ZITA NGO BURCA (1973)

August 16, 2019, 8:27 pm

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24252 June 15, 1973

IN RE PETITION TO DECLARE ZITA NGO TO POSSESS ALL QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT 473 FOR THE PURPOSE OF CANCELLING HER ALIEN REGISTRY WITH THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION. ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Artemio Derecho, Angelito C. Imperio and Ferdinand S. Tinio for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for oppositor-appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

ANTONIO, J.:

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the decision in this case which reversed that of the Court of First Instance of Leyte declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, the said court have found her to be married to a Filipino citizen and to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino citizen enumerated in the Naturalization Law. Her motion to such effect was filed on February 20, 1967, and March 2, 1967, the Court required the Solicitor General to comment on the same. On October 4, 1971, however, before petitioner's motion could be resolved, this Court rendered decision in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, which, effect, passed on all the issues raised in said motion favorably to petitioner's position. Accordingly, and there being sufficient number of members of the Court in favor of maintaining the ruling in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, the decision in this case should be modified.

On April 24, 1964, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte a petition alleging that she is married to Filipino citizen and possesses all the qualifications and none the disqualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 and praying that a declaration to such effect be made by the Court for the purpose of laying the basis for the cancellation by the Bureau of Immigration of her alien certificate of registration. On April 17, 1964, the court set the petition for hearing on November 20, 1964 and ordered notified thereof to be given to the Solicitor General. In the same order it was required that said notice of hearing be published in the Official Gazette once a month for three consecutive months a once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Morning Times, a newspaper edited in the City of Ormoc, where petition resides, and posted in a public and conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court. On November 13, 1964, the Solicitor General filed an "Opposition and Motion to Dismiss" on the following grounds:

(1) As an application for Philippine Citizenship, the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended, such as petitioner's former places of residence, and that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications specified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Specifically, as can be gathered in the Notice of Hearing, there is no allegation that she is of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines; or that she has some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Likewise, there is no showing that the petition is supported by the affidavits of at least two credible persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act, and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines, and is not in any way disqualified under the provision of the Act. Similarly, there is no showing that she has filed a declaration of intention or is exempt from such requirement. Even in the Notice of Hearing, there is failure to mention the names of witnesses whom she proposes to introduce in support of the petition, as required under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

(2) As a separate proceedings to declare the petitioner a citizen being allegedly the wife of a Filipino citizen, and to direct the cancellation of her alien Registry, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual (Palaran vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15047, January 30, 1962; Channie Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961; Delumen vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-552. January 28, 1954; in re Hospicion Obiles 49 Off. Gaz. 923), and that citizenship is not the proper subject for declaratory judgment (Feliseta Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-16108, October 31, 1960: Santiago vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-14653, January 31, 1963; Board of Commissioners, et al. vs. Hon. Felix R. Domingo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-21274, July 31, 1963).

Thereafter, the court proceeded to hear the case and rendered its decision, in which it found inter alia the following:

After the necessary publications of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette for July 6, July 13 and 20, 1964, (Exhibit A) and the Morning Times for April 26, May 3, 10, 1964 (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 and B-3) this case was called for trial with the Honorable Solicitor General opposing the petition as aforesaid.

It appears from the evidence presented that petitioner is a native born Nationalist Chinese Citizen who was born at Gigaquit Surigao on March 30, 1933 (Exhibit D). In 1946, she transferred to Surigao, Surigao until her marriage to Florencio Burca a native born Filipino Citizen on May 14, 1961 (Exhibit C) when she transferred to Ormoc City to live with her husband. Petitioner studied at Surigao, Surigao from first grade to fourth year where she graduated. Thereafter she took home economics special course at the University of San Carlos, Cebu City.

Petitioner knows how to read and write the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, and the English language (Exhibits G and H).

She has not left the Philippines since birth up to the present time.

She is a holder of ACR No. A-14805 (Exh. E) and Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333 (Exh. F).

Petitioner has no criminal record and that she has no pending case, civil or criminal or administrative, and that she has never been convicted of any crime (Exhibits J, K, L).

She is engaged in farming and in business and had a net income with her husband in the sum of P16,034.84 for which they paid an Income Tax of P1,556.00 per O.R. C-050357 dated at Ormoc City on April 14, 1964 (Exhibits 1 and 1-1).

She is a person of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which she is living.

She is supporting a two-year old legitimate child.

She is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments.

She is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas.

She is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy.

She has mingled socially with the Filipinos, and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos. She is a Catholic and was joined in wedlock by a Catholic priest (Exh. C).

No evidence was presented by the oppositor and City Fiscal Ramon de Veyra, representing the Solicitor General limited himself to the cross examination of the petitioner.

and held:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition, and declaring that ZITA NGO BURCA petitioner, has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino Citizen and that she being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision becomes final and executory.

The Solicitor General appealed in due time and made the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE DECLARATION OF PETITIONER AS A FILIPINO CITIZEN BY REASON OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER HAS ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS TO BECOME A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES SHE BEING MARRIED TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE OPPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

In the decision of this Court in this case rendered on January 30, 1967, the position of the Solicitor General was upheld the above judgment of the trial court was reversed, the Court holding (1) that the only means by which the alien wife Filipino citizen may have herself declared as having become a Filipino citizen by reason of her marriage is through compliance with the procedure for naturalization contained in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, and (2) in said proceeding aside from the showing that she is laboring under any of the disqualifications enumerate Section 4, thereof, she must prove that she possesses all qualifications under Section 2 of the same statute. More specifically the alien wife of a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire the citizenship of her husband is required to file corresponding petition for naturalization in court, allege prove all the requisite requirements such as continuous residence for a period of at least ten years, lucrative income and the like. In other words, she was required to follow procedure for the judicial naturalization of aliens, thus rendering for naught the first paragraph of Section 15 of Revised Naturalization Law. Under such doctrine the alien wife of a Filipino was placed in some cases in a disadvantageous position than an ordinary alien.

To accord substance to the obvious legislative purpose this Court in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case, held thru Mr. Justice Barredo:

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase 'who may be lawfully naturalized', found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course, in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws, We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called 'melting pot' of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the extreme. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they could show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. (41 SC 292, 350-351.)

Withal, the Court also held that it is not necessary for alien wife of a Filipino citizen to resort to the procedure naturalization cases before she can be declared a citizen reason of her marriage We further added:

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is there for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own, citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation obtains even as to native born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as we view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

'Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.'

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition." .

As already stated, it is the view of the majority of the Court that insofar as the decision in the case at bar conflicts with the above rulings laid down in Moy Ya Lim Yao, it should be reconsidered and modified. Truth to tell, We can hardly do otherwise. As may be gathered from the opinion written for the Court by Justice Barredo in that case, the Court not only made reference to but actually sustained many of the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration of herein appellee as well as in the memorandum submitted by the amici curiae in this case.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, We cannot grant petitioner-appellee's prayer for the affirmance of the trial court's judgment declaring her a Filipino citizen. It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. Under our laws there can be no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, that the courts may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. In Moy Ya Lim Yao, We adverted to administrative procedure heretofore followed in the Bureau Immigration regarding the steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration, and thus secure recognition of her status Filipino citizen. Such a procedure could be availed of Petitioner. Judicial recourse would be avoidable to Petitioner in case of an adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner.

At the same time, it may not be amiss to clarify a matter related to the point involved in this case, which has given to a certain degree of confusion and unnecessary difficulties on the part of all concerned. We deem it wise to deal with it here in order to preclude unnecessary litigations, not to speak of legal complications that may ensue as a consequence of the lack of finality of judicial or administrative determinations on person's citizenship in certain cases.

Heretofore up to Moy Ya Lim Yao, it has been the constant doctrine of this Court, that a final and executory decision the question of citizenship, by a court other than in naturalization proceedings, or by an administrative body, generally not considered binding in other cases and for other purpose than that specifically involved in the case where such decision is rendered. Thus for instance, in a case involving the determination of the citizenship of a party as a prerequisite to the exercise of a license, franchise or privilege, such as operation of a public utility, and where the administration agency concerned shall have found as an established fact to the applicant is a Filipino citizen, even if such finding, may have been affirmed by this Court on appeal, the same will be considered as conclusive on the question of such citizenship. Hence if such party should apply for a license to engage in retail trade or for the lease or purchase of any disposable lands of the public domain, the question of his citizenship may litigated again.

Understandably such a result is unfair to the party concerned. Instead of according finality and stability judicial or administrative decisions, it engenders confusion and multiplicity of suits.

Certainly if the decision of the administrative agency on the matter of citizenship, as an important issue involved in the case, is affirmed by this Court, We find no cogent reason why such decision on the matter can not be given preclusive effect. We have conceded the authority of certain administrative agencies to ascertain the citizenship of the parties involved in the cases therein, as a matter inherent in or essential to the efficient exercise of their powers. Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. In discussing this point, Professor Allan D. Vestal of the University of Iowa, holds the view that: Preclusive effect may or may not be given to an administrative ruling depending on a number of factors. If the decision is a factual matter and if it has been rendered by an agency with fact-finding procedures which approximate those of a court, then preclusion should obtain." (Vestal Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Georgetown Law Journal, 857, 874.) Obviously, if the decision of an administrative agency on the question of citizenship, is affirmed by this Court on the ground that the same is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, there appears to be no valid reason why such finding should have no conclusive effect in other cases, where the same issue is involved. The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it, which is affirmed by this Court. For the "effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation" (Clear, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale Law Journal, 345).

It must be stressed however that in the public interest, in such cases, the Solicitor General or his authorized representative should be allowed to intervene on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, and to take appropriate steps the premises. For only in that manner can there be assurance that the claim to Filipino citizenship was thoroughly threshed out before the corresponding court or administration agency.

Accordingly, in response to the vigorous and able plea of amici curiae, We declare it to be a sound rule, that where citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in controversy, after a full-blown hearing, with the act participation of the Solicitor General or his authority representative, and this finding on the Citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shows constitute conclusive proof of such person's citizenship, in a other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

In resume, therefore, since Our opinion in the decision January 30, 1967, requiring an alien woman married to Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this Country, to submit a judicial proceeding in all respects similar to a naturalization case, wherein in addition, she has to prove not only that she not laboring under any of the disqualifications under section but also possesses all the qualifications set forth in section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, conflicts with Our ruling Moy Ya Lim Yao, the decision has to that extent be consider modified.1We cannot, however, affirm petitioner's claim Filipino citizenship in these proceedings. That is a matter which in accordance with Our suggestion in Moy Ya Lim Yao the appropriate governmental agency, such as the Commissioner on Immigration, shall have to pass upon.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, and consistently with the foregoing opinion, the decision herein of January 30, 1967 is hereby modified; the reversal of the decision of the court a quo and the dismissal of the petition, are however affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner's availing of the procedure indicated above. No costs.

Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., concurs in line with the view he expressed in Yap vs. Republic, L-27430.

Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., concurs in the result, but dissents and votes to maintain the decision sought to be reconsidered for the reason therein stated.

Footnotes

1 The doctrine in Moy Ya Lim Yao, was reiterated by this Court thru Justice Zaldivar in Yap v. Republic, L-Z7430, May 17, 1972 and again in Tiu v. Vivo, L-21425, September 15, 1972.

↧

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS (2004)

August 16, 2019, 8:28 pm

≫ Next: ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION

≪ Previous: ZITA NGO BURCA (1973)

EN BANC

G.R. No. 163256 November 10, 2004

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIÑE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.

On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country."

Private respondents alleged that based on a letter1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer3 stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period.4 Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum5 subsequently.

Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:

x x x

The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxx.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:]

xxx.

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

xxx.

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx

Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.

In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration."

It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965).

x x x

Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. 6

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.7

On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz:

(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;

(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;

(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004;

(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen;

(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their records and for petitioner's reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.8

The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.

When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondent's only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner.

Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex "2"– Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex "3"– Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex "4"– Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex "5"– Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex "6"– Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization.

Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004.

The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex "3."

This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171.

As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)9

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

In its Comment,10 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioner's name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioner's opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

In his Reply,11 petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.

The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.12 Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.13

First Issue: Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation?

The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171,14 thus:

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as "applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term." The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that "the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:

x x x

…The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events—i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being—in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

x x x

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his American citizenship—was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.17

Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above.

Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division?

The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated:

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Tinga, JJ., on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1 COMELEC (First Division) Resolution, Rollo, p. 36.
2 COMELEC en banc Resolution, Rollo, p. 43.
3 Rollo, p. 73.
4 Supra, note 2.
5 Supra, note 3, at 87.
6 Supra, note 1, at 39-40.
7 Id. at 41.
8 Supra, note 3, at 47.
9 Id. at 44-47.
10 Id, at 106.
11 Id. at 112.
12 Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004; Garcia v. Commission on Elections,258 SCRA 754, 757 (1996); Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76, 77 (1961).
13 Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, citing Brillantes, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004.
14 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171:
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with an association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
SEC. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation."15 257 SCRA 727 (1996).
16 Id. at 748-749.
17 Id. at 754-756.
18 Republic Act No. 8171 took effect on January 12, 1996.
19 Supra, note 3, at 44.

↧

ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION

August 16, 2019, 8:29 pm

≫ Next: AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.

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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139 June 08, 2001

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the admission and integration of aliens into its territory and body politic including the grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and interest.

Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;

(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;

(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;

(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and

(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.

Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:

(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;

(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the following:

(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;

(b) The petitioner's present and former places of residence;

(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse;

(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner shall state the date and place of his/her marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship and residence of his/her spouse; and if his marriage is annulled, the date of decree of annulment of marriage and the court which granted the same;

(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and birthplace and residences of his/her children ;

(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act;

(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public charge; and

(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever any prince, potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the country of which the applicant is a citizen or subject.

(2) The application shall be accompanied by:

(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate;

(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native born certificate of residence;

(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the death certificate of his spouse, if widowed, or the court decree annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;

(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth certificates, alien certificate of registration or native born certificate of residence if any, of petitioner's minor children, wherever applicable;

(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and sworn statements on the good moral character of the petitioner by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of good reputation in his/her place of residence stating that they have personally known the petitioner for at least a period of ten (10) years and that said petitioner has in their own opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act;

(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and that he/she is not afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS);

(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the petitioner in the schools he attended in the Philippines. Should the petitioner have minor children, a certification that his children are enrolled in a school where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and are part of the curriculum; and

(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the past three (3) years.

Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. - There shall be constituted a Special Committee on Naturalization herein referred to as the "Committee", with the Solicitor General as chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or his representative, and the National Security Adviser, as members, with the power to approve, deny or reject applications for naturalization as provided in this Act.

The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to consider applications for naturalization. For this purpose, the chairman and members shall receive an honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00), respectively, per meeting attended.

Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that he has all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, may file an application for naturalization with the secretariat of the Special Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition shall be stamped to indicate the date of filing and a corresponding docket number. Within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the petition, the Committee shall determine whether the petition is complete in substance and in form. If such petition is complete, the Committee shall immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition indicating the name, qualifications and other personal circumstances of the applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area. The Committee shall immediately furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil registrar of the petitioner's place of residence and tile National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition and its supporting documents. These agencies shall have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area in their buildings, offices and premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee a report stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material information which might be adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship.

If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of the agencies which were furnished a copy of the petition or the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever comes in later, the Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material information it has received pertaining to the petition, and may, for the purpose call the petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition and its annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its annexes.

If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information.

Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it shall approve the petition and henceforth, notify the petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the same.

Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the notice of the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, forthwith, a certificate of naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the certificate, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment of the required naturalization processing fee and certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to take the abovementioned oath of allegiance within said period of time, the approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.

Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken his oath of allegiance as required in the preceding section, the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's oath to the proper local civil registrar. Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien certificates of registration of the applicant.

Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization in cancellation of applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows: Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the BI subject to the requirements of existing laws.

Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in the following cases:

(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false statement or misrepresentation or committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in connection with the petition for naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled;

(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor children who acquire Filipino citizenship by virtue of his naturalization shall, within five (5) years next following the grant of Philippine citizenship, establish permanent residence in a foreign country, that individual's certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person's remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of origin, or two (2) years in any foreign country, shall be considered prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside therein;

(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a condition for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked; and

(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national security, the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.

In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall make an express renunciation of his title or membership in this order of nobility before the Special Committee or its duly authorized representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the records of his application for citizenship.

Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate issued under this proceeding for the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a naturalization certificate in violation of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO) and by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and in the case that the person convicted is a naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not earlier cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered cancelled.

Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned city or municipal civil registrar may, within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, file a petition for the acquisition of the Philippine citizenship: Provided, That the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act and subject to the requirements of existing laws.

Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of the Philippines Law Center and another twenty-five percent (25%) shall be allotted for the publication of the Journal of the House of Representatives. Said amount shall be treated as receipts automatically appropriated.

Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be needed for the proper implementation of the provisions of this Act.

Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the part, section or provision not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and effect.

Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd)

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate

(Sgd)

FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives

(Sgd)

LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd)

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: June 08, 2001

(Sgd)

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

↧

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.

August 16, 2019, 8:30 pm

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Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate

JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by the the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: August 29, 2003

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

↧

BENGZON V, SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE (1991)

August 17, 2019, 4:54 am

≫ Next: the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

≪ Previous: AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,

vs.

THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.

Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.

The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:

14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, among others:

(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...

x x x x x x x x x

(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.

(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint.

(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government;

(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);

(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.

x x x x x x x x x

On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.

Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees — like what petitioners seek — from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.

The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government...

x x x x x x x x x

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

x x x x x x x x x

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.

xxx xxxx xxx

In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.

I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:

"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work."

Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:

"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government."

The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.

xxx xxxx xxx

Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."

Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:

12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue.

Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious statements.

Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:

Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:

Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own conclusion.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:

x x x x x x x x x

WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;

WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban workers;

WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.

Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:

... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.

In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:

Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22

In another case —

... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25thus —

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran,26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the Sandiganbayan

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.

The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative — investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.

The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?

The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)

Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)

The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:

Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.

First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?

Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of another branch of government?

And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?

The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).

The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co, Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.

Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:

The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)

The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The same court which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private contract may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these and many other questions.

In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.

... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected that the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.

The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution contained no avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of public office the duties of which were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)

The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:

Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.

And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]

The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.

Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]

The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue from information derived from such inquiry.

The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.

United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]

The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the indictment arose was not in furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or recommendations for legislation.

United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)

Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that Congress must secure information in order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional powers to act. — (Emphasis Supplied)

The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission.

The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the United State Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. (Id., at 48)

On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure. (Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).

Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more imperative.

Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.

The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not keep any of the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede to exercise it.

It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.

The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.

In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually exclusive. They may complement each other.

... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).

In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.

The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional consideration, in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...

I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.

The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.

The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.

What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.

Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.

In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was he released.

As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also premature.

I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also secret and hidden.

I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.

In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.

More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.

The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law.

The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A. No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:

Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation. Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one in which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.

While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at bar.

Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.

# Separate Opinions