  1. Constitution is defined by Cooley as:
    1. a body of statutory, administrative and political provisions by which the three branches of government are defined;
    2. a body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised;
    3. a body of rules and edicts emanating from the rulings of courts and written guidelines of the executive and the legislature by which government is governed;
    4. a body of interpretations and rules by which the three branches of government are judged for purposes of sovereign compliance with good corporate governance.
  2. The three essential parts of a Constitution are:
    1. the bill of rights, governmental organization and functions, and method of amendment;
    2. the preamble, the bill of rights, and provisions on checks and balances;
    3. the national territory, the declaration of principles and state policies, and the transitory provisions;
    4. the executive department, the legislative department and the judiciary.
  3. The constitutional provision on initiative and referendum is not self-executory. This is so because it requires:
    1. an implementing resolution from the COMELEC;
    2. an implementing resolution from the Supreme Court;
    3. an implementing legislation;
    4. an implementing resolution from the party-list representative of the House of Representatives.
  4. In an amendment to the constitution by "initiative and referendum", the "initiative" phase is meant that the people propose the amendments. There is a valid proposal when a proposition has received the approval of:
    1. at least 3% of the persons of majority age of each district, and 12% of the registered voters of the region from proposal emanates;
    2. at least 3% of the registered voters of each province and 12% of the total number of registered voters nationwide;
    3. at least 3% of the registered voters of each district and 12% of the total number of registered voters nationwide;
    4. more than 3% of the 3% of the registered voters of each district but less than 12% of the total number of registered voters nationwide.
  5. The Constitution declares that the Philippines is a republican state. Republicanism means:
    1. the form of government must be presidential;
    2. the representatives of the government are elected by the people;
    3. sovereignty resides in the elected representatives of the government;
    4. the form of government cannot be changed by the people.
  6. A chief characteristic of the presidential form of government is:
    1. concentration of power in the judiciary thru the power of expanded judicial review;
    2. supremacy of the presidency compared to the totality of powers of the legislative;
    3. regular periodic election of the President for a fixed term;
    4. unlimited term for the President for as long as elected by the people in free and honest elections.
  7. Which of the following best exemplifies how the system of checks and balances is carried out:
    1. the legislature passes a law that prohibits the president from commuting a judiciary imposed sentence, as a check of the president;
    2. the President pardons a convict as a way to set aside or modify a judgment of the judiciary;
    3. the judiciary overturns a pardon granted by the President as a check on executions;
    4. the President pardons an accused after arraignment in the interest of justice.
  8. Which phrase best completes the statement – The starting point of the principle of separation of powers is the assumption of the division of the functions of government into three distinct classes:
    1. the bill of rights, state policies, and social justice and human rights;
    2. the accountability of public officers, the constitutional commissions, and the national economy and patrimony;
    3. the self-executing provisions, the non-self-executing provisions, and the self-evident social justice provisions;
    4. the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
  9. The Constitution provides that the "separation of church and state shall be inviolable." This is implemented most by the constitutional principles embodied in:
    1. the free exercise clause;
    2. the non-establishment clause;
    3. the freedom of religious belief clause;
    4. the freedom of religion clause.
  10. Which one of the following is a non-self-executing provision of the Constitution:
    1. no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech;
    2. no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion;
    3. no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law;
    4. the state shall encourage and support researches and studies on the arts and culture.
  11. Basic Philippine law, in respect of the modes of acquiring citizenship, follows the rule(s) of:
    1. jus soli and jus sanguinis;
    2. naturalization and provides for jus soli;
    3. jus sanguinis and provides for naturalization;
    4. none of the above.
  12. Dual allegiance by citizen is:
    1. inimical to the national interest and is therefore proscribed by law;
    2. inimical to the national interest and is therefore prescribed by law;
    3. inimical to the national interest and therefore shall be dealt with by law;
    4. inimical to the national interest and is therefore outside of coverage of law.
  13. Margarita was born in 1986 to a Filipino mother and Swedish father. She has been living and continues to live in the US for the last 20 years and has also been naturalized as a US citizen. She recently reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Can Margarita vote in the next national elections?
    1. Yes. Dual citizens who are not residents may register under the Overseas Absentee Voting Law.
    2. Yes. Margarita is a Filipino citizen and thus may enjoy the right to suffrage like everyone else without registering as an overseas absentee voter.
    3. No. Margarita fails the residency requirement under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution for Filipinos.
    4. No. Dual citizens upon renunciation of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to their homeland as a consequence.
  14. Identify which one is an invalid exercise of the legislative power:
    1. legislation by local government on purely local matters;
    2. law granting an administrative agency the power to define policy and fix standards on price control;
    3. law authorizing the President, in times of war or other national emergency, for a limited period, subject to prescribed restrictions, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy;
    4. law authorizing the President to fix, within specific limits, tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other duties, within the framework of the national development program of the government.
  15. Which one of the following theories does not support the valid delegation of authority by the Congress to an administrative agency:
    1. an administrative agency may "fill up the details" of a statute;
    2. the legislature may leave to another body the ascertainment of facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation;
    3. an administrative agency has equal expertise with the legislature in crafting and implementing laws;
    4. contingent legislation.
  16. The rule in Article V1, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution that "Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory" is a prohibition against:
    1. re-apportionment;
    2. commandeering of votes;
    3. gerrymandering;
    4. re-districting.
  17. Article V1, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires that for a city to be entitled to have at least one representative, its population shall be at least:
    1. 250,000;
    2. 150,000;
    3. 100,000;
    4. 175,000.
  18. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session for all offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than:
    1. life imprisonment;
    2. reclusion perpetua;
    3. six years imprisonment;
    4. four years imprisonment.
  19. No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before:
    1. any regional court;
    2. any court of justice;
    3. any inferior court;
    4. any appellate court.
  20. Which of the following can be changed by an ordinary law enacted by Congress?
    1. Commencement of the term of office of Senators;
    2. Date of regular election for President and Vice Presidential;
    3. Authority to transfer appropriation;
    4. Regular election of the members of Congress.
  21. Congress shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war by vote of:
    1. three-fourths of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting jointly;
    2. two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting jointly;
    3. two-thirds of both Houses in separate session assembled, voting jointly;
    4. two-thirds of both Houses in joint session, voting separately.
  22. If by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuring fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed:
    1. referred;
    2. unacted;
    3. refilled;
    4. re-enacted.
  23. Provisions unrelated to an appropriation bill are considered prohibited. These are called:
    1. interlopers;
    2. riders;
    3. outriggers;
    4. add-ons.
  24. The requirement that "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" prevents:
    1. rollercoaster legislation;
    2. log-rolling legislation;
    3. rolling fields legislation;
    4. loggerhead legislation.
  25. The power of the President to veto any particular part in an appropriation revenue, or tariff bill, is called the:
    1. specific veto;
    2. revenue veto;
    3. item veto;
    4. monetary veto.
  26. A tax is progressive when:
    1. the rate fluctuates as the tax base decreases;
    2. the rate increases as the tax base remains the same;
    3. the rate increases as the tax base increases;
    4. the rate decreases as the tax base increases.
  27. When the Supreme Court sits en banc, cases are decided by the concurrence of a majority of the members who:
    1. actually sent in memos on matters for deliberation and called in their votes thereon;
    2. actually participated in the oral arguments and voted thereon;
    3. actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon;
    4. actually took part in the voting thereon and took notes on the actual deliberations.
  28. When the Supreme Court sits in division, cases can be decided by as few as a minimum of:
    1. three votes;
    2. four votes;
    3. five votes;
    4. six votes.
  29. A person who has a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement is considered to have:
    1. understanding to challenge the governmental act;
    2. standing to challenge the governmental act;
    3. opportunity to challenge the governmental act;
    4. familiarity to challenge the governmental act.
  30. Congressman Sugar Oll authored a bill called House Bill No, 0056 which legalizes jueteng. When the Bill became law (RA 10156), Fr. Nosu Gal, a priest, filed a petition seeking for the nullification of RA 10156 on the ground that it is unconstitutional as it violates Section 13, Article II, of the 1987 Constitution which states that "The state recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being". Fr. Gal filed the petition as a concerned citizen and as taxpayer. Does Fr. Gal have locus standi?
    1. No, because Fr. Gal has no personal and substantial interest that will be prejudiced by the implementation of the law;
    2. No, the law concerns neither citizens nor expenditure of public funds;
    3. Yes, because the issue is of transcendental importance;
    4. Yes, because as priest, Fr. Gal has special interest in the well-being of the youth.
  31. Where there is "the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentially of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncement by various departments on a question," describes what kind of political question:
    1. adherence kind;
    2. prudential kind;
    3. respectful kind;
    4. deference kind.
  32. The "operative fact" doctrine of constitutional law is applied when a law is declared:
    1. operative;
    2. factual;
    3. constitutional;
    4. unconstitutional.
  33. The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers:
    1. police power, power of sequestration, power of foreign policy;
    2. power of immigration, municipal power, legislative power;
    3. executive power, legislative power, judicial power;
    4. police power, power of eminent domain, power of taxation.
  34. The most essential, insistent and the least limitable of (government) powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs, is:
    1. emergency power;
    2. police power;
    3. legislative power;
    4. power to declare martial law.
  35. 35. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, which right occupies the highest preferred position:
    1. right to academic freedom;
    2. right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
    3. right to freedom of expression and of assembly;
    4. right to equal health.
  36. In which of the following would there be no double jeopardy even if a subsequent case is filed?
    1. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor objected. Dismissal granted;
    2. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, the prosecutor moves for dismissal with the consent of Pot. Granted;
    3. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor posts no objections. Dismissal granted;
    4. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable postponements against Pot’s wishes, the prosecutor moves for dismissal over the objections of Pot. Granted.
  37. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Bill of Rights, which provides for the exclusion of evidence that violate the right to privacy of communication and correspondence, to come under the exclusionary rule, the evidence must be obtained by:
    1. private individuals acting on their own;
    2. government agents;
    3. private individuals acting on orders of superiors;
    4. former high government officials.
  38. The complementing regime that best characterizes the guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are:
    1. prior punishment and moderate punishment;
    2. prior censorship and subsequent remedies;
    3. no prior restraint and subsequent punishment;
    4. no prior restraint and no subsequent punishment.
  39. The free exercise and non-establishment clauses pertain to which right under the Bill of Rights:
    1. liberty of movement;
    2. liberty of abode;
    3. religion;
    4. life and liberty.
  40. The Gangnam Style’s Witnesses (whose tenets are derogatory to the Catholic Church), applied for a permit to use the public plaza and kiosk to hold their religious meeting on the occasion of their founding anniversary. Mayor Lebron allowed them to use the northwestern part of the plaza but not the kiosk (which is a few meters away from the Catholic church). Members of the Gangnam Style Witnesses claim that the act of Mayor Lebron is a violation of their freedom of assembly and religion. Is this correct?
    1. No, because this is valid exercise of police power;
    2. Yes, because the plaza being of public use can be used by anybody regardless of religious belief;
    3. No, because historical experience shows that peace and order may be disturbed whenever two opposing religious groups or beliefs expound their dogmas;
    4. Yes, because there is no clear and present danger in holding a religious meeting by another religious group near a catholic church.
  41. Which one is NOT a recognized limitation to the right to information on matters of public concern:
    1. national security matters;
    2. trade secrets and banking transactions;
    3. criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters;
    4. government research data used as a basis for policy development.
  42. Which one of the following circumstances is NOT an element of taking under eminent domain:
    1. entering upon public property for a momentary period;
    2. under color of legal authority;
    3. devoting it to public use;
    4. as substantially to cust the owner of all beneficial ownership.
  43. Market value for purposes of determining just compensation in eminent domain has been described as the fair value of property:
    1. between one who desires to purchase and one does not desire to sell;
    2. between one who desires to purchase and one who wants to delay selling;
    3. between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell;
    4. between one who desires to purchase on terms and one who desires to sell after a period of time.
  44. Under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, etc. The investigation referred to is called:
    1. preliminary investigation;
    2. summary investigation;
    3. criminal investigation;
    4. custodial investigation.
  45. All persons charged shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with:
    1. offenses punishable by death when evidence of guilt is strong;
    2. offenses punishable by life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong;
    3. offenses punishable by death when evidence of guilt is weak;
    4. offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
  46. Criminal trial may proceed, notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified, and his failure to appear is unjustifiable, after:
    1. preliminary investigation;
    2. arraignment;
    3. sentencing;
    4. prosecution has rested its case.
  47. The requisites of a valid trial in absentia exclude:
    1. Wherein his/her failure to appear is unjustifiable;
    2. Wherein he/she allows himself/herself to be identified by the witness in his/her absence, without further unqualified admitting that every time a witness mentions a name by which he/she is known, it shall be understood to refer to him/her;
    3. Wherein he/she has been duly notified of the trial;
    4. Wherein the accused has already been arraigned.
  48. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of:
    1. imminent danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;
    2. grave danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;
    3. clear and present danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;
    4. invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
  49. The right of the accused against self-incrimination will be violated if:
    1. he is charged with violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act and he was required to produce his bank passbook;
    2. he is a public officer charged with amassing ill-gotten wealth and his statement of assets and liabilities will be presented as evidence;
    3. his gun was subjected to a ballistics test;
    4. a sample of his blood was taken if his blood type matches the blood type found at the scene of the crime.
  50. The death penalty shall not be imposed:
    1. unless for compelling reasons involving death penalty crimes and the executive hereafter provides for it;
    2. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and a constitutional amendment provides for it;
    3. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and Congress hereafter provides for it;
    4. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and the Supreme Court hereafter upholds it.
  51. An ex post facto law has been defined as one:
    1. which aggravates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;
    2. which mitigates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;
    3. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
    4. which aggravates a crime or makes it non-criminal after it was committed.
  52. A bill of attainder is:
    1. an executive act which inflicts punishment without tender;
    2. a judicial act which inflicts punishment without tender;
    3. a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial;
    4. a legislative act which pardons punishment after tender.
  53. Which one of the following is NOT an independent Constitutional Commission under Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution:
    1. Commission on Elections;
    2. Commission on Human Rights;
    3. Civil Service Commission;
    4. Commission on Audit.
  54. The independent Constitutional Commissions enjoy:
    1. decisional autonomy;
    2. organizational autonomy;
    3. fiscal autonomy;
    4. quasi-judicial autonomy.
  55. The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a:
    1. Chairman and a Commissioner;
    2. Chairman and two (2) Commissioners;
    3. Chairman and three (3) Commissioners;
    4. Chairman and four (4) Commissioners.
  56. In Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, the Supreme Court held that the personality of the petitioners to sue is based on the concept of:
    1. ecological responsibility;
    2. environmental accountability;
    3. intergenerational responsibility;
    4. interdisciplinary responsibility.
  57. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitutor, local government can only be:
    1. an imperuim in imperio;
    2. an infa-sovereign subdivision;
    3. a sovereign nation;
    4. a sovereign entity.
  58. Which one is NOT among the Constitutionally mandated grounds for impeachment of impeachable officials:
    1. culpable violation of the Constitution;
    2. treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes;
    3. betrayal of public trust;
    4. culpable violation of the duty to be at all times accountable to the people.
  59. Which is NOT an impeachable public officer:
    1. a justice of the Supreme Court;
    2. a commissioner of the Comelec;
    3. the administrator of the Supreme Court;
    4. the Ombudsman.
  60. Which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment:
    1. the Senate;
    2. the House of Representatives;
    3. the Senate President;
    4. the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
  61. At least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives may file articles of impeachment by:
    1. verified bill and resolution;
    2. verified complaint and resolution;
    3. verified notice and resolution;
    4. verified complaint and notice.
  62. The President cannot grant pardon in cases of impeachment. He may however exercise such power when:
    1. A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding is subject to prosecution, trial and punishment in an ordinary criminal action;
    2. A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding is granted an absolute pardon;
    3. A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding files his appeal before the Supreme Court;
    4. None of the above.
  63. A public officer impeached and removed from office shall:
    1. nevertheless be immure from prosecution, trial and punishment according to law;
    2. nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
    3. nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law;
    4. nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment only for criminal acts under the law.
  64. The Ombudsman and his deputies are appointed by the President from a list prepared by:
    1. the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
    2. the Commission on Appointments;
    3. the Judicial and Bar Council;
    4. the Supreme Court.
  65. SALN means:
    1. Summary of assets, liabilities and net worth;
    2. Statement of assets in banks, liabilities and net worth;
    3. Statement of assets, liabilities and net worth;
    4. Statement of personal assets, liabilities and net worth.
  66. The independent economic planning agency of the Government as provided for by the Constitution is the:
    1. National Privatization Office;
    2. National Productivity Commission;
    3. National Economic Development Authority;
    4. National Economic Council.
  67. The Independent Central Monetary Authority of the Government is the:
    1. Bankers Association of the Philippines;
    2. Philippine Mission of the International Monetary Fund;
    3. Central Bank of the Philippines;
    4. World Bank, Philippine Affiliate.
  68. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines only upon prior concurrence of the:
    1. House of Representatives;
    2. Senate;
    3. Central Bank;
    4. Monetary Board.
  69. Bona fide associations of citizens which demonstrate capacity of promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure are:
    1. independent party-list organizations;
    2. independent sectoral organizations;
    3. independent indigenous organizations;
    4. independent people’s organizations.
  70. The principal function of the Commission on Human Rights is:
    1. issue writs of injunction/ restraining orders;
    2. investigatory;
    3. quasi-judicial;
    4. rule-making.
  71. Optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools is allowed provided it be:
    1. without additional overtime cost to Government;
    2. without additional cost to Government;
    3. without additional cost for religious books to Government;
    4. without additional power consumption costs to Government.
  72. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed:
    1. in all public institutions;
    2. in all elementary and high schools;
    3. in all schools;
    4. in all institutions of higher learning.
  73. Under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which one of the following is NOT considered a source of international law:
    1. international conventions;
    2. international custom;
    3. international humanitarian law;
    4. general principles of law.
  74. In international law, it is a norm which States cannot derogate or deviate from their agreements:
    1. terra nullius;
    2. opinio juris;
    3. jus cogens;
    4. jus cogentus.
  75. In international law, the status of an entity as a State is accepted by other States through this act. It is the "act by which another State acknowledges that the political entity recognized possesses the attributes of statehood."
    1. accession;
    2. recognition;
    3. acknowledgment;
    4. attribution.
  76. An act or process by which a State, in compliance with a formal demand or request, surrenders to another State an alleged offender or fugitive criminal who has sought refuge in the territory of the first State, in order to stand trial or complete his prison term:
    1. extramediation;
    2. exterrertioriality;
    3. extradition;
    4. extraterritoriality.
  77. This doctrine considers the general or customary norms of international law as a part of municipal law and are to be enforced as such, without regard as to whether they are enacted as statutory or legislative rules or not:
    1. accession;
    2. incorporation;
    3. accretion;
    4. adoption.
  78. Under the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the extent of the contiguous zone is:
    1. 3 nautical miles from the lowest water mark;
    2. 12 miles from the outer limits;
    3. 12 miles from the lowest water mark;
    4. 200 miles from the outer limits.
  79. It is a line from which the breadth of the territorial sea and other maritime zones is measured:
    1. contiguous line;
    2. economic line;
    3. baseline;
    4. archipelagic line.
  80. It is a maritime zone adjacent to the territorial seas where the coastal state may exercise certain protective jurisdiction:
    1. baseline zone;
    2. contiguous zone;
    3. transit zone;
    4. appurtenant zone.
  81. Butchoy installed a jumper cable. He was prosecuted under a Makati ordinance penalizing such act. He moved for its dismissal on the ground that the jumper cable was within the territorial jurisdiction of Mandaluyong and not Makati. The case was dismissed. The City of Mandaluyong thereafter filed a case against him for theft under the Revised Penal Code (RCP). Is there double jeopardy?
    1. No. The first jeopardy was terminated with his express consent;
    2. Yes. This is double jeopardy of the second kind – prosecution for the same act under an ordinance and a law;
    3. Yes. He is prosecuted for the same offense which has already been dismissed by the City of Makati;
    4. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III only contemplates conviction or acquittal which could terminate a first jeopardy.
  82. One of the cardinal primary due process rights in administrative proceedings is that evidence must be "substantial.""Substantial evidence" is:
    1. less than a mere scintilla;
    2. less than preponderant scintilla;
    3. more than a glint of scintilla;
    4. more than a mere scintilla.
  83. A statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they may take effect, is a:
    1. legislative encroachment;
    2. legislative veto;
    3. legislative oversight;
    4. legislative scrutiny.
  84. Which one of the enumeration below does not come under the Administrative Code definition of a "rule":
    1. agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law;
    2. fixes and describes the procedures in or practice requirements of, an agency;
    3. includes memoranda and statements concerning internal administration;
    4. an agency process for the formulation of a final order.
  85. Under the Administrative Code, "adjudication" means:
    1. whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege;
    2. an agency process for the formulation of a final order;
    3. agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule;
    4. agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation or conditioning of a license.
  86. The requirement of the Administrative Code on "public participation" is that, if not otherwise required by law, an agency shall:
    1. in all cases, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule;
    2. in all clear and proper cases, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule;
    3. as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford the party-list parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule;
    4. as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
  87. Under the Administrative Code, in the fixing of rates, no rules or final order shall be valid unless:
    1. the proposed rates shall have been submitted to the U.P. Law Center for publication at least two weeks before the first hearing thereon;
    2. the proposed rates shall have been published in the Official Gazette at least two weeks before the final hearing thereon;
    3. the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first hearing thereon;
    4. the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the final hearing thereon.
  88. In the judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies, the Administrative Code requires that the review shall be made:
    1. on the basis of the pleadings taken as a whole;
    2. on the basis of the record taken as a whole;
    3. on the basis of the evidence taken as a whole;
    4. on the basis of the memoranda taken as a whole.
  89. In the judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies, the Administrative Code requires that, except when specifically provided otherwise by law:
    1. the findings of law of agency when supported by substantial evidence, shall be final;
    2. the findings of fact of the agency when supported by preponderant evidence, shall be final;
    3. the findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence, shall be final;
    4. the findings of law of the agency when supported by credible evidence, shall be final.
  90. The right of the accused to be informed is violated if:
    1. he was accused of killing his wife by strangulation but it was proven that his wife died of poisoning;
    2. it was proven that he killed somebody on a date different from the one alleged in the information;
    3. he was charged with parricide but was convicted of murder, because it turned out that he and the victim were not married;
    4. the accused was charged with commission of acts of lasciviousness and was convicted of unjust vexation.
  91. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute" is:
    1. void for fair notice;
    2. void for arbitrariness;
    3. void for vagueness;
    4. void conclusively.
  92. "Chilling effect" is a concept used in the area of constitutional litigation affecting:
    1. protected speech;
    2. protected executive privilege;
    3. protected legislative discretion;
    4. protected judicial discretion.
  93. In the law of libel and protected speech, a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a:
    1. public figure;
    2. celebrity;
    3. public official;
    4. de facto public officer.
  94. Which one of the following is not a proper test in cases of challenges to governmental acts that may violate protected speech:
    1. clear and present danger;
    2. balancing of interests;
    3. reasonable relation;
    4. dangerous tendency.
  95. Commercial speech is entitled to:
    1. more protection compared to other constitutionally guaranteed expression;
    2. equal protection compared to other constitutionally guaranteed expression;
    3. lesser protection compared to other constitutionally guaranteed expression;
    4. none of the above.
  96. No liability can attach to a false, defamatory statement if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is known as what rule?
    1. libel malice rule;
    2. actual malice rule;
    3. malice in fact rule;
    4. legal malice rule.
  97. It is form of entrapment. The method is for an officer to pose as a buyer. He, however, neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime because in these cases, the "seller" has already decided to commit a crime. The offense happens right before the eyes of the officer. Under these circumstances:
    1. there is a need for an administrative but not a judicial warrant for seizure of goods and arrest of the offender;
    2. there is need for a warrant for the seizure of the goods and for the arrest of the offender;
    3. there is no need for a warrant either for the seizure of the goods or for the arrest of the offender;
    4. the offender can be arrested but there is a need for a separate warrant for the seizure of the goods.
  98. Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and dangerous and he identifies himself and makes reasonable inquiries, but nothing serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other’s safety, he is entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons for weapons. Such search is constitutionally permissible and is known as a:
    1. stop and search;
    2. stop and frisk;
    3. stop and interrogate;
    4. stop and detain.
  99. Accused was charged with slight illegal detention. On the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:
  100. "Court: to the accused:Q: "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?"
     A: "I have no lawyer and i will plead guilty."
    Accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty, was found guilty and sentenced. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The accused was deprived of his:
    1. right to cross-examination;
    2. right to be presumed innocent;
    3. right to counsel;
    4. right to production of evidence.
  101. The constitutional right of an accused "to meet the witnesses face to face" is primarily for the purpose of affording the accused an opportunity to:
    1. identify the witness;
    2. cross-examine the witness;
    3. be informed of the witness;
    4. be heard.
- NOTHING FOLLOWS -
HAND IN YOUR ANSWER SHEET.
THERE IS NO NEED TO RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE TO HEAD WATCHER.

2012 BAR EXAMINATIONS
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
7 October 201210 A.M.-12 NN.
Set B
ESSAY – TYPE QUESTIONS
INSTRUCTIONS
The following questionnaire consists of ten (10) questions (numbered I to X) contained in FIVE (5) pages.
Begin your answer to each numbered question on a separate page; an answer to a sub-question/s under the same number may be written continuously on the same page and succeeding pages until completed.
Answer the question directly and concisely. Do Not repeat the question. Write legibly.
HAND IN YOUR NOTEBOOK. THERE IS NO NEED TO RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE HEAD WATCHER.
GOOD LUCK!!!
_____________________________________
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Chairperson
2012 Bar Examinations Committee
PLEASE CHECK THAT THIS SET CONTAINS SIX (6) PAGES (INCLUDING THIS PAGE).
WARNING: NOT FOR SALE OR UNAUTHORIZED USE
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
I.
Mr. Violet was convicted by the RTC of Estafa. On appeal, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Fix Bail for Provisional Liberty Pending Appeal. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and set a bail amount in the sum of Five (5) Million Pesos, subject to the conditions that he secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court". Further, he was ordered to surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until the court orders its return.
  1. Mr. Violet challenges the conditions imposed by the Court of Appeals as violative of his liberty of abode and right to travel. Decide with reasons. (5%)
  2. Are "liberty of abode" and "the right to travel" absolute rights?
    Explain. What are the respective exception/s to each right if any? (5%)
II.
A verified impeachment complaint was filed by two hundred (200) Members of the House of Representatives against Madam Chief Justice Blue. The complaint was immediately transmitted to the Senate for trial.
  1. Madam Chief Justice Blue challenges such immediate transmittal to the Senate because the verified complaint 1) not included in the order of business of the House, 2) was not referred to the House Committee on Justice for hearing and consideration for sufficiency in form and substance, and 3) was not submitted to the House Plenary for consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2), Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide with reasons. (5%)
  2. What is the purpose of Impeachment? Does conviction prevent further prosecution and punishment? Explain. (3%)
  3. Enumerate the grounds for impeachment. Is graft and corruption a ground for impeachment? (2%)
III.
Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by PO1 White to a nearby police station. Upon arriving at the police station, Brown was asked to stand side-by-side with five (5) other cigarette vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White informed them that they were looking for a certain cigarette vendor who snatched the purse of a passer-by and the line-up was to allow the victim to point at the vendor who snatched her purse. No questions were to be asked from the vendors.
  1. Brown, afraid of a "set up" against him, demanded that he be allowed to secure his lawyer and for him to be present during the police line-up. Is Brown entitled to counsel? Explain (5%)
  2. Would the answer in (a.) be the same if Brown was specifically invited by White because an eyewitness to the crime identified him as the perpetrator? Explain. (3%)
  3. Briefly enumerate the so-called "Miranda Rights". (2%)
IV.
Mr. Yellow and Mr. Orange were the leading candidates in the vice-presidential elections. After elections, Yellow emerged as the winner by a slim margin of 100,000 votes. Undaunted, Orange filed a protest with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). After due consideration of the facts and the issues, the PET ruled that Orange was the real winner of the elections and ordered his immediate proclamation.
  1. Aggrieved, Yellow filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari challenging the decision of the PET alleging grave abuse of discretion. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction? Explain. (3%)
  2. Would the answer in (a.) be the same if Yellow and Orange were contending for a senatorial slot and it was the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) who issued the challenged ruling? (3%)
  3. What is the composition of the PET? (2%)
  4. What is judicial power? Explain Briefly. (2%)
V.
Judge Red is the Executive Judge of Green City. Red is known to have corrupt tendencies and has a reputation widely known among practicing lawyers for accepting bribes. Ombudsman Grey, wishing to "clean up" the government from errant public officials, initiated an investigation on the alleged irregularities in the performance of duties of Judge Red.
  1. Judge Red refused to recognize the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over him because according to him, any administrative action against him or any court official or employee falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Decide with reasons. (5%)
  2. Does the Ombudsman have authority to conduct investigation over crimes or offenses committed by public officials that are NOT in connection or related at all to the official’s discharge of his duties and functions? Explain. (3%)
  3. Who are required by the Constitution to submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth? (2%)
VI.
President Black of the Republic of Pasensya (RP) had a telephone conversation with President Blue of the People’s Republic of Conquerors (PRC). In that conversation, both leaders agreed that they will both pull-out all their vessels, civilian or otherwise, sea crafts and other ships from the hotly disputed Kalmado Shoal area within eight (8) days in order to de-escalate the situation. After eight days, all RP ships and vessels have left the area. However, several military and civilian ships carrying the PRC flag remained in the area and began construction of a dock that could provide fuel and other supplies to vessels passing by.
  1. Assuming that President Black and President Blue both had full capacity to represent their states and negotiate with each other under their respective systems of government, and further assuming that both leaders acknowledge the existence of the conversation, is the verbal agreement via telephone binding under international law? Explain. (5%)
  2. Assuming the answer to (a.) is in affirmative, does that agreement constitute a Treaty under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties? (2%)
  3. What are the sources of International Law? (2%)
  4. What is opinio juris in International Law? (1%)
VII.
Mayor Pink is eyeing re-election in the next mayoralty race. It was common knowledge in the town that Mayor Pink will run for re-election in the coming elections. The deadline for filing of Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is on March 23 and the campaign period commences the following day. One month before the deadline, Pink has yet to file her CoC, but she has been going around town giving away sacks of rice with the words "Mahal Tayo ni Mayor Pink" printed on them, holding public gatherings and speaking about how good the town is doing, giving away pink t-shirts with "Kay Mayor Pink Ako" printed on them.
  1. Mr. Green is the political opponent of Mayor Pink. In April, noticing that Mayor Pink had gained advantage over him because of her activities before the campaign period, he filed a petition to disqualify Mayor Pink for engaging in an election campaign outside the designated period.
  2. a.1. Which is the correct body to rule on the matter? Comelec en banc, or Comelec division? Answer with reasons. (2%)
    a.2. Rule on the petition. (5%)
  3. Distinguish briefly between Quo Warranto in elective office and Quo Warranto in appointive office. (3%)
VIII.
  1. What is the doctrine of "overbreath"? In what context can it be correctly applied? Not correctly applied? Explain (5%)
  2. What is the doctrine of "void for vagueness"? In what context can it be correctly applied? Not correctly applied? Explain (5%)
IX.
In a protest rally' along Padre Faura Street, Manila, Pedrong Pula took up the stage and began shouting "kayong mga kurakot kayo! Magsi-resign na kayo! Kung hindi, manggugulo kami dito!" ("you corrupt officials, you better resign now, or else we will cause trouble here!") simultaneously, he brought out a rock the size of a· fist and pretended to hurl it at the flagpole area of a government building. He did not actually throw the rock.
  1. Police officers who were monitoring the situation immediately approached Pedrong Pula and arrested him. He was prosecuted for seditious speech and was convicted. On appeal, Pedrong Pula argued he was merely exercising his freedom of speech and freedom of expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Decide with reasons. (5%)
  2. What is "commercial speech"? Is it entitled to constitutional protection? What must be shown in order for government to curtail "commercial speech"? Explain. (3%)
  3. What are the two (2) basic prohibitions of the freedom of speech and of the press clause? Explain. (2%)
X.
  1. What do you understand by the term "heirarchy of civil liberties"? Explain. (5%)
  2. Distinguish fully between the "free exercise of religion clause" and the "non-establishment of religion clause". (3%)
  3. When can evidence "in plain view" be seized without need of a search warrant? Explain. (2%)
- NOTHING FOLLOWS -
HAND IN YOUR ANSWER SHEET.
THERE IS NO NEED TO RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE HEAD WATCHER.

2011 bar questions

$
0
0
(1) Filipino citizenship may be acquired through judicial naturalization only by an alien
(A) born, raised, and educated in the Philippines who has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
(B) who has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
(C) born and raised in the Philippines who has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
(D) whose mother or father is a naturalized Filipino and who himself is qualified to be naturalized.
(2) Jax Liner applied for a public utility bus service from Bacolod to Dumaguete from the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB). BB Express opposed. LTFRB ruled in favor of Jax. BB appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), who reversed the LTFRB decision. Jax appealed to the Office of the President which reinstated the LTFRB’s ruling. BB Express went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari questioning the decision of the Office of the President on the ground that Office of the President has no jurisdiction over the case in the absence of any law providing an appeal from DOTC to the Office of the President. Will the petition prosper?
(A) No, exhaustion of administrative remedies up to the level of the President is a pre-requisite to judicial recourse.
(B) No, the action of the DOTC Secretary bears only the implied approval of the President who is not precluded from reviewing the decision of the former.
(C) Yes, when there is no law providing an appeal to the Office of the President, no such appeal may be pursued.
(D) Yes, the doctrine of qualified political agency renders unnecessary a further appeal to the Office of the President.
(3) Where A is set for promotion to Administrative Assistant III and B to the post of Administrative Assistant II vacated by A, the appointing authority must
(A) submit to the CSC the two promotional appointments together for approval.
(B) not appoint B until the CSC has approved A’s appointment.
(C) submit to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) the second appointment after its approval of the first.
(D) simultaneously issue the appointments of A and B.
(4) When a witness is granted transactional immunity in exchange for his testimony on how his immediate superior induced him to destroy public records to cover up the latter's act of malversation of public funds, the witness may NOT be prosecuted for
(A) direct contempt.
(B) infidelity in the custody of public records.
(C) falsification of public documents.
(D) false testimony.
(5) Mario, a Bureau of Customs’ examiner, was administratively charged with grave misconduct and preventively suspended pending investigation. The head of office found him guilty as charged and ordered his dismissal. The decision against him was executed pending appeal. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) subsequently found him guilty and after considering a number of mitigating circumstances, reduced his penalty to only one month suspension. Is Mario entitled to back salaries?
(A) Yes, the reduction of the penalty means restoration of his right to back salaries.
(B) No, the penalty of one month suspension carries with it the forfeiture of back salaries.
(C) No, he is still guilty of grave misconduct, only the penalty was reduced.
(D) Yes, corresponding to the period of his suspension pending appeal less one month.
(6) Althea, a Filipino citizen, bought a lot in the Philippines in 1975. Her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot since 1940, in the concept of owner. In 1988, Althea became a naturalized Australian citizen. Is she qualified to apply for registration of the lot in her name?
(A) Yes, provided she acquires back her Filipino citizenship.
(B) No, except when it can be proved that Australia has a counterpart domestic law that also favors former Filipino citizens residing there.
(C) Yes, the lot is already private in character and as a former natural-born Filipino, she can buy the lot and apply for its registration in her name.
(D) No, foreigners are not allowed to own lands in the Philippines.
(7) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when
(A) public safety or public health requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(B) dictated by the need to maintain public peace and order.
(C) public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(D) public safety or order requires otherwise as determined by the President.
(8) One advantage of a written Constitution is its
(A) reliability.
(B) permanence.
(C) flexibility.
(D) expediency.
(9) An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power
(A) essentially temporary in nature.
(B) requires special qualifications of the appointee.
(C) requires justifiable reason for its termination.
(D) is co-extensive with the term of the public officer who appointed him.
(10) The city government filed a complaint for expropriation of 10 lots to build a recreational complex for the members of the homeowners' association of Sitio Sto. Tomas, the most populated residential compound in the city. The lot owners challenged the purpose of the expropriation. Does the expropriation have a valid purpose?
(A) No, because not everybody uses a recreational complex.
(B) No, because it intends to benefit a private organization.
(C) Yes, it is in accord with the general welfare clause.
(D) Yes, it serves the well-being of the local residents.
(11) An example of a content based restraint on free speech is a regulation prescribing
(A) maximum tolerance of pro-government demonstrations.
(B) a no rally-no permit policy.
(C) when, where, and how lawful assemblies are to be conducted.
(D) calibrated response to rallies that have become violent.
(12) The President forged an executive agreement with Vietnam for a year supply of animal feeds to the Philippines not to exceed 40,000 tons. The Association of Animal Feed Sellers of the Philippines questioned the executive agreement for being contrary to R.A. 462 which prohibits the importation of animal feeds from Asian countries. Is the challenge correct?
(A) Yes, the executive agreement is contrary to our existing domestic law.
(B) No, the President is the sole organ of the government in external relations and all his actions as such form part of the law of the land.
(C) No, international agreements are sui generis which must stand independently of our domestic laws.
(D) Yes, the executive agreement is actually a treaty which does not take effect without ratification by the Senate.
(13) Jose Cruz and 20 others filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite on their petition for initiative to amend the Constitution by shifting to a unicameral parliamentary form of government. Assuming that the petition has been signed by the required number of registered voters, will it prosper?
(A) No, only Congress can exercise the power to amend the Constitution.
(B) Yes, the people can substantially amend the Constitution by direct action.
(C) Yes, provided Congress concurs in the amendment.
(D) No, since they seek, not an amendment, but a revision.
(14) The Comelec en banc cannot hear and decide a case at first instance EXCEPT when
(A) a Division refers the case to it for direct action.
(B) the case involves a purely administrative matter.
(C) the inhibition of all the members of a Division is sought.
(D) a related case is pending before the Supreme Court en banc.
(15) Each of the Constitutional Commissions is expressly described as "independent," exemplified by its
(A) immunity from suit.
(B) fiscal autonomy.
(C) finality of action.
(D) collegiality.
(16) There is double jeopardy when the dismissal of the first case is
(A) made at the instance of the accused invoking his right to fair trial.
(B) made upon motion of the accused without objection from the prosecution.
(C) made provisionally without objection from the accused.
(D) based on the objection of the accused to the prosecution's motion to postpone trial.
(17) The new Commissioner of Immigration, Mr. Suarez, issued an Office Order directing the top immigration officials to tender courtesy resignation to give him a free hand in reorganizing the agency. In compliance, Director Sison of the Administrative Department tendered his resignation in writing which Mr. Suarez immediately accepted. Director Sison went to court, assailing the validity of his courtesy resignation and Mr. Suarez’s acceptance of the same. Will the action prosper?
(A) No, Director Sison tendered his resignation and it was accepted.
(B) No, estoppel precludes Director Sison from disclaiming the resignation he freely tendered.
(C) Yes,for so long as no one has yet been appointed to replace him, Director Sison may still withdraw his resignation.
(D) Yes, Director Sison merely complied with the order of the head of office; the element of clear intention to relinguish office is lacking.
(18) An administrative rule that fixes rates is valid only when the proposed rates are
(A) published and filed with the UP Law Center.
(B) published and hearings are conducted.
(C) published and posted in three public places.
(D) published and all stakeholders are personally notified.
(19) The government sought to expropriate a parcel of land belonging to Y. The law provides that, to get immediate possession of the land, the government must deposit the equivalent of the land's zonal value. The government insisted, however, that what apply are the rules of court which require an initial deposit only of the assessed value of the property. Which should prevail on this matter, the law or the rules of court?
(A) Both law and rules apply because just compensation should be fixed based on its zonal or assessed value, whichever is higher.
(B) Both law and rules apply because just compensation should be fixed based on its zonal or assessed value, whichever is lower.
(C) The law should prevail since the right to just compensation is a substantive right that Congress has the power to define.
(D) The rules of court should prevail since just compensation is a procedural matter subject to the rule making power of the Supreme Court.
(20) After X, a rape suspect, was apprised of his right to silence and to counsel, he told the investigators that he was waiving his right to have his own counsel or to be provided one. He made his waiver in the presence of a retired Judge who was assigned to assist and explain to him the consequences of such waiver. Is the waiver valid?
(A) No, the waiver was not reduced in writing.
(B) Yes, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired judge does not cast doubt on his competence and independence.
(C) Yes, the waiver was made voluntarily, expressly, and with assistance of counsel.
(D) No, a retired Judge is not a competent and independent counsel.
(21) Governor Paloma was administratively charged with abuse of authority before the Office of the President. Pending hearing, he ran for reelection and won a second term. He then moved to dismiss the charge against him based on this supervening event. Should the motion be granted?
(A) Yes, Governor Paloma's reelection is an expression of the electorate's obedience to his will.
(B) No, Governor Paloma's reelection cannot extinguish his liability for malfeasance in office.
(C) No, Governor Paloma's reelection does not render moot the administrative case already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid.
(D) Yes, Governor Paloma's reelection is an expression of the electorate's restored trust.
(22) The decision of the Regional Trial Court on appeals pertaining to inclusions or exclusions from the list of voters
(A) is inappealable.
(B) is subject to an action for annulment.
(C) may be brought straight to the Supreme Court.
(D) is appealable to the Commission on Elections.
(23) The equal protection clause allows valid classification of subjects that applies
(A) only to present conditions.
(B) so long as it remains relevant to the government.
(C) for a limited period only.
(D) for as long as the problem to be corrected exists.
(24) The President wants to appoint A to the vacant post of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court because of his qualifications, competence, honesty, and efficiency. But A’s name is not on the list of nominees that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) submitted to the President. What should the President do?
(A) Request the JBC to consider adding A to the list.
(B) Decline to appoint from the list.
(C) Appoint from the list.
(D) Return the list to JBC.
(25) Courts may still decide cases that have otherwise become academic when they involve
(A) the basic interest of people.
(B) petitions for habeas corpus.
(C) acts of the Chief Executive.
(D) Presidential election protests.
(26) The right of the State to prosecute crimes by available evidence must yield to the right of
(A) the accused against self-incrimination.
(B) another State to extradite a fugitive from justice.
(C) the State to deport undesirable aliens.
(D) the complainant to drop the case against the accused.
(27) A temporary appointee to a public office who becomes a civil service eligible during his tenure
(A) loses his temporary appointment without prejudice to his re-appointment as permanent.
(B) has the right to demand conversion of his appointment to permanent.
(C) automatically becomes a permanent appointee.
(D) retains his temporary appointment.
(28) Upon endorsement from the Senate where it was first mistakenly filed, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice found the verified complaint for impeachment against the President sufficient in form but insufficient in substance. Within the same year, another impeachment suit was filed against the President who questioned the same for being violative of the Constitution. Is the President correct?
(A) No, "initiated" means the Articles of Impeachment have been actually filed with the Senate for trial; this did not yet happen.
(B) No, the first complaint was not deemed initiated because it was originally filed with the Senate.
(C) Yes, the dismissal of the first impeachment proceeding bars the initiation of another during the same term of the President.
(D) Yes, no impeachment proceeding can be filed against the President more than once within a year.
(29) The Solicitor General declines to institute a civil action on behalf of a government agency due to his strained relation with its head, insisting that the agency’s lawyers can file the action. Is the Solicitor General correct?
(A) Yes, when he deems he cannot harmoniously and effectively work with the requesting agency.
(B) No, he must, in choosing whether to prosecute an action, exercise his discretion according to law and the best interest of the State.
(C) Yes, as in any lawyer-client relationship, he has the right to choose whom to serve and represent.
(D) No, the Solicitor General's duty to represent the government, its offices and officers is mandatory and absolute.
(30) A department secretary may, with the President's consent, initiate his appearance before the Senate or the House of Representatives which
(A) must seek the concurrence of the other House before acting.
(B) must hold an executive session to hear the department secretary.
(C) may altogether reject the initiative.
(D) must accept such initiated appearance.
(31) The Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) passed a rule authorizing traffic enforcers to impound illegally parked vehicles, for the first offense, and confiscate their registration plates for the second. The MMDA issued this rule to implement a law that authorized it to suspend the licenses of drivers who violate traffic rules. Is the MMDA rule valid?
(A) No, since the MMDA does not have rule-making power.
(B) Yes, it is a valid exercise of the power of subordinate legislation.
(C) Yes, it is an implicit consequence of the law upon which it acted.
(D) No, the rule goes beyond the sphere of the law.
(32) Senator Bondoc was charged with murder and detained at the Quezon City Jail. He invoked, in seeking leave from the court to attend the session of the Senate, his immunity from arrest as a Senator. How should the court rule on his motion?
(A) Deny the motion unless the Senate issues a resolution certifying to the urgency of his attendance at its sessions.
(B) Grant the motion provided he posts bail since he is not a flight risk.
(C) Grant the motion so as not to deprive the people who elected him their right to be represented in the Senate.
(D) Deny the motion since immunity from arrest does not apply to a charge of murder.
(33) X, an administrative officer in the Department of Justice, was charged with grave misconduct and preventively suspended for 90 days pending investigation. Based on the evidence, the Secretary of Justice found X guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service. Pending appeal, X's dismissal was executed. Subsequently, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reversed the Secretary’s decision and the reversal became final and executory. What is the effect of X's exoneration?
(A) X is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries both during his 90 day preventive suspension and his suspension pending appeal.
(B) X is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries corresponding only to the period of delay caused by those prosecuting the case against him.
(C) X is entitled to reinstatement but not to back salaries on ground of "damnum absque injuria."
(D) X is entitled to reinstatement and back salaries during his suspension pending appeal.
(34) Courts may dismiss a case on ground of mootness when
(A) the case is premature.
(B) petitioner lacks legal standing.
(C) the questioned law has been repealed.
(D) the issue of validity of law was not timely raised.
(35) Alfredo was elected municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms. During his third term, the municipality became a city. Alfredo ran for city mayor during the next immediately succeeding election. Voltaire sought his disqualification citing the 3 term limit for elective officials. Will Voltaire's action prosper?
(A) No, the 3 term limit should not apply to a person who is running for a new position title.
(B) Yes, the 3 term limit applies regardless of any voluntary or involuntary interruption in the service of the local elective official.
(C) Yes, the 3 term limit uniformly applies to the office of mayor, whether for city or municipality.
(D) No, the 3 term limit should not apply to a local government unit that has assumed a different corporate existence.
(36) In what scenario is an extensive search of moving vehicles without warrant valid?
(A) The police became suspicious on seeing something on the car’s back seat covered with blanket.
(B) The police suspected an unfenced lot covered by rocks and bushes was planted to marijuana.
(C) The police became suspicious when they saw a car believed to be of the same model used by the killers of a city mayor.
(D) The driver sped away in his car when the police flagged him down at a checkpoint.
(37) Pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard
(A) summarily without need of trial.
(B) through trial by commissioner.
(C) ex parte.
(D) through speedy arbitration.
(38) When the President orders the Chief of the Philippine National Police to suspend the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside the residence, the President exercises
(A) the power of control.
(B) the Commander-in-Chief power.
(C) the power of supervision.
(D) the calling out power.
(39) Carlos, a foreign national was charged with and convicted of a serious crime in State X and sentenced to life imprisonment. His country applied for relief with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that State X did not inform Carlos of his right under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention to be accorded legal assistance by his government. State X, as signatory to the Vienna Convention, agreed to ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention. ICJ ruled that State X violated its obligation to provide consular notification to the foreign national's country. ICJ also required State X to review and reconsider the life sentence imposed on the foreign national. State X then wrote the United Nations informing that it was withdrawing from the Optional Protocol on Vienna Convention and was not bound by the ICJ decision. What principle of international law did State X violate?
(A) Pacta Sunt Servanda
(B) Act of State Doctrine
(C) Protective Principle
(D) Jus Cogens
(40) An informer told the police that a Toyota Car with plate ABC 134 would deliver an unspecified quantity of ecstacy in Forbes Park, Makati City. The officers whom the police sent to watch the Forbes Park gates saw the described car and flagged it down. When the driver stopped and lowered his window, an officer saw a gun tucked on the driver's waist. The officer asked the driver to step out and he did. When an officer looked inside the car, he saw many tablets strewn on the driver's seat. The driver admitted they were ecstacy. Is the search valid?
(A) No, the rule on warrantless search of moving vehicle does not allow arbitrariness on the part of the police.
(B) Yes, the police officers had the duty to verify the truth of the information they got and pursue it to the end.
(C) Yes, the police acted based on reliable information and the fact that an officer saw the driver carrying a gun.
(D) No, police officers do not have unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of moving vehicles.
(41) The Commission on Elections is an independent body tasked to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Hence, it may
(A) conduct two kinds of electoral count: a slow but official count; and a quick but unofficial count.
(B) make an advance and unofficial canvass of election returns through electronic transmission.
(C) undertake a separate and unofficial tabulation of the results of the election manually.
(D) authorize the citizens arm to use election returns for unofficial count.
(42)The President may proclaim martial law over a particular province subject to revocation or extension
(A) by Congress,subject to ratification by the Supreme Court.
(B) by the Supreme Court.
(C) by Congress alone
(D) by Congress, upon recommendation of the respective Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
(43) During his incumbency, President Carlos shot to death one of his advisers during a heated argument over a game of golf that they were playing. The deceased adviser’s family filed a case of homicide against President Carlos before the city prosecutor’s office. He moved to dismiss the case, invoking presidential immunity from suit. Should the case be dismissed?
(A) Yes, his immunity covers his interactions with his official family, including the deceased adviser.
(B) No, his immunity covers only work-related crimes.
(C) Yes, his immunity holds for the whole duration of his tenure.
(D) No, his immunity does not cover crimes involving moral turpitude.
(44) The School Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School designated Maria, her daughter, as public school teacher in her school. The designation was assailed on ground of nepotism. Is such designation valid?
(A) No, because the law prohibits relatives from working within the same government unit.
(B) Yes, because Maria’s position does not fall within the prohibition.
(C) No, because her mother is not the designating authority.
(D) No, because Maria is related to the supervising authority within the prohibited degree of consanguinity.
(45) The President's appointment of an acting secretary although Congress is in session is
(A) voidable.
(B) valid.
(C) invalid.
(D) unenforceable.
(46) Congress passed a bill appropriating P50 million in assistance to locally based television stations subject to the condition that the amount would be available only in places where commercial national television stations do not operate. The President approved the appropriation but vetoed the condition. Was the veto valid?
(A) Yes, since the vetoed condition may be separated from the item.
(B) Yes, the President's veto power is absolute.
(C) No, since the veto amounted to a suppression of the freedom to communicate through television.
(D) No, since the approval of the item carried with it the approval of the condition attached to it.
(47) In the exercise of its power of legislative inquiries and oversight functions, the House of Representatives or the Senate may only ask questions
(A) that the official called is willing to answer.
(B) that are relevant to the proposed legislation.
(C) to which the witness gave his prior consent.
(D) material to the subject of inquiry.
(48) An ordinance prohibits "notorious street gang members" from loitering in public places. The police are to disperse them or, if they refuse, place them under arrest. The ordinance enumerates which police officers can make arrest and defines street gangs, membership in them, and public areas. The ordinance was challenged for being vague regarding the meaning of "notorious street gang members." Is the ordinance valid?
(A) No, it leaves the public uncertain as to what conduct it prohibits.
(B) No, since it discriminates between loitering in public places and loitering in private places.
(C) Yes, it provides fair warning to gang members prior to arrest regarding their unlawful conduct.
(D) Yes, it is sufficiently clear for the public to know what acts it prohibits.
(49) The people may approve or reject a proposal to allow foreign investors to own lands in the Philippines through an electoral process called
(A) referendum.
(B) plebiscite.
(C) initiative.
(D) certification.
(50) Where a candidate for the Senate stated in his certificate of candidacy that he is single, when he is very much married, though separated, his certificate of candidacy
(A) may be canceled.
(B) will subject him to a quo warranto action.
(C) remains valid.
(D) may be denied due course.
(51) A candidate who commits vote buying on Election Day itself shall be prosecuted by the
(A) COMELEC.
(B) Secretary of Justice.
(C) police and other law enforcement agencies.
(D) City or Provincial Prosecutor.
(52) A law authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to require the quarantine of animals that suffer from dangerous communicable diseases at such place and for such time he deems necessary to prevent their spread. The Secretary of Agriculture issued a regulation, imposing a penalty of imprisonment for 10 days on persons transporting quarantined animals without his permission. The regulation is
(A) a valid exercise of the power of subordinate legislation.
(B) invalid for being ultra vires.
(C) a valid exercise of police power.
(D) invalid for being discriminatory.
(53) Small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens may be allowed by
(A) Congress.
(B) either the Senate or the House of Representatives.
(C) the President.
(D) the President with the consent of Congress.
(54) When the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approves the appointment of the Executive Director of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board who possesses all the prescribed qualifications, the CSC performs
(A) a discretionary duty.
(B) a mix discretionary and ministerial duty.
(C) a ministerial duty.
(D) a rule-making duty.
(55) Xian and Yani ran for Congressman in the same district. During the canvassing, Yani objected to several returns which he said were tampered with. The board of canvassers did not entertain Yani's objections for lack of authority to do so. Yani questions the law prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases involving the election of Congressmen since the Constitution grants COMELEC jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation cases, without distinction. Is Yani correct?
(A) Yes, the Constitution grants jurisdiction to COMELEC on all pre-proclamation cases, without exception.
(B) No, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over pre-proclamation cases pertains only to elections for regional, provincial, and city officials.
(C) No, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over pre-proclamation cases does not include those that must be brought directly to the courts.
(D) Yes, any conflict between the law and the Constitution relative to COMELEC's jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of the Constitution.
(56) When the Supreme Court nullified the decisions of the military tribunal for lack of jurisdiction, it excluded from their coverage decisions of acquittal where the defendants were deemed to have acquired a vested right. In so doing, the Supreme Court applied
(A) the operative fact doctrine.
(B) the rule against double jeopardy.
(C) the doctrine of supervening event.
(D) the orthodox doctrine.
(57) Accused X pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide against him. Since he was admitted to bail, they sent him notices to attend the hearings of his case. But he did not show up, despite notice, in four successive hearings without offering any justification. The prosecution moved to present evidence in absentia but the court denied the motion on the ground that the accused has a right to be present at his trial. Is the court correct?
(A) No, the court is mandated to hold trial in absentia when the accused had been arraigned, had notice, and his absence was unjustified.
(B) Yes, it remains discretionary on the court whether to conduct trial in absentia even if the accused had been arraigned and had notice and did not justify his absence.
(C) Yes, it is within the court's discretion to determine how many postponements it will grant the accused before trying him in absentia.
(D) No, the court may reject trial in absentia only on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
(58) Following COMELEC Chairman Bocay's conviction for acts of corruption in the impeachment proceedings, he was indicted for plunder before the Sandiganbayan and found guilty, as charged. Can he get Presidential pardon on the plunder case?
(A) No, plunder is not a pardonable offense.
(B) No, conviction in a criminal case for the same acts charged in the impeachment proceedings is not pardonable.
(C) Yes, convictions in two different fora for the same acts, are too harsh that they are not beyond the reach of the President’s pardoning power.
(D) Yes, conviction in court in a criminal action is subject to the President's pardoning power.
(59) A private person constituted by the court as custodian of property attached to secure a debt sought to be recovered in a civil proceeding is
(A) a private sheriff.
(B) a public officer.
(C) a private warehouseman.
(D) an agent of the party to whom the property will ultimately be awarded.
(60) The COMELEC en banc shall decide a motion for reconsideration of
(A) the House or Representatives and the Senate electoral tribunals.
(B) the decision of the election registrar.
(C) the decision of the COMELEC division involving an election protest.
(D) its own decision involving an election protest.
(61) Adela served as Mayor of Kasim for 2 consecutive terms. On her third term, COMELEC ousted her in an election protest that Gudi, her opponent, filed against her. Two years later, Gudi faced recall proceedings and Adela ran in the recall election against him. Adela won and served as Mayor for Gudi's remaining term. Can Adela run again for Mayor in the next succeeding election without violating the 3 term limit?
(A) No, she won the regular mayoralty election for two consecutive terms and the recall election constitutes her third term.
(B) A. No, she already won the mayoralty election for 3 consecutive terms.
(C) Yes, her ouster from office in her third term interrupted the continuity of her service as mayor.
(D) Yes, the fresh mandate given her during the recall election erased her disqualification for a third term.
(62) A child born in the United States to a Filipino mother and an American father is
(A) a Filipino citizen by election.
(B) a repatriated Filipino citizen.
(C) a dual citizen.
(D) a natural born Filipino citizen.
(63) Involuntary servitude may be required as
(A) part of rehabilitation of one duly charged with a crime.
(B) substitute penalty for one who has been duly tried for a crime.
(C) punishment for a crime where one has been duly convicted.
(D) condition precedent to one's valid arraignment.
(64) Van sought to disqualify Manresa as congresswoman of the third district of Manila on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder. By the time the case was decided against Manresa, she had already served her full term as congresswoman. What was Manresa's status during her incumbency as congresswoman?
(A) She was a de jure officer, having been duly elected.
(B) She was not a public officer because she had no valid existing public office.
(C) She was a de jure officer since she completed her term before she was disqualified.
(D) She was a de facto officer since she was elected, served, and her disqualification only came later.
(65) Whose appointment is NOT subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments?
(A) Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
(B) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
(C) Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(D) Executive Secretary
(66) The system of checks and balances operates when
(A) the President nullifies a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning the offender.
(B) Congress increases the budget proposal of the President.
(C) the President does not release the countryside development funds to members of Congress.
(D) Congress expands the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as defined by the Constitution.
(67) The price of staple goods like rice may be regulated for the protection of the consuming public through the exercise of
(A) power of subordinate legislation.
(B) emergency power.
(C) police power.
(D) residual power.
(68) Associate Justice A retires from the Supreme Court 90 days before the forthcoming Presidential election. May the incumbent President still appoint Justice A's successor?
(A) No, it will violate the Constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
(B) Yes, vacancies in the Supreme Court should be filled within 90 days from occurrence of the vacancy.
(C) Yes, vacancies in the Supreme Court should be filled within 90 days from submission of JBC nominees to the President.
(D) No, the incumbent President must yield to the choice of the next President
(69) The President may set a limit on the country's import quota in the exercise of his
(A) delegated power.
(B) concurring power.
(C) residual power.
(D) inherent power.
(70) Amor sued for annulment of a deed of sale of Lot 1. While the case was ongoing, Baltazar, an interested buyer, got a Certification from Atty. Crispin, the Clerk of Court, that Lot 1 was not involved in any pending case before the court. Acting on the certification, the Register of Deeds canceled the notice of lis pendens annotated on Lot 1’s title. Amor filed a damage suit against Atty. Crispin but the latter invoked good faith and immunity from suit for acts relating to his official duty, claiming he was not yet the Clerk of Court when Amor filed his action. Decide.
(A) Atty. Crispin is immune from suit since he enjoys the presumption of regularity of performance of public duty.
(B) Atty. Crispin's defense is invalid since he issued his certification recklessly without checking the facts.
(C) Atty. Crispin's defense is valid since he was unaware of the pendency of the case.
(D) As Clerk of Court, Atty. Crispin enjoys absolute immunity from suit for acts relating to his work.
(71) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) found Atlantic Homes, Inc. liable in damages arising from its delayed release of the title to the house and lot that it sold to Josephine. Atlantic appealed to the Office of the President which rendered a one page decision, affirming the attached HLURB judgment. Atlantic challenges the validity of the decision of the Office of the President for not stating the facts and the law on which it is based. Is the challenge correct?
(A) No, the Office of the President is governed by its own rules respecting review of cases appealed to it.
(B) Yes, the decision of the Office of the President must contain its own crafted factual findings and legal conclusions.
(C) Yes, administrative due process demands that the Office of the President make findings and conclusions independent of its subordinate.
(D) No, the Office of the President is not precluded from adopting the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the HLURB decision.
(72) A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Leonardo, a cargo truck driven by Joseph, and a dump truck driven by Lauro but owned by the City of Cebu. Lauro was on his way to get a load of sand for the repair of the road along Fuente Street, Cebu City. As a result of the collision, 3 passengers of the jeepney died. Their families filed a complaint for damages against Joseph who in turn filed a third party complaint against the City of Cebu and Lauro. Is the City of Cebu liable for the tort committed by its employee?
(A) The City of Cebu is not liable because its employee was engaged in the discharge of a governmental function.
(B) The City of Cebu is liable for the tort committed by its employee while in the discharge of a non-governmental function.
(C) The City of Cebu is liable in accord with the precept of respondeat superior.
(D) The City of Cebu is not liable as a consequence of its non-suitability.
(73) During promulgation of sentence, the presence of the accused is mandatory but he may appear by counsel or representative when
(A) he is charged with a light offense.
(B) he was able to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.
(C) he waives his right to be present.
(D) he is convicted of a bailable offense.
(74) An information for murder was filed against X. After examining the case records forwarded to him by the prosecution, the trial judge granted bail to X based on the prosecution's manifestation that it was not objecting to the grant of bail. Is the trial judge correct?
(A) Yes, the trial judge may evaluate the strength or weakness of the evidence based on the case records forwarded to him.
(B) No, the trial judge should have held a hearing to ascertain the quality of the evidence of guilt that the prosecution had against X.
(C) No, the trial judge should have conducted a hearing to ascertain first whether or not X was validly arrested.
(D) Yes, the trial judge may reasonably rely on the prosecution's manifestation that he had no objection to the grant of bail.
(75) The President CANNOT call out the military
(A) to enforce customs laws.
(B) to secure shopping malls against terrorists.
(C) to arrest persons committing rebellion.
(D) to raid a suspected haven of lawless elements.
(76) Mass media in the Philippines may be owned and managed by
(A) corporations wholly owned and managed by Filipinos.
(B) corporations 60% owned by Filipinos.
(C) corporations wholly owned by Filipinos.
(D) corporations 60% owned and managed by Filipinos.
(77) Procedural due process in administrative proceedings
(A) requires the tribunal to consider the evidence presented.
(B) allows the losing party to file a motion for reconsideration.
(C) requires hearing the parties on oral argument.
(D) permits the parties to file memoranda.
(78) The Constitution prohibits cruel and inhuman punishments which involve
(A) torture or lingering suffering.
(B) primitive and gross penalties.
(C) unusual penal methods.
(D) degrading and queer penalties.
(79) Judge Lloyd was charged with serious misconduct before the Supreme Court. The Court found him guilty and ordered him dismissed. Believing that the decision was not immediately executory, he decided a case that had been submitted for resolution. The decision became final and executory. But the losing party filed a certiorari action with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in the case and bar Judge Lloyd from further acting as judge. Can the relief against Judge Lloyd be granted?
(A) No, Judge Lloyd's right to stay as judge may be challenged only by direct proceeding, not collaterally.
(B) Yes, the action against Judge Lloyd may be consolidated with the case before the Court of Appeals and decided by it.
(C) Yes, Judge Lloyd 's right to stay as judge may be challenged as a necessary incident of the certiorari action.
(D) No, the losing party has no standing to challenge Judge Lloyd's right to stay as judge.
(80) Executive Secretary Chua issued an order prohibiting the holding of rallies along Mendiola because it hampers the traffic flow to Malacanang. A group of militants questioned the order for being unconstitutional and filed a case against Secretary Chua to restrain him from enforcing the order. Secretary Chua raised state immunity from suit claiming that the state cannot be sued without its consent. Is the claim correct?
(A) No, public officers may be sued to restrain him from enforcing an act claimed to be unconstitutional.
(B) Yes, the order was not a proprietary act of the government.
(C) No, only the president may raise the defense of immunity from suit.
(D) Yes, Secretary Chua cannot be sued for acts done in pursuance to his public office.
(81) Anton was the duly elected Mayor of Tunawi in the local elections of 2004. He got 51% of all the votes cast. Fourteen months later, Victoria, who also ran for mayor, filed with the Local Election Registrar, a petition for recall against Anton. The COMELEC approved the petition and set a date for its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of Bar Examination Questionnaire for Political Law Set A registered voters or total number of those who actually voted during the local election in 2005, whichever is lower. Anton attacked the COMELEC resolution for being invalid. Do you agree with Anton?
(A) No, the petition, though initiated by just one person, may be ratified by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.
(B) No, the petition, though initiated by just one person may be ratified by at least 25% of those who actually voted during the 2004 local elections.
(C) Yes, the petition should be initiated by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters who actually voted during the 2004 local elections.
(D) Yes,the petition should be initiated by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters of Tunawi.
(82) Using the description of the supplier of shabu given by persons who had been arrested earlier for selling it, the police conducted a surveillance of the area indicated. When they saw a man who fitted the description walking from the apartment to his car, they approached and frisked him and he did not object. The search yielded an unlicensed gun tucked on his waist and shabu in his car. Is the search valid?
(A) No, the man did not manifest any suspicious behavior that would give the police sufficient reason to search him.
(B) Yes, the police acted on reliable information which proved correct when they searched the man and his car.
(C) Yes, the man should be deemed to have waived his right to challenge the search when he failed to object to the frisking.
(D) No, reliable information alone, absent any proof beyond reasonable doubt that the man was actually committing an offense, will not validate the search.
(83) A law interfering with the rights of the person meets the requirements of substantive due process when
(A) the means employed is not against public policy.
(B) it is in accord with the prescribed manner of enforcement as to time, place, and person.
(C) all affected parties are given the chance to be heard.
(D) the interest of the general public, as distinguished from those of a particular case, requires such interference.
(84) A judge of the Regional Trial Court derives his powers and duties from
(A) statute.
(B) the President, the appointing power.
(C) Supreme Court issuances.
(D) the rules of court.
(85) When an elective official's preventive suspension will result in depriving his constituents of his services or representation, the court may
(A) require the investigating body to expedite the investigation.
(B) hold in abeyance the period of such suspension.
(C) direct the holding of an election to fill up the temporary vacancy.
(D) shorten the period of such suspension.
(86) When the State requires private cemeteries to reserve 10% of their lots for burial of the poor, it exercises its
(A) eminent domain power.
(B) zoning power.
(C) police power.
(D) taxing power.
(87) In the valid exercise of management prerogative consistent with the company's right to protect its economic interest, it may prohibit its employees from
(A) joining rallies during their work shift.
(B) marrying employees of competitor companies.
(C) publicly converging with patrons of competitor companies.
(D) patronizing the product of competitor companies.
(88) The President issued an executive order directing all department heads to secure his consent before agreeing to appear during question hour before Congress on matters pertaining to their departments. Is the executive order unconstitutional for suppressing information of public concern?
(A) No, because those department heads are his alter egos and he is but exercising his right against self-incrimination.
(B) Yes, the President cannot control the initiative of the department heads to conform with the oversight function of Congress.
(C) Yes, the President cannot withhold consent to the initiative of his department heads as it will violate the principle of check and balance.
(D) No, the President has the power to withhold consent to appearance by his department heads during question hour.
(89) When the President contracted a personal loan during his incumbency, he may be sued for sum of money
(A) during his term of office.
(B) during his tenure of office.
(C) after his term of office.
(D) after his tenure of office.
(90) The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee summoned X, a former department secretary, to shed light on his alleged illicit acquisition of properties claimed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government. X sought to restrain the Committee from proceeding with its investigation because of a pending criminal case against him before the Sandiganbayan for ill-gotten wealth involving the same properties. Decide. The investigation may
(A) not be restrained on ground of separation of powers.
(B) be restrained on ground of prejudicial question.
(C) not be restrained on ground of presumed validity of legislative action.
(D) be restrained for being sub judice.
(91) A government that actually exercises power and control as opposed to the true and lawful government is in terms of legitimacy
(A) a government of force.
(B) an interim government.
(C) a de facto government.
(D) an illegitimate government.
(92) The Special Committee on Naturalization is headed by
(A) the Secretary of Justice.
(B) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
(C) the National Security Adviser.
(D) the Solicitor General.
(93) The President issued Proclamation 9517 declaring a state of emergency and calling the armed forces to immediately carry out necessary measures to suppress terrorism and lawless violence. In the same proclamation, he directed the government's temporary takeover of the operations of all privately owned communication utilities, prescribing reasonable terms for the takeover. Is the takeover valid?
(A) Yes, it is an implied power flowing from the President's exercise of emergency power.
(B) No, it is a power reserved for Congress alone.
(C) Yes, subject to ratification by Congress.
(D) No, it is a power exclusively reserved for the People's direct action.
(94) A candidate for Senator must be at least 35 years old on
(A) the day he is duly proclaimed.
(B) the day the election is held.
(C) the day he files his certificate of candidacy.
(D) the day he takes his oath of office.
(95) The Office of the Special Prosecutor may file an information against a public officer for graft
(A) on its own initiative subject to withdrawal of the information by the Ombudsman.
(B) independently of the Ombudsman, except in plunder cases.
(C) only when authorized by the Ombudsman.
(D) independently of the Ombudsman.
(96) Since the Constitution is silent as to who can appoint the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, the President appointed W to that position without submitting his appointment to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Is W’s appointment by the President valid?
(A) No, since the position of Chairman of the Commission was created by statute, the appointment of its holder requires the consent of Congress.
(B) Yes, since the power to appoint in the government, if not lodged elsewhere, belongs to the President as Chief Executive.
(C) Yes, since the power to fill up all government positions mentioned in the Constitution has been lodged in the President.
(D) No, because absent any express authority under the Constitution, the power to appoint does not exist.
(97) The Chief Justice appointed X, the President’s sister, as Assistant Court Administrator in the Supreme Court during the President's tenure. Claiming that the Constitution prohibits the appointment in government of a President’s relative, a taxpayer asks for its nullification. Will the challenge prosper?
(A) Yes, since the appointment essentially violates the law against nepotism.
(B) Yes, because relatives of the President within the fourth civil degree cannot be appointed as heads of offices in any department of government.
(C) No, X's appointment, although in the government, is not in the Executive Department that the President heads.
(D) No, the position to which X was appointed is not among those prohibited under the Constitution.
(98)May an incumbent Justice of the Supreme Court be disbarred as a lawyer?
(A) No, it will amount to removal.
(B) No, his membership in the bar is secure.
(C) Yes, by the Supreme Court itself.
(D) Yes, by Congress in joint session.
(99) Mayor Lucia of Casidsid filed her certificate of candidacy for congresswoman of the district covering Casidsid. Still, she continued to act as mayor of Casidsid without collecting her salaries as such. When she lost the election and a new mayor assumed office, she filed an action to collect the salaries she did not get while serving as mayor even when she ran for congresswoman. Is her action correct?
(A) No, salaries can be waived and she waived them.
(B) No, because her acts as de facto officer are void insofar as she is concerned.
(C) Yes, public policy demands that a de facto officer enjoy the same rights of a de jure officer.
(D) A. Yes, it is but just that she be paid for the service she rendered.
(100) X, a Filipino and Y, an American, both teach at the International Institute in Manila. The institute gave X a salary rate of P1,000 per hour and Y, P1,250 per hour plus housing, transportation, shipping costs, and leave travel allowance. The school cited the dislocation factor and limited tenure of Y to justify his high salary rate and additional benefits. The same package was given to the other foreign teachers. The Filipino teachers assailed such differential treatment, claiming it is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause. Decide.
(A) The classification is based on superficial differences.
(B) The classification undermines the "Filipino First" policy.
(C) The distinction is fair considering the burden of teaching abroad.
(D) The distinction is substantial and uniformly applied to each class.

2o10 bar questions

$
0
0
PART I
I
The dictatorial regime of President A of the Republic of Gordon was toppled by a combined force led by Gen. Abe, former royal guards and the secessionist Gordon People’s Army. The new government constituted a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to look into the serious crimes committed under President A’s regime. After the hearings, the Commission recommended that an amnesty law be passed to cover even those involved in mass killings of members of indigenous groups who opposed President A. International human rights groups argued that the proposed amnesty law is contrary to international law. Decide with reasons. (4%)
II
Compare and contrast the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice. (3%)
III
A, a British photojournalist, was covering the violent protests of the Thai Red-Shirts Movement in Bangkok. Despite warnings given by the Thai Prime Minister to foreigners, specially journalists, A moved around the Thai capital. In the course of his coverage, he was killed with a stray bullet which was later identified as having come from the ranks of the Red-Shirts. The wife of A sought relief from Thai authorities but was refused assistance.
  1. Is there state responsibility on the part of Thailand? (2%)
  2. What is the appropriate remedy available to the victim’s family under international law? (3%)
IV
Choose the statement which appropriately completes the opening phrase:
“A State which resorts to retorsion in international law
  1. must ensure that all states consent to its act.
  2. cannot curtail migration from the offending state.
  3. can expel the nationals of the offending state.
  4. should apply proportionate response within appreciable limit.
  5. None of the above.
Explain your answer. (2%)
V
Congresswoman A is a co-owner of an industrial estate in Sta. Rosa, Laguna which she had declared in her Statement of Assets and Liabilities. A member of her political party authored a bill which would provide a 5-year development plan for all industrial estates in the Southern Tagalog Region to attract investors. The plan included an appropriation of 2 billion pesos for construction of roads around the estates. When the bill finally became law, a civil society watchdog questioned the constitutionality of the law as it obviously benefitted Congresswoman A’s industrial estate. Decide with reasons. (3%)
VI
The “Poverty Alleviation and Assistance Act” was passed to enhance the capacity of the most marginalized families nationwide. A financial assistance scheme called “conditional cash transfers” was initially funded 500 million pesos by Congress. One of the provisions of the law gave the Joint-Congressional Oversight Committee authority to screen the list of beneficiary families initially determined by the Secretary of Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to the Department implementing rules. Mang Pandoy, a resident of Smokey Mountain in Tondo, questioned the authority of the Committee.
  1. Does Mang Pandoy have legal standing to question the law?(2%)
  2. Is the grant of authority to the Oversight Committee to screen beneficiaries constitutional? (3%)
Decide with reasons.
VII
True or False.
  1. A proclamation of a state of emergency is sufficient to allow the President to take over any public utility. (0.5%)
  2. A treaty which provides tax exemption needs no concurrence by a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (0.5%)
VIII
Distinguish “presidential communications privilege” from “deliberative process privilege.” (3%)
IX
The League of Filipino Political Scientists (LFPS) organized an international conference on the human rights situation in Myanmar at the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). An exiled Myanmar professor Sung Kui, critical of the military government in Myanmar, was invited as keynote speaker. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs informed the President of the regional and national security implications of having Prof. Kui address the conference. The President thereupon instructed the immigration authorities to prevent the entry of Prof. Kui into Philippine territory. The chancellor of CLSU argued that the instruction violates the Constitution. Decide with reasons. (4%)
X
A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced disappearance, applied for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before a Regional Trial Court in Tarlac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection and production orders addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff to allow entry at Camp Aquino and permit the copying of relevant documents, including the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied by court-designated Commission on Human Rights (CHR) lawyers, A took photographs of a suspected isolation cell where her husband was allegedly seen being held for three days and tortured before he finally disappeared. The CHR lawyers requested one Lt. Valdez for a photocopy of the master plan of Camp Aquino and to confirm in writing that he had custody of the master plan. Lt. Valdez objected on the ground that it may violate his right against self-incrimination. Decide with reasons. (4%)
XI
Which statement best completes the following phrase: (1%)
“Freedom from torture is a right
  1. subject to derogation when national security is threatened.”
  2. confined only during custodial investigation.”
  3. which is non-derogable both during peacetime and in a situation of armed conflict.”
  4. both (a) and (b)
  5. none of the above.
XII
A witnessed two hooded men with baseball bats enter the house of their next door neighbor B. After a few seconds, he heard B shouting, “Huwag Pilo babayaran kita agad.” Then A saw the two hooded men hitting B until the latter fell lifeless. The assailants escaped using a yellow motorcycle with a fireball sticker on it toward the direction of an exclusive village nearby. A reported the incident to PO1 Nuval. The following day, PO1 Nuval saw the motorcycle parked in the garage of a house at Sta. Ines Street inside the exclusive village. He inquired with the caretaker as to who owned the motorcycle. The caretaker named the brothers Pilo and Ramon Maradona who were then outside the country. PO1 Nuval insisted on getting inside the garage. Out of fear, the caretaker allowed him. PO1 Nuval took 2 ski masks and 2 bats beside the motorcycle. Was the search valid? What about the seizure? Decide with reasons. (4%)
XIII
True or False.
  1. A valid and definite offer to buy a property is a pre-requisite to expropriation initiated by a local government unit. (0.5%)
  2. Re-classification of land by a local government unit may be done through a resolution. (0.5%)
  3. Boundary disputes between and among municipalities in the same province may be filed immediately with the Regional Trial Court. (0.5%)
  4. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is authorized to confiscate a driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic regulations. (0.5%)
XIV
ABC operates an industrial waste processing plant within Laoag City. Occasionally, whenever fluid substances are released through a nearby creek, obnoxious odor is emitted causing dizziness among residents in Barangay La Paz. On complaint of the Punong Barangay, the City Mayor wrote ABC demanding that it abate the nuisance. This was ignored. An invitation to attend a hearing called by the Sangguniang Panlungsod was also declined by the president of ABC. The city government thereupon issued a cease and desist order to stop the operations of the plant, prompting ABC to file a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court, arguing that the city government did not have any power to abate the alleged nuisance. Decide with reasons. (3%)
XV
True or False.
  1. A person who occupies an office that is defectively created is a de facto officer. (0.5%)
  2. The rule on nepotism does not apply to designations made in favor of a relative of the authority making a designation. (0.5%)
  3. A discretionary duty of a public officer is never delegable. (0.5%)
  4. Acquisition of civil service eligibility during tenure of a temporary appointee does not automatically translate to a permanent appointment. (0.5%)
XVI
Rudy Domingo, 38 years old, natural-born Filipino and a resident of the Philippines since birth, is a Manila-based entrepreneur who runs KABAKA, a coalition of peoples’ organizations from fisherfolk communities. KABAKA’s operations consist of empowering fisherfolk leaders through livelihood projects and trainings on good governance. The Dutch Foundation for Global Initiatives, a private organization registered in The Netherlands, receives a huge subsidy from the Dutch Foreign Ministry, which, in turn is allocated worldwide to the Foundation’s partners like KABAKA. Rudy seeks to register KABAKA as a party-list with himself as a nominee of the coalition. Will KABAKA and Rudy be qualified as a party-list and a nominee, respectively? Decide with reasons. (4%)
PART II
XVII
During his campaign sortie in Barangay Salamanca, Mayor Galicia was arrested at a PNP checkpoint for carrying highpowered firearms in his car. He was charged and convicted for violation of the COMELEC gun ban. He did not appeal his conviction and instead applied for executive clemency. Acting on the favorable recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President granted him pardon. Is he eligible to run again for an elective position? Explain briefly. (5%)
XVIII
The House Committee on Appropriations conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation into alleged irregular and anomalous disbursements of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) and Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA) of Congressmen as exposed by X, a Division Chief of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Implicated in the questionable disbursements are high officials of the Palace. The House Committee summoned X and the DBM Secretary to appear and testify. X refused to appear, while the Secretary appeared but refused to testify invoking executive privilege.
  1. May X be compelled to appear and testify? If yes, what sanction may be imposed on him? (2%)
  2. Is the Budget Secretary shielded by executive privilege from responding to the inquiries of the House Committee? Explain briefly. If the answer is no, is there any sanction that may be imposed upon him? (3%)
XIX
To instill religious awareness in the students of Doña Trinidad High School, a public school in Bulacan, the Parent- Teacher’s Association of the school contributed funds for the construction of a grotto and a chapel where ecumenical religious services and seminars are being held after school hours. The use of the school grounds for these purposes was questioned by a parent who does not belong to any religious group. As his complaint was not addressed by the school officials, he filed an administrative complaint against the principal before the DECS. Is the principal liable? Explain briefly. (5%)
XX
Define/explain the following:
  1. Doctrine of operative facts (1%)
  2. De facto municipal corporation (1%)
  3. Municipal corporation by estoppel (1%)
  4. Doctrine of necessary implication (1%)
  5. Principle of holdover (1%)
XXI
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Pasay City passed an ordinance requiring all disco pub owners to have all their hospitality girls tested for the AIDS virus. Both disco pub owners and the hospitality girls assailed the validity of the ordinance for being violative of their constitutional rights to privacy and to freely choose a calling or business. Is the ordinance valid? Explain. (5%)
XXII
Governor Diy was serving his third term when he lost his governorship in a recall election.
  1. Who shall succeed Governor Diy in his office as Governor? (1%)
  2. Can Governor Diy run again as governor in the next election? (2%)
  3. Can Governor Diy refuse to run in the recall election and instead resign from his position as governor? (2%)
XXIII
A was a career Ambassador when he accepted an ad interim appointment as Cabinet Member. The Commission on Appointments bypassed his ad interim appointment, however, and he was not re-appointed. Can he re-assume his position as career Ambassador? (5%)
XXIV
Compare and contrast “overbreadth doctrine” from “void-forvagueness” doctrine. (5%)
XXV
  1. What is the rotational scheme of appointments in the COMELEC? (2%)
  2. What are the two conditions for its workability? (2%)
  3. To what other constitutional offices does the rotational scheme of appointments apply? (2%)
XXVI
Distinguish between “pocket veto” and “item veto.” (2%)
XXVII
What is the concept of association under international law? (2%)

2009 bar questions

$
0
0
PART I
I
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences.   (5%)
  1. A law making "Bayan Ko" the new national anthem of the Philippines, in lieu of "Lupang Hinirang," is constitutional.
  2. Under the archipelago doctrine, the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago form part of the territorial sea of the archipelagic state.
  3. A law that makes military service for women merely voluntary is constitutional.
  4. A law fixing the passing grade in the Bar examinations at 70%, with no grade lower than 40% in any subject, is constitutional.
  5. An educational institution 100% foreign-owned may be validly established in the Philippines.
II
Despite lingering questions about his Filipino citizenship and his one-year residence in the district, Gabriel filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman before the deadline set by law. His opponent, Vito, hires you as lawyer to contest Gabriel's candidacy.
  1. Before election day, what action or actions will you institute against Gabriel, and before which court, commission or tribunal will you file such action/s? Reasons.   (2%)
  2. If, during the pendency of such action/s but before election day, Gabriel withdraws his certificate of candidacy, can he be substituted as candidate? If so, by whom and why? If not, why not?   (2%)
  3. If the action/s instituted should be dismissed with finality before the election, and Gabriel assumes office after being proclaimed the winner in the election, can the issue of his candidacy and/or citizenship and residence still be questioned? If so, what action or actions may be filed and where? If not, why not?   (2%)
III
The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234, authorizing the expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion as the site of a freedom park, and appropriating the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the |Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the ordinance because the municipality has an existing freedom park which, though smaller in size, is still suitable for the purpose, and to pursue expropriation would be needless expenditure of the people's money. Is the disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain your answer.   (2%)
IV
The Municipality of Pinatukdao is sued for damages arising from injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was hit by a glass pane that fell from a dilapidated window frame of the municipal hall. The municipality files a motion to dismiss the complaint, invoking state immunity from suit. Resolve the motion with reasons.   (3%)
V
To address the pervasive problem of gambling, Congress is considering the following options: (1) prohibit all forms of gambling; (2) allow gambling only on Sundays; (3) allow gambling only in government-owned casinos; and (4) remove all prohibitions against gambling but impose a tax equivalent to 30% on all winnings.
  1. If Congress chooses the first option and passes the corresponding law absolutely prohibiting all forms of gambling, can the law be validly attacked on the ground that it is an invalid exercise of police power? Explain your answer.   (2%)
  2. If Congress chooses the last option and passes the corresponding law imposing a 30% tax on all winnings and prizes won from gambling, would the law comply with the constitutional limitations on the exercise of the power of taxation? Explain your answer.   (2%)
VI
In a criminal prosecution for murder, the prosecution presented, as witness, an employee of the Manila Hotel who produced in court a videotape recording showing the heated exchange between the accused and the victim that took place at the lobby of the hotel barely 30 minutes before the killing. The accused objects to the admission of the videotape recording on the ground that it was taken without his knowledge or consent, in violation of his right to privacy and the Anti-Wire Tapping law. Resolve the objection with reasons.   (3%)
VII
Crack agents of the Manila Police Anti-Narcotics Unit were on surveillance of a cemetery where the sale and use of prohibited drugs were rumored to be rampant. The team saw a man with reddish and glassy eyes walking unsteadily towards them, but he immediately veered away upon seeing the policemen. The team approached the man, introduced themselves as peace officers, then asked what he had in his clenched fist. Because the man refused to answer, a policeman pried the fist open and saw a plastic sachet filled with crystalline substance. The team then took the man into custody and submitted the contents of the sachet to forensic examination. The crystalline substance in the sachet turned out to be shabu. The man was accordingly charged in court.
During the trial, the accused:
  1. challenged the validity of his arrest;   (2%) and
  2. objected to the admission in evidence of the prohibited drug, claiming that it was obtained in an illegal search and seizure.   (2%)
Decide with reasons.
VIII
Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank (IUB) with the sale of unregistered foreign securities, in violation of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and the House of Representatives unanimously approved, a Resolution directing the House Committee on Good Government (HCGG) to conduct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of legislation, in order to prevent the recurrence of any similar fraudulent activity.
The HCGG immediately scheduled a hearing and invited the responsible officials of IUB, the Chairman and Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). On the date set for the hearing, only the SEC Commissioners appeared, prompting Congressman Nonoy to move for the issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad testificandum to compel the attendance of the invited resource persons.
The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit HCGG from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash the subpoena, raising the following arguments:
  1. The subject of the legislative investigation is also the subject of criminal and civil actions pending before the courts and the prosecutor's office; thus, the legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action;   (3%) and
  2. Compelling the IUB officials, who are also respondents in the criminal and civil cases in court, to testify at the inquiry would violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination.   (3%)
    Are the foregoing arguments tenable? Reasons.
  3. May the Governor of the BSP validly invoke executive privilege and, thus, refuse to attend the legislative inquiry? Why or why not?   (3%)
IX
Warlito, a natural-born Filipino, took up permanent residence in the United States, and eventually acquired American citizenship. He then married Shirley, an American, and sired three children. In August 2009, Warlito decided to visit the Philippines with his wife and children: Johnny, 23 years of age; Warlito, Jr., 20; and Luisa, 17.
While in the Philippines, a friend informed him that he could reacquire Philippine citizenship without necessarily losing U.S. nationality. Thus, he took the oath of allegiance required under R.A. 9225.
  1. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, is Warlito a natural-born or a naturalized Filipino citizen today? Explain your answer.   (3%)
  2. With Warlito having regained Philippine citizenship, will Shirley also become a Filipino citizen? If so, why? If not, what would be the most speedy procedure for Shirley to acquire Philippine citizenship? Explain. (3%)
  3. Do the children --- Johnny, Warlito Jr., and Luisa --- become Filipino citizens with their father's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship? Explain your answer.   (3%)
X
Maximino, an employee of the Department of Education, is administratively charged with dishonesty and gross misconduct. During the formal investigation of the charges, the Secretary of Education preventively suspended him for a period of sixty (60) days. On the 60th day of the preventive suspension, the Secretary rendered a verdict, finding Maximino guilty, and ordered his immediate dismissal from the service.
Maximino appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed the Secretary's decision. Maximino then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the CSC decision, exonerating Maximino. The Secretary of Education then petitions the Supreme Court (SC) for the review of the CA decision.
  1. Is the Secretary of Education a proper party to seek the review of the CA decision exonerating Maximino? Reasons.   (2%)
  2. If the SC affirms the CA decision, is Maximino entitled to recover back salaries corresponding to the entire period he was out of the service? Explain your answer.   (3%)


PART II
XI
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences.   (5%)
  1. Aliens are absolutely prohibited from owning private lands in the Philippines.
  2. A de facto public officer is, by right, entitled to receive the salaries and emoluments attached to the public office he holds.
  3. The President exercises the power of control over all executive departments and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
  4. Decisions of the Ombudsman imposing penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are merely recommendatory.
  5. Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance.
XII
William, a private American citizen, a university graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he was arguing with. The police came, and brought him to the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police investigator, in halting English, informed William of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William refused the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request was denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the duration of the investigation.
William protested his arrest.
  1. He argued that since the incident took place inside the U.S. embassy, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction because the U.S. embassy grounds are not part of Philippine territory; thus, technically, no crime under Philippine law was committed. Is William correct? Explain your answer.   (3%)
  2. He also claimed that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not given the lawyer of his choice; that being an American, he should have been informed of his rights in proper English; and that he should have been informed of his rights as soon as he was taken into custody, not when he was already at the police station. Was William denied his Miranda rights? Why or why not?   (3%)
  3. If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under the "international standard of justice" and that he comes from a U.S. State that has outlawed capital punishment, should William be granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons.   (3%)
XIII
A terrorist group called the Emerald Brigade is based in the State of Asyaland. The government of Asyaland does not support the terrorist group, but being a poor country, is powerless to stop it.
The Emerald Brigade launched an attack on the Philippines, firing two missiles that killed thousands of Filipinos. It then warned that more attacks were forthcoming. Through diplomatic channels, the Philippines demanded that Asyaland stop the Emerald Brigade; otherwise, it will do whatever is necessary to defend itself.
Receiving reliable intelligence reports of another imminent attack by the Emerald Brigade, and it appearing that Asyaland was incapable of preventing the assault, the Philippines sent a crack commando team to Asyaland. The team stayed only for a few hours in Asyaland, succeeded in killing the leaders and most of the members of the Emerald Brigade, then immediately returned to the Philippines.
  1. Was the Philippine action justified under the international law principle of "self-defense"? Explain your answer.   (3%)
  2. As a consequence of the foregoing incident, Asyaland charges the Philippines with violation of Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter that prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State." The Philippines counters that its commando team neither took any territory nor interfered in the political processes of Asyaland. Which contention is correct? Reasons.   (3%)
  3. Assume that the commando team captured a member of the Emerald Brigade and brought him back to the Philippines. The Philippine Government insists that a special international tribunal should try the terrorist. On the other hand, the terrorist argues that terrorism is not an international crime and, therefore, the municipal laws of the Philippines, which recognize access of the accused to constitutional rights, should apply. Decide with reasons.   (3%)
XIV
The Philippine Government is negotiating a new security treaty with the United States which could involve engagement in joint military operations of the two countries' armed forces. A loose organization of Filipinos, the Kabataan at Matatandang Makabansa (KMM) wrote the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of National Defense (DND) demanding disclosure of the details of the negotiations, as well as copies of the minutes of the meetings. The DFA and the DND refused, contending that premature disclosure of the offers and counter-offers between the parties could jeopardize on-going negotiations with another country. KMM filed suit to compel disclosure of the negotiation details, and be granted access to the records of the meetings, invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
  1. Decide with reasons.    (3%)
  2. Will your answer be the same if the information sought by KMM pertains to contracts entered into by the Government in its proprietary or commercial capacity? Why or why not?   (3%)
XV
The KKK Television Network (KKK-TV) aired the documentary, "Case Law: How the Supreme Court Decides," without obtaining the necessary permit required by P.D. 1986. Consequently, the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) suspended the airing of KKK-TV programs. MTRCB declared that under P.D. 1986, it has the power of prior review over all television programs, except "newsreels" and programs "by the Government", and the subject documentary does not fall under either of these two classes. The suspension order was ostensibly based on Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 which grants MTRCB the authority to issue such an order.
KKK-TV filed a certiorari petition in court, raising the following issues:
  1. The act of MTRCB constitutes "prior restraint" and violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression;   (3%) and
  2. While Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was issued and published in a newspaper of general circulation, a copy thereof was never filed with the Office of the National Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center.   (2%)
Resolve the foregoing issues, with reasons.
XVI
  1. Angelina, a married woman, is a Division Chief in the Department of Science and Technology. She had been living with a married man, not her husband, for the last fifteen (15) years. Administratively charged with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, she admits her live-in arrangement, but maintains that this conjugal understanding is in conformity with their religious beliefs. As members of the religious sect, Yahweh's Observers, they had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which has been confirmed and blessed by their Council of Elders. At the formal investigation of the administrative case, the Grand Elder of the sect affirmed Angelina's testimony and attested to the sincerity of Angelina and her partner in the profession of their faith. If you were to judge this case, will you exonerate Angelina? Reasons.   (3%)
  2. Meanwhile, Jenny, also a member of Yahweh's Observers, was severely disappointed at the manner the Grand Elder validated what she considered was an obviously immoral conjugal arrangement between Angelina and her partner. Jenny filed suit in court, seeking the removal of the Grand Elder from the religious sect on the ground that his act in supporting Angelina not only ruined the reputation of their religion, but also violated the constitutional policy upholding the sanctity of marriage and the solidarity of the family. Will Jenny's case prosper? Explain your answer.   (2%)
XVII
Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a local manufacturer of computers and computer parts, owns a sprawling plant in a 5,000-square meter lot in Pasig City. To remedy the city's acute housing shortage, compounded by a burgeoning population, the Sangguniang Panglungsod authorized the City Mayor to negotiate for the purchase of the lot. The Sanggunian intends to subdivide the property into small residential lots to be distributed at cost to qualified city residents. But FCC refused to sell the lot. Hard pressed to find a suitable property to house its homeless residents, the City filed a complaint for eminent domain against FCC.
  1. If FCC hires you as lawyer, what defense or defenses would you set up in order to resist the expropriation of the property? Explain.   (5%)
  2. If the Court grants the City's prayer for expropriation, but the City delays payment of the amount determined by the court as just compensation, can FCC recover the property from Pasig City? Explain.   (2%)
  3. Suppose the expropriation succeeds, but the City decides to abandon its plan to subdivide the property for residential purposes having found a much bigger lot, can FCC legally demand that it be allowed to repurchase the property from the City of Pasig? Why or why not?   (2%)
XVIII
What are the essential elements of a valid petition for a people's initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution? Discuss. (2%)

2008 bar questions

$
0
0
  1. The legal yardstick in determining whether usage has become customary international law is expressed in the maxim opinio juris sive necessitatis or opinio juris for short. What does the maxim mean? (3%)
  2. Under international law, differentiate "hard law" from "soft law".(3%)
- II -
May a treaty violate international law? If your answer is in the affirmative, explain when such may happen. If your answer is in the negative, explain why. (5%)
- III -
The President alone without the concurrence of the Senate abrogated a treaty. Assume that the other country-party to the treaty is agreeable to the abrogation provided it complies with the Philippine Constitution. If a case involving the validity of the treaty abrogation is brought to the Supreme Court, how should it be resolved? (6%)
- IV -
Congress passed a law authorizing the National Housing Authority (NHA) to expropriate or acquire private property for the redevelopment of slum areas, as well as to lease or resell the property to private developers to carry out the redevelopment plan. Pursuant to the law, the NHA acquired all properties within a targeted badly blighted area in San Nicolas, Manila except a well-maintained drug and convenience store that poses no blight or health problem itself. Thereafter, NHA sold all the properties it has thus far acquired to a private realty company for redevelopment. Thus, the NHA initiated expropriation proceedings against the store owner who protested that his property could not be taken because it is not residential or slum housing. He also contended that his property is being condemned for a private purpose, not a public one, noting the NHA`s sale of the entire area except his property to a private party. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? (6%)
- V -
Having received tips the accused was selling narcotics, two police officers forced open the door of his room. Finding him sitting partly dressed on the side of the bed, the officers spied two capsules on a night stand beside the bed. When asked, " Are these yours?", the accused seized the capsules and put them in his mouth. A struggle ensued, in the course of which the officer pounced on the accused, took him to a hospital where at their direction, a doctor forced an emetic solution though a tube into the accused's stomach against his will. This process induced vomiting. In the vomited matter were found two capsules which proved to contain heroin. In the criminal case, the chief evidence against the accused was the two capsules.
  1. As counsel for the accused, what constitutional rights will you invoke in his defense? (4%)
  2. How should the court decide the case? (3%)
- VI -
The Philippine National Police (PNP) issued a circular to all its members directed at the style and length of male police officers' hair, sideburns and moustaches, as well as the size of their waistlines. It prohibits beards, goatees and waistlines over 38 inches, except for medical reason. Some police officers questioned the validity of the circular, claiming that it violated their right to liberty under the Constitution. Resolve the controversy. (6%)
- VII -
JC, a major in the Armed Forces of t\he Philippine, is facing prosecution before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the murder of his neighbor whom he suspected to have molested his (JC's) 15-year old daughter.
  1. Is JC entitled to bail? Why or why not? (3%)
  2. Assume that upon being arraigned, JC entered a plea of guilty and was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. JC then testified to the effect that he stabbled the deceased in self-defense beacause the latter was strangling him and that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a decision acquittal violate JC's right against double jeopardy? Why or why noy? (3%)
- VIII -
ST, a Regional Trial Court judge who falsified his Certificate of Service, was found liable by the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency, and meted the penalty of suspension form office for 6 months. Subsequently, ST filed a petition for executive clemency with the Office of the President. The Executive Secretary, acting on said petition issued a resolution granting ST executive clemency. Is the grant of executive clemency valid? Why or why not? (6%)
- IX -
Abdul ran and won in the May 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections for Vice-Governor of Tawi-Tawi. After being proclaimed Vice-Governor in the 2004 elections, his opponent, Khalil, filed an election protest before the Commission on Election. Ruling with finalty on the protest, the COMELEC declared Khalil as the duly elected Vice-Governor though the decision was promulgated only in 2007, when Abdul had fully served his 2004-2007 term and was in fact already on his 2007-2010 term as Vice Governor.
  1. Abdul now consults you if the can still run for Vice-Governor of Tawi-Tawi in the forthcoming May 2010 election on the premise that he could not be considered as having served as Vice-Governor from 2004-2007 because he was not duly elected to the post, as he assumed office merely as a presumptive winner and that presumption was later overturned when COMELEC decided with finality that had lost in the May 2004 elections. What will be your advice? (3%)
  2. Abdul also consults you whether his political party can validly nominate his wife as subtitute candidate for Vice-Mayor of Tawi-Tawi in May 2010 elections in case the COMELEC disqualifies him and denies due course to or cancels his certificate of candidacy in view of a false material representation therein.What will be your advice? (3%)
- X -
The 1st Legislative District of South Cotabato is composed of General Santos and three municipalities including Polomolok. During the canvassing proceedings before the District Board of Canvassers in connection with the 2007 congressional election, candidate MP objected to the certificate pf canvass for Polomolok on the ground that it was obviously manufactured, submitting as evidence the affidavit of a mayoralty candidate of Polomolok. The certificate of canvass for General Santos was likewise objected to by MP on the basis of the confirmed report of the local NAMFREL that 10 election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the certificate. MP moved that the certificate of canvass for General Santos be corrected to exclude the the result from the non-existent precincts. The District Board of Canvassers denied both objections and ruled to include the certificate of canvass. May MP appeal the rulings to the COMELEC? Explain. (6%)
- XI -
On August 8, 2008 the Governor of Bohol died and Vice-Governor Cesar succeeded him by operation of law. Accordingly, Benito, the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was elevated to the position of Vice-Governor. By the elevation of Benito to the office of Vice-Governor, a vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was created.
How should the vacancy be filed? (3%)
- XII -
The Mayor of San Jose City appointed his wife, Amelia, as City Treasurer from among tree (3) employees pf the city considered for the said position. Prior to said promotion, Amelia had been an Assistant City Treasurer for ten (10) years, that is, even before she married the City Mayor. Should the Civil Service Commission approve the promotional appointment of Amelia? Why or why not? (6%)
- XIII -
Congress enacted a law establishing the right to trial by jury of an accused charged with a felony or offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The law provides for the qualification of prospective jury member, the guidelines to be observed by the judge and the lawyers in jury selection including the grounds for challenging the selection of jury member, and t\he methodology for jury deliberations. Is the law constitutional? Explain fully. (7%)
- XIV -
In 1963, congress passed a law creating a government-owned corporation named Manila War Memorial Commission (MWMC), with the primary function of overseeing the construction of a massive memorial in the heart of Manila to commemorate victim of the 1945 Battle of Manila
The MWMC charter provided an initial appropriation of P1,000,000, empowered the corporation to raise funds in its own name, and set aside a parcel of land in Malate for the memorial site. The charter set the corporate life of MWMC at 50 years with a proviso that Congress may not abolish MWMC until after the completion of the memorial.
Forty-five (45) years later, the memorial was only 1/3 complete and the memorial site itself had long been overrun by quatters. Congress enacted a law abolishing the MWMC and requiring that the funds raised by it be remitted to the National Treasury. The MWMC challenged the validity of the law, arguing that under its charter its mandate is to complete the memorial no matter how long it takes. Decide with reason. (6%)
- XV -
The principal of Jaena High School, a public school wrote a letter to the parents and guardians of all the school's pupils, informing them that the school was willing to provide religious instruction to its Catholic students during class hours, through a Catholic priest. However, students who wished to avail of such religious instruction needed to secure the consent of their parents and guardians in writing.
  1. Does the offer violate the constitutional prohibition againts the establishment of religion? (3%)
  2. the parents of evangelical Christian students, upon learning of the offer, demanded that they too be entitled to have their children instructed in their own religious faith during class hours. The principal, a devout Catholic, rejected the request. As counsel for the parents of the evangelical students, how would you argue in support of their position? (3%)
- XVI -
Nationwide protest have erupted over rising gas prices, including disruptive demonstrations in many universities throughout the country. The Metro Manila State University, a public university, adopted a university-wide circular prohibiting public mass demonstrations and rallies within the campus. Offended by the circular,militant students spread word that on the following Friday, all students were to wear black T-shirt as a symbols of their protest both against high gas prices and the university ban on demonstrations. The effort was only moderately successful, with around 30% of the students heeding the call. Nonetheless, university officials were outraged and compelled the students leaders to explain why they should not be expelled for violating the circular against demonstrations.
The student leaders approached you for legal advice. They contended that they should not be expelled since they did not violate the circular, their protest action being neither a demonstrator nor a rally since all they did was wear black T-shirts. What would you advise the students? (6%)
- XVII -
As a reaction to the rice shortage and the dearth of mining engineers. Congress passed a law requiring graduates of public science high school henceforth to take up agriculture or mining engineering as their college course. Several students protested, invoking their freedom to choose their profession. Is the law constitutional? (6%)
NOTHING FOLLOWS.

2007 bar questions

$
0
0
INSTRUCTION: YOU WILL BE GIVEN CREDIT FOR YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF LEGAL DOCTRINE AND FOR THE QUALITY OF YOUR LEGAL REASONING.
- I -
(10 POINTS)
True or False. Briefly explain your answer.
  1. For purposes of communication and instruction! the official languages of the Philippines, until otherwise provided by law, are Filipino and English.
  2. The 1987 Constitution has increased the scope of academic freedom recognized under the previous Constitution.
- II -
(10 POINTS)
The City Mayor issues an Executive Order declaring that the city promotes responsible parenthood and upholds natural family planning. He prohibits all hospitals operated by the city from prescribing the use of artificial methods of contraception, including condoms, pills, intrauterine devices and surgical sterilization. As a result, poor women in his city lost their access to affordable family planning programs. Private clinics! however, continue to render family planning counsel and devices to paying clients.
  1. Is the Executive Order in any way constitutionally infirm? Explain.
  2. Is the Philippines in breach of any obligation under international law? Explain.
  3. May the Commission on Human Rights order the Mayor to stop the implementation of the Executive Order? Explain.
- III -
(10 POINTS)
Lawrence is a Filipino computer expert based in Manila who invented a virus that destroys all the files stored in a computer. Assume that in May 2005, this virus spread all over the world and caused $50 million in damage to property in the United States, and that in June 2005, he was criminally charged before United States courts under their anti-hacker law. Assume that in July 2005, the Philippines adopted its own anti-hacker law, to strengthen existing sanctions already provided against damage to property. The United States has requested the Philippines to extradite him to US courts under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
  1. Is the Philippines under an obligation to extradite Lawrence? State the applicable rule and its rationale.
  2. Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines adopted its anti-hacker legislation. Will that change your answer?
- IV -
(10 POINTS)
In 1993, historians confirmed that during World War II, "comfort women" were forced into serving the Japanese military. These women were either abducted or lured by false promises of jobs as cooks or waitresses, and eventually forced against their will to have sex with Japanese soldiers on a daily basis during the course of the war, and often suffered from severe beatings and venereal diseases. The Japanese government contends that the "comfort stations" were run as "onsite military brothels" (or prostitution houses) by private operators, and not by the Japanese military. There were many Filipina "comfort women."
  1. Name at least one basic principle or norm of international humanitarian law that was violated by the Japanese military in the treatment of the "comfort women."
  2. The surviving Filipina "comfort women" demand that the Japanese government apologize and pay them compensation. However, under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Agreement -the legal instrument that ended the state of war between Japan and the Allied Forces -all the injured states, including the Philippines, received war reparations and, in return, waived all claims against Japan arising from the war. Is that a valid defense?
  3. The surviving Filipina "comfort women" sue the Japanese government for damages before Philippine courts. Will that case prosper?
- V -
(10 POINTS)
The Destilleria Felipe Segundo is famous for its 15-year old rum, which it has produced and marketed successfully for the past 70 years. Its latest commercial advertisement uses the line: "Nakalikim ka na ba ng kinse anyos?" Very soon, activist groups promoting women's and children's rights were up in arms against the advertisement.
  1. All advertising companies in the Philippines have formed an association, the Philippine Advertising Council, and have agreed to abide by all the ethicalguidelines and decisions by the Council. In response to the protests, the Council orders the pull-out of the "kinse anyos" advertising campaign. Can Destilleria Felipe Segundo claim that its constitutional rights are thus infringed?
  2. One of the militant groups, the Amazing Amazonas, call on all government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) to boycott any newspaper, radio or TV station that carries the "kinse anyos" advertisements. They call on all government nominees in sequestered corporations to block any advertising funds allocated for any such newspaper, radio or TV station. Can the GOCCs and sequestered corporations validly comply?
- VI -
(10 POINTS)
True or False. Briefly explain your answer.
  1. An amendment to the Constitution shall be valid upon a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Congress.
  2. All public officers and employees shall take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution .
- VII -
(10 POINTS)
Batas Pambansa 880, the Public Assembly Law of 1985, regulates the conduct of all protest rallies in the Philippines.
  1. Salakay, Bayan! held a protest rally and planned to march from Quezon City to Luneta in Manila. They received a permit from the Mayor of Quezon City, but not from the Mayor of Manila. They were able to march in Quezon City and up to the boundary separating it from the City of Manila. Three meters after crossing the boundary, the Manila Police stopped them for posing a danger to pubHc safety. Was this a valid exercise of police power?
  2. The security police of the Southern Luzon Expressway spotted a caravan of 20 vehicles, with paper banners taped on their sides and protesting graft and corruption in government. They were driving at 50 kilometers per hour in a 40-90 kilometers per hour zone. Some banners had been blown off by the wind, and posed a hazard to other motorists. They were stopped by the security police. The protesters then proceeded to march instead, sandwiched between the caravan vehicles. They were also stopped by the security force. May the security police validly stop the vehicles and the marchers?
- VIII -
(10 POINTS)
The Provincial Governor of Bataan requested the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release its Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA) of P100 million for the current budget year. However, the General Appropriations Act provided that the IRA may be released on Iy if the province meets certain conditions as determined by an Oversight Council created by the President.
  1. Is this requirement valid?
  2. The Provincial Governor is a party-mate of the President. May the Bataan Representative instead file a petition to compel the DBM to release the funds?
- IX -
(10 POINTS)
The Department of Education (DepEd) requires that any school applying for a tuition fee increase must, as a condition for the increase, offer full tuition scholarships to students from low-income families. The Sagrada Familia Elementary School is a Catholic school and has applied for a tuition fee increase. Under this regulation by the DepEd, it will end up giving tuition scholarships to a total of 21 students next year. At a cost of P50,OOO per student, the school will lose a total of P1.05 million for next year.
  1. Is this DepEd requirement valid?
  2. If instead the DepEd requires a full tuition scholarship for the highest ranking students in each grade, determined solely on the basis of academic grades and rank, will the DepEd requirement be valid?
- X -
(10 POINTS)
The Supreme Court has provided a formula for allocating seats for party-list representatives.
  1. The twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-Iist congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
  2. The two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
  3. The three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats; and
  4. The first-party rule - additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be determined in relation to the total number of votes garnered by the party with the highest number of votes.
For each of these rules, state the constitutional or legal basis, if any, and the purpose.
NOTHING FOLLOWS.

2006 bar questions

$
0
0
- I -
  1. What do you mean by the "Calling-out Power" of the President under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution? 5%
  2. On February 24, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.1017 declaring a state of national emergency. Is this Proclamation constitutional? Explain. 2.5%
  3. During the effectivity of this Proclamation, Gener, Lito, and Bong were arrested by the police for acts of terrorism. Is the arrest legal? Explain. 2.5%
- II -
The Samahan Ng Mga Mahihirap (SM) filed with the Office of the City Mayor" of Manila an application for a permit to hold a rally on Mendiola Street on September 5, 2006 from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to protest the political killings of journalists. However, the City Mayor denied their application on the ground that a rally at the time and place applied for will block the traffic in the San Miguel and Quiapo Districts. He suggested the Liwasang Bonifacio, which has been designated a Freedom Park, as venue for the rally.
  1. Does the SM have a remedy to contest the denial of its application for a permit? 2.5%
  2. How should a wage distortion be settled?
  3. Does the availability of a Freedom Park justify the denial of SM's application for a permit? 2.5%
  4. Assuming that despite the denial of SM's application for a permit, its members hold a rally, prompting the police to arrest them. '- Are the arrests without judicial warrants lawful? 2.5%
- III -
The President issued Proclamation No.1018 placing the Philippines under Martial Law on the ground that a rebellion staged by lawless elements is endangering the public safety .Pursuant to the Proclamation, suspected rebels were arrested and detained and military tribunals were set up to try them. Robert dela Cruz, a citizen, filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of Proclamation No.1018.
  1. Does Robert have a standing to challenge Proclamation No.1018? Explain. 2.5%
  2. In the same suit, the Solicitor General contends that under the Constitution, the President as Commander-in-Chief, determines whether the exigency has arisen requiring the exercise of his power to declare Martial Law and that his determination is conclusive upon the courts. How should the Supreme Court rule? 2.5%
  3. The Solicitor General argues that, in any event, the determination of whether the rebellion poses dangers to public safety involves a question of fact and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. What should be the ruling of the Court? 2.5%
  4. Finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the President reported to Congress such proclamation of Martial Law, but Congress did not revoke the proclamation. What is the effect of the inaction of Congress on the suit brought by Robert to the Supreme Court? 2.5%
- IV -
State whether or not the following laws are constitutional. Explain briefly.
  1. A law prohibiting Chinese citizens from engaging in retail trade. 2%
  2. A law denying persons charged with crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or death the right to bail. 2%
  3. A law fixing the terms of local elective officials, other than barangay officials, to 6 years. 2%
  4. A law changing the design of the Philippine flag. 2%
  5. A law creating a state corporation to exploit, develop, and utilize compressed natural gas. 2%
- V -
  1. What is the function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal? 2.5%
  2. What is the composition of each? 2.5%
  3. Differentiate an election protest from an action for quo warranto. 2.5%
  4. What is a quasi-judicial body or agency? 2.5%
- VI -
  1. a) What is the principal identifying feature of a presidential form of government? Explain. 2.5%

    b) What are the essential characteristics of a parliamentary form of government? 2.5%
  2. What Constitutional provisions institutionalize the principle of civilian supremacy? 2.5%
  3. Does a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR) constitute a property right protected by the Constitution? 2.5%
- VII -
Select the best answer and explain.
  1. An accused's right against self-incrimination is violated in the following cases: 5%
    1. When he is ordered by the trial court to undergo a paraffin test to prove he is guilty of murder;
    2. When he is compelled to produce his bankbooks to be used as evidence against his father charged with plunder;
    3. When he is ordered to produce a sample of his handwriting to be used as evidence that he is the author of a letter wherein he agreed to kill the victim;
    4. When the president of a corporation is subpoenaed to produce certain documents as proofs he is guilty of illegal recruitment.
  2. The legislature may abolish this body: 5%
    1. Commission on Appointments
    2. Ombudsman
    3. Judicial and Bar Council
    4. Court of Tax Appeals
    5. Commission on Audit
- VIII -
  1. Atty. Emily Go, a legitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was born in 1945. At 21, she elected Philippine citizenship and studied law. She passed the bar examinations and engaged in private practice for many years. The Judicial and Bar Council nominated her as a candidate for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. But her nomination is being contested by Atty .Juris Castillo, also an aspirant to the position. She claims that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen, hence, not qualified to be appointed to the Supreme Court. Is this contention correct? 5%
  2. Atty. Richard Chua was born in 1964. He is a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His father became a naturalized Filipino citizen when Atty .Chua was still a minor . Eventually, he studied law and was allowed by the Supreme Court to take the bar examinations, subject to his submission to the Supreme Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Although he never complied with such requirement, Atty. Chua practiced law for many years until one Noel Eugenio filed with the Supreme Court a complaint for disbarment against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. He then filed with the Bureau of Immigration an affidavit electing Philippine citizenship. Noel contested it claiming it was filed many years after Atty. Chua reached the age of majority. Will Atty. Chua be disbarred? Explain. 5%
- IX -
  1. Where is the seat of the International Court of Justice? 1%
  2. How many are its members? 1 %
  3. What is the term of their office? 1 %
  4. Who is its incumbent president? 1 %
  5. What is his/her nationality? 1 %
  6. In 1980, the United States filed with the International Court of Justice a complaint against Iran alleging that the latter is detaining American diplomats in violation of International Law. Explain how the International Court of Justice can acquire jurisdiction over these contending countries. 5%
- X -
  1. How is state sovereignty defined in International Law? 2.5%
  2. Is state sovereignty absolute? 2.5%
  3. What is the principle of auto-limitation? 2.5%
  4. What is the relationship between reciprocity and the principle of auto-limitation? 2.5%
NOTHING FOLLOWS.

Freedom of expression

$
0
0
FACTS:On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay.
 On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9

QUESTION:  Is the order of the COMELEC correct?
ANSWER: No. The main subject of this case is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect" caused by respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.

That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue — and a complex piece of legislation at that — can easily be interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and non-judgmental. Some may have expected that the authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can often be expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that they have been expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speechby candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents. EN BANC,G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
 
Viewing all 486 articles
Browse latest View live